quite as bad as some of the doomsayers were suggesting it might be.

Well, we have not conducted a study, but we have conducted a post-Desert Storm survey, and I am happy to report that at least through December 31, the retention rate for National Guardsmen and reservists who were activated, who were called to active duty, has been as high or higher than the rate for those who were not activated. This pattern holds true for both officers and enlisted. And remarkably enough, it holds true for all major occupational categories, including health care categories.

As I see it, Mr. Chairman, it is essential and critical that we retain this type of high quality. If we do, we are never going to have to worry about whether they are equal to the challenges of what we all know to be a very uncertain future. I very much look forward to working with the committee and explaining what we are doing and working with you in achieving the best total force that we can obtain for the future.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to respond to your questions.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN M. DUNCAN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity to once again discuss the current capabilities and future needs of the Reserve components. I do so today, of course, in the context of both the President's regional defense strategy, and the Administration's Defense budget request for fiscal year (FY) 1993.

This is the fifth consecutive year in which I have been privileged to report on the condition of our Reserve forces. The relevance and the importance of their condition is not an abstract matter of curiosity. It is a question the answer to which directly affects the security of the nation.

To say that circumstances have changed since I first addressed the capabilities and needs of the Reserve components, is to press the art of understatement to the limits. The President has observed that the new era we have entered is one whose outline would have been unimaginable as recently as 1988. During a period of less than 22 years, the Reserve forces of the United States have contributed substantially to the successful armed conflict in Panama; they were critical to the magnificent victory in the Gulf War; they have shared in the glory of the historic end of the Cold War; they have assumed major responsibilities in the nation's fight against the epidemic of illegal drugs; they have engaged in a wide range of routine peacetime operations; and, in many other ways they have formed a vital part of what the President described last year as "the finest fighting force this nation has ever known in its history."

Now we must mobilize our best thinking and our energies to the challenges which the Reserve forces will face in the remaining years of this century and beyond-a future in which the risks and threats to our security will be characterized by ambiguity and rapid change, rather than by the relative certainty of the past. As we shape the Reserve forces of the future, we cannot afford to be diverted by collateral matters. Success will depend upon a steady focus on, and continuing improvement of the fundamental, practical factors that permitted the outstanding performance of our National Guardsmen and Reservists in the Gulf War.

Because of the historically unprecedented use of Reserve forces during the last year and the uniqueness of many of the challenges which the Reserve components will face in the future, my Statement this year is more comprehensive than in previous years. I trust that its usefulness will be commensurate with its detail.

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

When I testified before you last year, I noted that in the preceding few months, the nation's reliance on Reserve forces had been tested in ways that were unprecedented since the adoption of the Total Force Policy. Units and individuals from each of the Reserve components were performing a broad range of missions that were es

sential to what Secretary of Defense Cheney has called "one of the most lopsided victories in modern history."

Because my testimony last year included a lengthy discussion of the nature and scope of the mobilization and deployment of Reserve forces in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and because the Department of Defense has only recently prepared its final Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict pursuant to Title V, Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102–25), I will limit my remarks here to certain specific subjects which I have not recently addressed, or which are the focus of current attention with the Department. By way of introduction to those subjects, I will merely summarize our use of Reserve forces in the Gulf conflict.

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm involved the largest mobilization and deployment of Reserve component forces since the Korean War and the first Presidential authorization to call up Reserve forces, in over two decades. More than 231,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists from all of the military Services were ordered to active duty pursuant to the provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 673 and 673b. Thousands of others_volunteered. Approximately 106,000 served in the Kuwait Theater of Operations. Reserve forces participated in all phases of the Persian Gulf crisis, from the initial response through the redeployment of forces. They performed vital missions, including combat missions, combat support missions, and combat service support missions. They also performed many administrative functions. Many others served at bases in the United States and in other parts of the world as backfill for deploying Active component personnel. Some 72 Reservists gave their lives in the conflict.

By any standard, the activation, deployment, and performance of the Reserve components were extraordinarily successful. In his recent testimony before the Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was again emphatic in his praise of Reserve forces: "Make no mistake-our Total Force Policy is alive and well! This was clearly demonstrated during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Guard and Reserves were critical to the success of the mission-we simply could not have done it without them.”

