He may be right and he may not be. Go ahead.

General POWELL. The only point I would make is we are coming down from a very large number to a much smaller number. We have never been able in the administration and Congress to solve this problem of mobility associated with the land-based leg. So we are getting our mobility at sea. For the most part, these forces are paid for. There are savings, obviously, if you were to make the force smaller, but they are not huge savings, because this is for the most part sunk costs.

As has often been said, strategic weapons have tended to be cheap in terms of what you get from them in terms of deterrence.

DESIGNING THE BASE FORCE

Senator BUMPERS. Mr. Chairman, you see this chart right here? General POWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator BUMPERS. You remember that one?

General POWELL. Very well, sir.

Senator BUMPERS. Well, that chart is exactly the one that we looked at in this subcommittee before the Soviet Union dissolved. General POWELL. Yes, sir.

Senator BUMPERS. There have been no changes in downsizing. This was after Eastern Europe fell and nothing has changed since the Soviet Union has collapsed. That seems sort of strange to me, but I would just be interested in hearing your comments.

General POWELL. We did not design that force for the situation that existed at the time we designed it. When Secretary Cheney and I started working on this in the fall of 1989 and early 1990, we drew up a set of assumptions about the kind of world we thought we were in. And I went back through those charts recently. We anticipated at that time that the changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union which we could just then begin to see were going to be of an historic nature, revolutionary proportions. Those assumptions included: No Warsaw Pact; not only no Warsaw Pact, but independence for those Eastern European nations; the reunification of Germany.

We had numbers that said the Soviet conventional forces would probably be cut in half, a 40-percent reduction in spending. So they were rather bold assumptions. Mr. Cheney would thump me all the time. We had some fascinating debates, saying: Well, suppose it does not happen? Well, we will protect ourselves by having offramps. So as we start down toward this base force, if the world does not turn out to be as favorable as we had thought, if these events do not transpire in the Soviet Union, we can get up, building back up or not going down as far.

So the base force was designed for a situation of revolutionary change. Now, even we could not have anticipated how revolutionary those changes were going to become. But the fundamental underpinning concept is still sound. The numbers we are going down to are still in our judgment good numbers to go down to. We do not see significant evidence to suggest that we ought to bust those numbers in any significant way.

The various proposals that are out, principally Mr. Aspin's proposals, frankly frighten me to death. I am not sure which one Mr. Aspin ultimately will recommend, but he has one that cuts that by

another quarter million, another quarter million reservists. He has another one that goes down even more radically.

I do not think those are prudent judgments. We are not going to get to that number for another 2 years. So it is really not useful at this point to just come out with a program of a month every month as a result of what happened in Moscow the past weekend.

So I am still committed to the proposition that we ought to come down gradually over time, hit those numbers earlier than we thought, probably in the period 1995, and then continue the debate with the Congress, take a look at how the world situation changes over the next year or two. And I can assure you, Senator, if the world situation continues to change in a favorable way and if the Chiefs and the Secretary and I come to a judgment that we can make further reductions, we are going to make further reductions. I do not want to spend a dollar more than is necessary for the Nation's security. But I also do not want to put the Nation's security at risk because we seem to be the only piggybank in town and we are the only ones to solve every problem in the world from acne to the deficit.

Senator BUMPERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your indulgence.

U.S. PRESENCE IN ASIA

Senator INOUYE. I thank you.

Senator Bumpers suggested that the Germans might invite us to leave. That reminded me of current events. Right now we are busily moving out of Subic, and yet 10 days ago I received an official letter and a call from the Philippine Ambassador, from the official emissary of the President, President Aquino, literally begging that we stop the dismantling of Subic, suggesting that there is going to be an election in May and things are going to change: We do not want you to leave.

And I said: Put it in writing. So I sent one to your Secretary and one to the Secretary of State and the President.

So it just bears out what you have been saying: Everywhere where we have been, including the Philippines, on the one hand they tell us to leave, but on the other hand they whisper in our ears: For heaven's sake, do not leave us.

