Gorbachev committed the Soviet Union to ending the cold war in 1988.

Mr. Chairman, there are 55 programs on that list for the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps representing 9 different ship types, 12 aircraft types, 2 combat vehicle programs, and 23 missile and ordnance programs.

Some of those programs were canceled in reaction to external events. The majority of these 55 programs were terminated as part of a considered and aggressive strategy for bringing naval means in line with America's new ends, and for doing so in a way that makes responsible, cost-effective use of our national resources.

In addition, we have removed 46 ships from our active inventory since January 1991 and, as we meet today, we are currently decommissioning, on average, 3 ships every 2 weeks.

Our strategy calls for future naval forces that are restructured as well as re-sized-that are not just old wine in new bottles. It is a strategy embodied in the President's base force. It is a strategy that provides the right Navy and Marine Corps to the National Command Authority, that makes our extraordinary people, I repeat, our extraordinary people our highest priority, and that recognizes the Navy and Marine Corps' 200 year old responsibility to, as you say, Mr. Chairman, be ready in the world's trouble spots even when the Nation's attention is focused elsewhere.

But why is that important? After all, in some quarters it has become an article of faith that the United States is unlikely to find itself in a war or even a significant armed conflict any time in the next 10 or 20 years. That might be true, Mr. Chairman, but only, only I submit, if we make it true-only as long as America's forces are so capable, so ready, so visible, and so versatile that no armed aggressor will risk provoking a conflict with us.

Our short-sightedness, our failure, as you noted in your opening comments, in the past, to be ready and to be seen as ready have cost us dearly over these years, and have led us down the path to Pearl Harbor, to Korea, and Desert One. As Secretary Cheney has so often said, we have done this before and we have never gotten it right.

Mr. Chairman, this the fifth time I have sat at this table. Over those years I have made it my business here not to be a mere promoter of naval services-not just a tout for sea power. As I see it, the American people rely on you, sitting in Congress, to make the hard decisions on how best to provide for their safety and for the protection of their vital interests.

And they rely on me as the civilian leader of the Department of the Navy; Admiral Kelso, as the uniformed leader; and General Mundy as the leader of our Marine Corps, to offer you our best, most considered advice.

In offering that advice, I have no interest in preserving the Navy and Marine Corps of the 1980's. I have no interest in spending the taxpayers' money on any capabilities that do not serve this Nation's needs.

The budget statement that I have submitted to you reflects our convictions about what kind of naval forces America must have for the future and how best to provide them. It reflects my conviction

as well that forward-deployed and combat-ready naval forces of the Navy and the Marine Corps are right for these times.

They are right for influencing global events, right for responding to regional crises, and right for proving that America has not lost interest in what happens in this world. There are a number of evolving issues that concern me, including the future of our defense industrial base and the need to draw down our infrastructure to match our operational forces. Working in cooperation with one another, I am convinced that we will solve these issues.

NAVY PRIORITIES

But in the meantime, I do not intend to deviate from this Department's two highest priorities, the same ones that I have had now for 4 years, and I would like to close by stating them once again for the record.

First, we absolutely must take proper care of our uniformed people. They are the heart and soul of this Nation's ability to project its power and its influence anywhere in the world. And by the sacrifices they have assumed, they have earned, I believe, our uncompromising support.

Second, we must maintain the operational readiness of our naval forces. I have said it many times, it makes little difference how many ships, how many squadrons and battalions we deploy if they are not properly manned, properly equipped, and properly trained and prepared to respond immediately when the leaders of the United States are forced to place us again in harm's way.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

After the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps make their statements I will be happy to respond to your questions.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The statement follows:]

JOINT STATEMENT OF HON. H. LAWRENCE GARRETT III, ADM. FRANK B. KELSO II, AND GEN. CARL E. MUNDY, JR.

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is our pleasure to appear today to review the posture of the Department of the Navy. You may recall that in the past, separate reports were submitted to you by the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We have departed from that practice this year by providing a unified statement incorporating the combined vision of the Department's civilian and military leadership. This move reflects our conviction that America's naval power requirements in the post-Cold War world increasingly call for closely coordinated Navy and Marine Corps policies. It also reflects our determination to provide quality naval forces for this Nation in a way that responsibly shares national resources with other urgent budget priorities.

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet empire have offered the United States an historic opportunity to reshape its strategy and military forces. The risk of global superpower confrontation has virtually disappeared; the types of conflict in which the United States might become involved in the future are likely to be regional, sudden, and widely dispersed. The President's National Security Strategy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy underscore this fact and emphasize the fundamental requirement for forces that are positioned forward for rapid response to crises. The Base Force concept that evolves from and is organized around the National Military Strategy seeks to protect enduring American interests, both political and economic, without reliance on the large-scale forward basing of United States forces that characterized the last forty years.

The Navy and the Marine Corps have already begun adapting to this changed world; they have begun a careful, deliberate effort both to reduce and restructure their forces. They will continue, however, to be the strongest naval forces in the world, and they will do so by concentrating their resources on force quality and readiness--even over force structure.

That's because the Nation must be able to rely on a ready, expeditionary Navy and Marine Corps in both peace and war. As in the past, preserving stability and restraining the emergence of aggressive regional powers in areas of importance to the United States will remain key United States national security objectives. The Nation will continue to need forces with a flexible mix of power projection capabilities, self-sufficiency in logistics and self-defense, and the capability to operate effectively with other United States and allied military services. These expeditionary forces must be available on short notice to protect United States interests abroad with minimum reliance on foreign bases or access agreements. Finally, the forces which the United States retains in strength should be those which have the greatest utility for both peacetime and wartime missions.