Lieutenant General Gus Pagonis, the former Commanding General, 22d Theater Army Area Command, USCENTCOM, Saudi Arabia, and several other field commanders with whom I have talked, have privately confirmed and emphasized General Powell's observation.

POST-ACTIVATION TRAINING OF LARGE GROUND COMBAT MANEUVER UNITS

While the use of Reserve forces in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was highly successful, it was not totally free of problems, and we will be studying our experiences in the conflict for some time. The lessons that have been learned to date are largely positive, in nature and they reinforce the conclusion that only marginal changes are needed to ensure that the Reserve components can effectively support future contingencies with the same quality of performance.

The nature and the amount of post-activation training for National Guard and Reserve units did, of course, vary from unit to unit and it depended upon a number of factors, such as the nature of the missions assigned to specific units, the training readiness condition of the units, and the levels of organization in the units that had been maintained in peacetime. There were also instances where post-activation development of certain individual skills was necessary because of the use of new equipment or the unique requirements of theater-specific missions. Generally speaking, units of the Reserve components that deployed outside of the United States were ready on schedule and the timing and sequence of their deployment was determined by the needs of the theater commanders and similar factors, rather than by post-activation training requirements.

One problem that has received a disproportionate and in my opinion unjustified amount of attention, involves the post mobilization training of large, ground combat maneuver units under the Army's "roundout" concept. The idea of "roundout" is, of course, to use an Army National Guard or Reserve brigade to "roundout" an Active component division which includes two Active component brigades. Three Army National Guard roundout brigades were called to active duty in connection with Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The 48th Infantry Brigade was activated on November 30, 1990. It was certified as combat ready for the Persian Gulf conflict on February 28, 1991, the same day that the temporary cease fire was entered into. It would have been deployed had the war continued. According to the recent testimony of the Army Chief of Staff, the other two brigades (the 155th Armor Brigade and the 256th Infantry Brigade) were making progress in their post

activation training and would have been certified as combat ready if the war had continued.

In my opinion, many broad and incorrect conclusions about the mobilization of the three brigades have skewed the debate about the future utility of roundout brigades generally. While it is true that the post-mobilization training of these three brigades was not completed in sufficient time to permit them to participate in a ground war that lasted only 100 hours, that fact should not mask the high motivation and general competence of the soldiers in the brigades. It is also true that the Army's experience with the brigades demonstrated the need for a more accurate measurement of true combat readiness-and I am continuing to urge the development of a more operationally based standard-but that fact should not obscure the recognition that the brigades could have been made ready for less demanding conflicts in a shorter period of time.

In recent months, the subject of the mobilization of the three roundout brigades has been studied in depth by the Government Accounting Office, the Army Inspector General, and by various other groups within the Department of Defense. As a result, there is a much broader understanding of the fact that large, ground combat maneuver units such as armor or mechanized infantry brigades, require significant training subsequent to activation. The peacetime readiness of such units is a function not only of resource levels, leadership and motivation, but also of the amount of pre-mobilization training they have received in the synchronization and integration of complex battlefield systems, e.g., air defense, direct fire and indirect fire support, close air support, and command and control.

There is also a much better understanding today of the type of peacetime training that will permit roundout units to be better prepared at the outset of future conflicts and of the sequence in which roundout brigades are likely to be deployed in those conflicts. In view of the dramatic changes in the security environment, roundout brigades are likely to be part of the early reinforcing forces for a major or prolonged conflict, but the new military strategy will not require such units to be part of any rapidly deploying forces.

The future use of roundout brigades is a subject that continues to receive the attention of the leadership of the DOD. I continue to believe that the concept is sound and that it also has great potential utility for units that are smaller than brigades. Current Army plans call for continued improvement and use of the roundout concept as well as the new "roundup" concept in which a Guard or Reserve brigade would join an Active division that has already deployed as soon as the post-mobilization training of the brigade is completed.