General POWELL. The interesting thing about the Philippines is we tried to convince them for a long period of time that it was in their interest for us to remain, but they made the judgment and they gave us the termination notice, and we are terminating. If the election turns out differently before our departure, then we would consider that. But right now we are on a 1-year withdrawal program.

Interestingly, Senator, a number of our other friends have come forward and said: We really do not want you to leave from the western Pacific and Eastern Asia region. So we are having a little bit of presence in Singapore. Our friends in Malaysia and Indonesia are inviting us in. They do not want to see us go all the way back to Hawaii or to the west coast of the United States.

Forward presence is influence. Forward presence is for the purpose of stability, not just in our interest but in their interest as well.

DEFENSE PLANNING GUIDANCE SCENARIOS

Senator INOUYE. You brought up the matter of Lithuania, the recent events, and I thought I would ask this question. I realize that traditional force planning and acquisition programs and weapons usually depend upon the identification of threats. You have scenarios of possible threats and how U.S. troops would be deployed to meet such threats.

There was an article just a few days ago on seven possible_scenarios. It supposedly came out of your shop, and they range from North Korea invading the south and we coming to the aid of Lithuania. Are these scenarios that somebody dreamed up or did it come out of your shop?

General POWELL. They came out of my shop, working with the Secretary's policy officials and analytical officials. What they represent are some scenarios that can be used by the programmers and planners in the services to make judgments about what we need to be doing with respect to purchases of supplies, and what we need in the way of sustainment for power projection forces.

But they do not reflect any belief that the Armed Forces are going to be fighting in Lithuania. They reflect the belief that it is prudent for us to plan for the possibility of a contingency somewhere in Europe that might involve U.S. forces. We are not hoping for one and we are not looking for one to justify the budget.

Just as we plan for a contingency in Southwest Asia, not with Iraq or Iran, but just in that neighborhood, that is where danger exists. We ought to be prepared. I cannot believe that the New York Times or the Washington Post were shocked to learn that we were planning on how we might fight a war in Korea. The news would have been, headline: "Pentagon and Powell and Cheney doing no planning." We ought to be courtmartialed. That is what we are supposed to do, Mr. Chairman.

So we get accused when we do not have scenarios, and when we do have scenarios the scenarios are ripped apart as being unreasonable, warlike, and the musings and machinations of a bunch of old generals in the Pentagon. Well, that is what we do get paid to do. We get paid to plan and anticipate unpleasant things in the world that the Armed Forces of the United States may be called upon to deal with.

PREPOSITIONING IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

Senator INOUYE. One small item. I do not have it in my questions here, but watching your presentation, you had these prepositioned equipments. I presume it is in [deleted]?

General POWELL. We have some stocks prepositioned in [deleted] on the ground, not ground force units but some Air Force stocks. Senator INOUYE. Will you get approval from them to continue to preposition?

General POWELL. We are continuing to work with the Saudis to do more prepositioning, but we have some approval and some of our things are still left from Desert Storm. We have not concluded all our agreements. We have agreements with Kuwait and we are prepositioning about a brigade's worth of equipment in Kuwait. We have an agreement with Bahrain. We have some agreements with

Oman. We are working with Qatar, the UAE, and we are continuing to work with Saudi Arabia.

What you saw on the chart were the three Marine maritime prepositioning squadrons. We have some afloat prepositioned stocks for the Army and the Air Force. Our new initiative is to put afloat the heavy Army brigade. One of the things we lacked in Saudi Arabia was the ability to get a heavy unit in there early. We think this will take care of that problem for the future requirement.

Senator INOUYE. Finally, when you came up with the problem you have in not being able to predict the future, I could not help but recall that in January 1990 we were all set to retire General Schwartzkopf and to dismantle the Central Command. We were all prepared to set up a trade fair in Baghdad to sell the Iraqis computer technology and aerospace technology, and some of my colleagues thought that Saddam Hussein was a possible path to

peace.

So I concur with you, this is a very unpredictable world, and if we are not ready we may be in a bigger mess than what we are. So you will find me supporting you. I want to thank you for your candor.

