SLIDE 10: PILOT BONUS LONG TERM TAKE RATES

If airline projections are correct, and I have no reason to question them, there's no end in sight. Commercial airline hiring projections dwarf my command's-and the service's-pilot population. The DOD inventory of pilots whose initial flight school commitment expires over the next few years does not even come close to projected airline demands, further increasing the marketability of separating pilots. Today, the Air Force is over 1,000 pilots short. That shortage is projected to rise to almost 2,000 by fiscal year 2002, a shortage which will be absorbed, proportionately, by my command. Considering the easily transferable large airframe, multi-engine skills of my command's pilots, this should not be surprising. The exodus will draw the Air Force 15 percent below requirements, a foreboding statistic for a force (and a nation) with the global interests and responsibilities of ours. (See Slide #11).

SLIDE 11: AIRLINE HIRING VS. LOSSES

But the implications of this pilot "exodus" for AMC's warfighting readiness extend far beyond mere numbers and statistics. First, many of the pilots who depart are the most experienced, capable aviators in my flying units. They fly the toughest, most demanding missions, and frequently make the difference between success and failure. Second, these same men and women make up my instructor force, the cadre of my aviators responsible for training new crewmembers. As our instructor force shrinks, training an increasingly younger replacement force becomes even more challenging. Training programs take longer to complete, the list of crewmembers awaiting upgrade grows, and the few instructors who remain must take even more of the training burden on their shoulders. . . in short, straining the resources of both training and operational squadrons in an aviation "Catch-22".

Regrettably, it has also proven unwise to take as "truth" the notion that pilots who've remained in service through their initial commitments will press on with us. Prior to 1995 only 1 in 14 pilots in a given year group between the 14th and 19th years of service left the Air Force. Last year that number rose to 1 in 4. This development poses an additional threat to our experience levels, and therefore to the credibility and capability of our force. We very much need the flexibility the S.4 bill provides by allowing us to offer bonuses to pilots beyond 14 years of service. . . these are THE most experienced pilots in the Air Force.

There is much more to the mobility officer corps than pilots. Two other examples well worth examining are AMC's transportation and maintenance career fields. At first blush, both appear well manned, at 110 percent and 120 percent respectively. However, the numbers are deceiving: the statistics are bloated with overmanning in the most junior ranks, our Lieutenants, Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels... the mid- and senior-level officers responsible for most of the critical dayto-day decisions out on "the line", are seriously undermanned. In reality, without the numbers that our most junior, most inexperienced officers provide, AMC has consistently been manned below 80 percent. The downward trend continues in the transporters, and there is only a glimmer of improvement in our maintainer corps. (See Slides #12 and #13).

Enlisted retention is just as disconcerting. AMC's first term reenlistment rate today is 49 percent, down 10 percent since fiscal year 1993. More alarming, our sec

Now, in this warfighting equation, every one of our aircraft is important, but today, the C-5 is essential. Without a doubt, it is currently Air Mobility Command's Center of Gravity, especially when considered in the context of our C-141/C-17 transition. Any C-5 shortfall directly jeopardizes this Nation's outsize/oversize cargo delivery capability. By way of explanation, "outsize/oversize" equipment is the big

equipment that the CINCS need most critically in the early days of a conflict... helicopters, Patriot batteries, Bradley Fighting Vehicles-equipment that won't fit in any aircraft other than a C-5 or C-17. The criticality is that in the early “halting phase" of a major theater war, as much as 70 percent of a regional warfighting CINC's cargo requirements are outsized/oversized equipment. So, as we translate that warfighting requirement into required strategic airlift capability, as the C-5's "Mission Capable" numbers continue to decline, AMC's ability to deliver to the warfighter the tools he needs to fight the initial stage of a conflict becomes ever more seriously jeopardized.

The second challenge we will face with our new C-5/C-17 Strategic Airlift mix is the fact that the resultant lower number of aircraft available (we are replacing 270 C-141s w/ only 135 C-17s) will detract significantly from AMC's ability to respond, and flexibility in responding, to this nation's "peacetime" commitments. The sheer number of taskings we are required to meet on a day-to-day basis-disaster relief in China or Central/South America, humanitarian disaster responses in Africa, even relief efforts within the United States itself-demand an unprecedented flexibility. While lift capacity metrics such as MTM/D are reasonably accurate metrics for determining whether or not AMC can support and sustain the warfighting CINCS in major theater war (MTW) scenarios, they are not sufficient to address (alone) our present-day, collective, global mobility, 'warfighting and peacetime' operations tempo. In essence, today's commitments demand that we combine "heavyweight" strength with "middleweight" speed and flexibility.

As I suggested earlier, AMC's maintenance troops are also cannibalizing parts at a significantly increasing rate, just to keep their jets flying. Simply stated, we're taking parts from some aircraft to keep others airborne "band aid" fixes that offer immediate relief, but which invariably come back to haunt both maintainers and operators. In fiscal year 1998, AMC maintainers cannibalized an average of 54 parts per 100 C-5 sorties. This number doesn't mean much by itself. However, in fiscal year 1997, the number was 46. The year before the rate was 42 parts per 100 sorties. When examined in this light, especially when one considers how stretched our C-5 maintainers are already as they try to deal daily with the combined effects of the constant demand for their product and it's current 61 percent MC rate, the numbers are very disconcerting. This is basically a 13 percent increase since fiscal year 1995. Not to be outdone, the C-130 has also witnessed a similarly significant rise in its cannibalization rates. (See Slides #7 & #8).