ACCESS TO INDIVIDUAL RESERVISTS

An additional matter that arose during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and which is currently receiving attention within DOD, involves the need of the military services to have access to certain individual National Guardsmen or Reservists who possess critical military skills.

Many units from the Army's Reserve components which were called to active duty required personnel augmentations to bring their unit strength to wartime requirements. Certain units had been maintained at peacetime personnel and equipment levels which were below wartime requirements. In other cases, certain assigned personnel could not be deployed with their units because they had not yet completed required training, were still in high school, or had temporary physical disabilities. This experience raises the question of how the military services should meet shortages of individual personnel during periods in which a president has exercised his authority under Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 673b (which permits the activation of as many as 200,000 Selected Reservists when it is necessary to "augment the active forces for any operational mission"), but where the operational need is not yet sufficiently serious to justify the exercise of the partial mobilization authority under Section 673 (which permits the involuntary activation of members of the Individual Ready Reserve, or IRR). In pre-Desert Storm mobilization exercises, Army planners had assumed the early availability of the IRR in large future conflicts, when in fact access to the IRR in Desert Storm was not available until three weeks before the ground war began.

The principal method adopted by the Army to fill activated Reserve component units was to reassign Selected Reservists who had the necessary military skills from units which were not scheduled for activation, to those that were activated or alerted for probable call-up. Many of the Selected Reservists were volunteers. Others were involuntarily assigned to new units. This cross-leveling process was supplemented by the cross-assignment of unit personnel among activated units once they arrived at their respective mobilization stations. After arrival, and when it was pos

sible to do so, Active personnel were also assigned to Reserve units in certain in

stances.

In most cases, Army Reserve component units arrived at their mobilization sites ready for deployment. But, there was a cost. Units from which individual filler personnel had been obtained were left in a diminished state of readiness. And, it took a certain amount of time to fully integrate the new individual Reservists into new units. The fact that the process worked as well as it did is testimony to both the professionalism of the individual Reservists themselves, and the advantage of having available an adequate number of Reserve personnel from which to draw requisite skills.

While the cross-leveling process worked reasonably well in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, I do not believe that it is a desirable long-term solution to the problem presented by mobilized Reserve component units that are not at full strength. Equitable principles alone suggest that we should be cautious about calling members of the IRR to active duty when many Selected Reserve Units which have received considerably more training (albeit for missions that are not needed for the crisis at hand or which are being performed by other units) and whose members have received pay and other compensation for the more extensive training, are not activated.

We are evaluating several initiatives to ensure that the manning levels of early deploying Selected Reserve units meet wartime requirements. I am confident that these efforts will result in a higher level of readiness among Selected Reserve units to meet the challenges of the next decade.

EMPLOYER SUPPORT

The support of activated "citizen-soldiers" by their civilian employers, was remarkable. It was not, however, coincidental.

The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR), an agency within my office, was established in 1972 for the purpose of promoting public and private understanding of the Reserve components, and to gain U.S. employer and community support of National Guardsmen and Reservists through programs, policies and practices that encourage that support. With a Washington staff of 27 people and in excess of 3,700 volunteers in 55 states, territories, and the District of Columbia, NCESGR serves as an important conduit of information for employers and Reservist-employees.

In my testimony to the Congress last year, I described the actions that I took and the wide-ranging efforts of NCESGR to ensure that the units and individuals that were called to active duty received strong support from their respective states and communities. Only now, however, are we able to summarize our employer support efforts and reflect upon the results.

Between August 1990 and September 1991, NCESGR averaged over 6,500 inquiries per month on its toll-free telephone line. Initially, inquiries from Reservists and employers related primarily to voluntary duty, job protection, benefit entitlements, reemployment rights and responsibilities, and similar matters. As Reservists returned from active duty to their civilian work places, the requests for information shifted to more tangible and immediate problems involving actual or perceived violations of law.