It has been a good afternoon. I am sorry that we had all of these interruptions, but I hope we can continue this dialog as we move along.

Senator BUMPERS. Mr. Chairman, before we leave may I ask one additional question?

Senator INOUYE. Sure

SOVIET THREAT

Senator BUMPERS. General, I was questioning a moment ago about the Soviet threat and the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. In the last issue of Soviet Military Power, which the Pentagon published in 1990, here is what it stated about the Soviet Union, that:

They represent the most dangerous challenge to our national security. The military might of the Soviet Union is enormous and remains targeted on the United States and its allies. All evidence indicates that this fact will not change.

Well now, obviously everything has changed very dramatically, much more so than you, I, or anybody else could possibly have anticipated. But it takes me back to the question I asked you a moment ago: that the chart remains the same as it did in 1990, when the Pentagon said they were a threat and you anticipated they would stay the same.

All I am saying is that gives Les Aspin some pretty good ammunition for his proposal.

Senator INOUYE. If I may interrupt at that point. It would give Les Aspin a lot of ammo if he can tell us what is going to happen to Yeltsin next week or what is going to be happening to all of these new republics out there and the unhappy troops out there. General POWELL. One, I will not claim authorship of the statement. And at the time it was written, the Soviet Union was still a very powerful country, with a heck of a capability available to it. But in 1990, the same time that we were watching that situation

and still able to observe Soviet military power of the kind described in that manual, we could not see the future.

My own concept at that time was driven to a large extent by my previous 2 years' experience as National Security Advisor to President Reagan. I came from being a corps commander in Germany, minding my own business

Senator BUMPERS. Those were happier days.

General POWELL. In 1986, Senator, I was a happy corps_commander, watching the Red Army on the other side of the Fulda Gap. That was my corps. I had the most important military job in Europe, guarding the narrowest point of Germany against the 8th Guards Army and the 1st Guards Tank Army.

Then suddenly I found myself in the White House on 3 days' notice, really. Frank Carlucci said: Come back, you have got to be Deputy National Security Advisor. Then in the next 2 years I was Deputy National Security Advisor and National Security Advisor. I met Mr. Gorbachev and I visited the Soviet Union four times and saw him a total of five times and went to three summits between Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan.

I met Marshal Akhromeyev, I met a number of Soviet officials. I studied, I listened, and the conclusion I came to is that this place is rotten, it is falling apart. They have this huge capability, it is there, but it is falling apart, and this man Gorbachev knows it.

The first time I ever met him was with George Shultz and we were in the Hall of Saint Catherine, and Gorbachev leaned over to Mr. Shultz and said: "I do not know how long I can do this. I do not know how long I will last a year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, 5 years. It does not make any difference; we are on a course to change. We have to change. We have no choice."

And I looked at him, because 12 months earlier I had been at the Fulda Gap and now my archenemy was telling me: Powell, I am going to change the rules on you.

My last meeting with Mr. Gorbachev as National Security Advisor was at Governor's Island, December, early December 1988, when he made the famous "I am going to cut 500,000" announcement to the UN and came over to Governor's Island in New York Harbor to have a last meeting with President Reagan and then President-elect Bush. And he leaned across the table then and said to President Reagan and Vice President Bush, he said:

I know people say that this is all a trick to deceive you, that this is all a game so I can get an advantage in Europe. But I am telling you I am playing real politics. A revolution is underway. You do not believe me now, but you will see it.

So, Senator, when I became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 9 months, 10 months, after that meeting on Governor's Island, not expecting to be, I had gone off to Atlanta, GA, to another wonderful command that only lasted 6 months, and then got brought back to be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I came to that position on the October 1, 1989, having witnessed the beginning of these revolutionary changes.

Secretary Cheney and I began work that very same month, October 1989, to see how we should start structuring ourselves. And it was in 1990, at the same time that we were accurately representing the way the world still was, that for the first time in a long time a Secretary of Defense stood up and said: We are going