Expeditionary, combat-ready naval forces are likely to be held principally responsible for a wide range of post-Cold War national security missions and objectives. No other nation's permission is required for United States naval forces to operate in international waters. No nation has the power to prevent United States naval forces from establishing and maintaining local control of any littoral area when needed. The Navy and the Marine Corps have the ability to dominate anywhere at sea, to project influence far inland, and to intervene ashore whenever called on to protect United States interests.

A key point in today's strategic environment is that naval forces are above all else enabling components of our nation's joint, multi-service military strategy. Forward-positioned Nuvy and Marine Corps forces can respond quickly to regional crises; once there, they are often the "wedge" which opens the way for full-scale joint military or humanitarian operations.

America has, at the moment, the highest quality Navy and Marine Corps in history, thanks to the will, foresight, and investment of the American people. The goal of the Department of the Navy is, above all, to preserve that essential quality --even as the Navy and Marine Corps re-size and reorganize themselves to meet tomorrow's strategic requirements. The Department's leaders have proceeded on the principle that United States naval forces cannot be considered in isolation. They exist to serve the National Military Strategy, which in turn supports the Nation's bedrock interests and objectives. They should be part of a menu of capabilities that America's unified military commanders can use to organize joint and combined operational task forces whenever necessary. The Navy and Marine Corps objective, in short, is to provide--at an affordable cost--those essential capabilities that naval forces are uniquely able to contribute in support of the Nation's security. America's national strategy can only succeed if United States naval forces are ready, capable, and potent.

The National Security Environment

New and Enduring Challenges

America's security agenda was dominated for over four decades by the specter of a hostile and powerful communist empire. The United States met that challenge successfully; and in the last three years, the Nation has seen the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the liberation of eastern Europe, the bankruptcy of communist ideology worldwide, and the end of the Soviet Union itself.

The end of the Cold War has offered the United States, its allies, and its former adversaries an historic opportunity to reshape their national priorities and build new, constructive relationships. But, at the same time, the end of the Cold War has created new security challenges, and left other strategic realities unchanged.

The old geopolitical landscape--dominated by a hostile superpower with global military capabilities--provided a predictable and tangible focal point for United States defense planning. That focus is gone, and the new landscape is characterized by much more diverse concerns, among them:

the proliferation of non-conventional weapons and associated delivery systems among regional powers;

the intensification of historic conflicts between ethnic, religious, and political groups in key regions of the world;

the continuing need--in a multipolar, economically interdependent world --to maintain freedom of the seas and safe seaborne commerce;

demographic pressures associated with overpopulation, refugee crises, and unmet economic aspirations;

the struggle to improve the human condition throughout the world, especially in lesser developed countries;

drug trafficking and related problems; and

the international community's expectation that the United States will continue to provide stable, positive, and visible leadership in an uncertain and unpredictable world.

Many of these concerns demand the application of traditional naval and expeditionary capabilities which require little or no obtrusive foreign basing, which can be inserted and withdrawn with relative ease; which are self-sustaining and combat ready, which are mobile, positioned forward, and immediately responsive; and which can provide a wide range of military options from mere presence up to --and over-the threshold of total war.

Indeed, the ability of forward-deployed naval forces to respond quickly to all types of overseas crises has been called upon in over 200 separate situations since World War II; and peacetime American governments have required naval forces to support national objectives and defend United States interests around the globe since before 1812.

The Navy and the Marine Corps are especially at home in today's fluid, multipolar environment. Although the United States will continue to support its traditional alliances in Europe and the Far East, the National Security Strategy is shifting from an emphasis on fixed forward defense against a continental superpower to flexible forward positioning of forces designed to shape and influence overseas regional events.

Regional cooperation in military security exercises, in peacekeeping forces, and in formally chartered coalition naval forces will come to be an increasingly important part of United States military operations. Many of those operations will take place within traditional alliances, although burdens will be more and more equitably shared among those partners. Other multinational naval operations will be of a less traditional, ad hoc nature, reflecting the rise of powerful regional and transregional threats and contingencies.

The Navy and Marine Corps are shaping their forces and doctrines to emphasize the unique, inherent capabilities that they can contribute to the National Command Authorities. We stress here the word "contribute," for Desert Storm proved decisively that a commander in chief must be able to select from among all the military tools at his disposal, and he must be able to rely on those tools to complement one another in joint, cooperative operations. Furthermore, the likelihood that post-Cold War international crises will affect the interests of more than one country increases the importance of coalition operations with allied and friendly nations.

In any event, there must be no doubt about American superiority at sea in the minds of friends or potential adversaries. The United States must maintain naval forces of sufficient size and capability to meet the Nation's needs, to inspire confidence among United States allies, and to discourage or defeat future threats to regional peace and freedom of the seas.

Foundations of National Strategy

Navy and Marine Corps strategic planning seeks to maintain balanced naval capabilities for the defense of national interests and objectives against a range of possible threats. They intend to do so, furthermore, in the most economic way possible without compromising the effectiveness of America's naval forces.

The President's National Security Strategy of the United States defines our national interests and articulates the underpinnings of the post-Cold War national strategy. The four foundations of this strategy are expanded upon in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy and have direct application to naval forces:

Forward Presence. The visible presence of United States military forces in regions vital to national interests is key to averting crises, preventing wars, and demonstrating American participation in global affairs. United States forces deployed overseas show American commitment, lend weight to its alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a rapid crisis