While there have been some problems, the number of Reservists who have experienced reemployment problems is an exceptionally small percentage of the total number who were activated, and the vast majority of conflicts have been easily resolved. Employer support of National Guardsmen and Reservists continues to be strong. According to a February 1991, survey conducted by William M. Mercer Inc., BaltimoreWashington, Chicago, Houston, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis-St. Paul area employers generally exceeded the requirements of law in their support of their Reservistemployees. Almost one-third of the companies surveyed elected to maintain the civilian levels of pay and benefits for their Reservist-employees for some specified period of time. Twelve percent of the employers said they paid Reservists their full civilian salaries for periods of time ranging from one month to the entire length of the period of activation, regardless of the amount of military pay received by the Reservist-employees.

In a January, 1991 survey conducted by TPF&C (a Towers and Perrin company), 16 percent of the companies continued full pay without reductions for military pay, for periods ranging from two weeks to two months.

In December 1991, Ross Roy Inc., a volunteer advertising agency which has consistently supported the efforts of NCESGR, completed a survey of the supervisors of employees who served in the Reserve components. The key findings of the survey were as follows:

(1) Ninety-five percent of the respondents knew that an employee cannot be denied a promotion because of obligations imposed by service in the Reserve components;

(2) Seventy-three percent said that the mobilization of National Guard and Reserve employees caused no disruptions or only slight disruptions within their company;

(3) Eighty-one percent of supervisors reported that they did not hire someone else while the mobilized employee was on active duty;

(4) only three percent reported problems of mobilized employees returning to work from active duty; (5) Eighty-seven percent of the respondents said they normally have enough advance notice to plan for the absence of their Reservist-employees;

(6) Ninety-nine percent of the respondents said that other things being equal, they would hire a Guard/Reserve employee, knowing that their military commitment might periodically require an absence from the workplace.

The employer-support strategy that was followed during the conflict was simpleto inform employers and their Reservist-employees of the rights and obligations of law as quickly and as effectively as possible. To that end, a media campaign blitz was initiated. Committee volunteers sought interviews by home town newspapers, television, and radio stations on the reemployment rights of activated Reservists. At the national level, articles were written for public and military periodicals and newspapers. The Advertising Council, Inc., a non-profit organization that addresses national social problems through public service advertising, was particularly helpful. NCESGR was the recipient of $49 million worth of pro-bono mass media advertising in 1991 and the creative and production quality public service announcements produced during the conflict were aired on a wide range of television and radio stations. At an April 1991 national conference of NCESGR, Secretary Cheney informed the large audience of NCESGR's volunteer state chairmen and committee members that "millions of people across this country gave their support, their time and talent to make this victory possible. This committee has played a crucial role in that effort you have done more than merely educate business on how to comply with the law. With your leadership and encouragement, employers have let our troops know that they have backing where it counts, at home."

FAMILY SUPPORT

Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm demonstrated clearly the importance of pre-mobilization family preparedness and of family support programs for the Reserve components.

Generally, the family support programs were very effective. Excellent work was done by family centers operated by the Reserve components and which served thousands of families of Active, National Guard and Reserve personnel throughout the United States, the territories, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.

I reported to the Congress last year that the Department of Defense prepared pamphlets for the families of activated Reservists which provided significant detail on important entitlements and benefits, and information about how to obtain specific assistance. The first pamphlet included important information on compensation, medical care, available services at military installations, family assistance, legal assistance, civilian reemployment rights and other matters which were of concern to activated Reservists, their families, their employers and community leaders. The second pamphlet was designed to provide information on important benefits and entitlements and to assist Reservists and their families with the transition from active duty back to civilian status. The benefits and protections which were included in the Soldier's and Sailor's Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1991 and the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, were covered in the latter pamphlets. Both pamphlets were well received and effective.

A team of representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the individual military services also conducted "Family Focus Forums" which involved Active, National Guard and Reserve families, support groups, and organizations at 20 military organizations world-wide. The forums were conducted for the purpose of determining the quality of family support being provided to the dependents of activated and deployed members of the Active and Reserve components.

Since the conclusion of the Gulf conflict, the DOD has begun a review of the peacetime structure of family support programs and is studying ways to strengthen the programs as the force structure and organization of the armed forces changes. The review includes surveys of individual Reservists and their spouses as well as field visits to National Guard and Reserve units to assess the effectiveness of family