Now, backing them up in the Reserves and directly linked to the Active force were two infantry divisions, Guard divisions, separate armored brigades, separate mechanized infantry brigades, an armored cavalry regiment, more artillery, more logistics units, higher level logistics units called a theater army support command, all sorts of signal, engineer, medical, military intelligence units.

In the last 22 years, let me describe to you what we have done to this one corps. The 2d Armored Division began inactivation a little over 2 years ago. The 8th Infantry Division and the 3d Armored Division went out of the structure about 12 months ago. They are gone, completely out of Europe. The flags are down, they are out. The 9th Infantry Division went out of the structure. All of these supporting units are going out of the structure, completely gone.

We believe it is prudent, it is good stewardship, it is correct, to take out the appropriate portion of the Reserve components that exist to support this Active force deployment. If we could take it out because the Red Army is gone, because there is no longer a real possibility of a major war in central Europe, it is not responsible to leave all of this Reserve structure here.

We do not want to take it all out. We just want to take some of it out. What do we want to do? We want to bring it down to the level that existed in about 1980, before the Reagan buildup.

We added about 300,000 reservists overall in the last 10 years. What for? To fight the battle in central Europe to give us sustaining capability in central Europe. That threat is gone. All we are asking is to back out that growth of the last 10 years.

We're not going to destroy the Reserves. We need the Reserves. In this new base force concept, we are going to have 920,000 active reservists, down from 1.2 million-backing out the growth.

Now, some of the other proposals that the other body is considering this day-I think there are four force levels that I have heard about it. Three of those force levels take the Reserves down by almost another 250,000 below what the base force is planning to do, and I am not sure how the other body will respond to that.

Senator LEAHY. You are going down to 900,000?

General POWELL. Yes; I will show it to you in another chart, Senator.

I have not forgotten you, Senator.

This shows what happens if you do not allow us to do this. The Army is the major problem. That is where the bulk of this force is. The Active Army has stayed at about 781,000 for the last 10 years. In fact, since the middle of the seventies it has stayed at about 781,000, right about that line [indicating].

The Reserves, National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, Army National Guard were about here, 575,000. In the last 10 years we put this growth in to fight the war in central Europe. The Army now, to get down to their base force level because of the new environment we are in and trying to save money, the solid line is taking the Army down to 535,000.

We are taking one-third of the Army out, Active. A quarter million Active soldiers are coming out of the structure. What Congress has told us for the last 3 years is do not take out a single reservist associated with this decline.

What we want to do is to bring the Reserves out at an appropriate rate so they will be back around where they were at the beginning of this period of growth. And what Congress has told us for 3 years, except this past year, where we got a little bit of relief after quite a battle, what Congress has said is: No, keep the Reserves up here, even though the force they are associated with as part of the total force concept is coming down this line.

What we are saying is that is not a reasonable position. We do not think that we should be forced to do that. Therefore, we are once again this year asking the Congress to allow us to reshape the Reserves.

We get accused of not liking the Reserves. We get accused of not understanding the Reserves. At the end of the day, this Army Reserves strength, when added to the Marines and the Air Force and the Navy, will give us 920,000 active reservists, down from 1.2 million, a fairly modest reduction.

Senator DECONCINI. General Powell, as the global situation changes, the Reserves are not primarily a backup, but they are more Ready Reserves that would be deployed, particularly in the Army, or maybe not just the Army, when needed.

General POWELL. Not just the Army. It differs.

Senator DECONCINI. That does not hold up with your presentation here. I wonder.

General POWELL. I am just focusing on the Army here because there really is no serious debate on the other services. The Air Force Reserve is almost like the Active. In fact, in many Air Force units the Reserves are more capable than the Active. You get older airline pilots who suddenly are now flying C-141's instead of 747's. So they're really mix and match.

But when you get to the Army, which has the bulk of the Reserves, and you are talking about combat units which are scheduled to go into intense combat against an armed enemy at sophisticated levels of warfare, it takes a great deal of training and capability to be able to do that. You cannot do it when the Reserves get called up on a Sunday and go on Tuesday and perform well. It cannot be done.

The question-I will hit it again, Senator, but I do not want to keep you waiting too long. A year ago when we started the drawdown, the Army felt that they could bring out about 30,000 a year comfortably. We told them that was just too slow, so they ratcheted it up and they are bringing out of Europe about 75,000. The drawdown this year throughout the whole force in 1993 is a little over 100,000 troops Active. Of those, 50,000, as I will show in a much later chart, are what we call pink slip drawdowns. These people are not just being attrited out of the force because their contracts are up; they are going to be either invited out with a bonus or fired, 50,000.

They are either going to be offered the VSI or the SSB which Congress has allowed. One is an annuity and one is a lump sum payment, and we have got young men and women who are sitting around making that judgment as to whether they ought to take it now. A lot of them are. Many of the young enlisted people are taking the bonus rather than the annuity, because of the instant pot of cash to do something to transition into civilian life.

A lot of officers and enlisted persons will not be able to stay as long as they thought they were going to be able to stay. They are being RIF'ed or they are being SERP'ed, as it is called, selective early retirement plan, where they thought they were going to have a full career of 30 years and being told "No" at 26, you have got to go.

So of the 100,000 drawdown, 50,000 roughly are what you call pink slips.

My view and the view of each of the service chiefs is that if we try to do it any faster than we are doing it now, we would have to increase the RIF rate to a level where we would start to do serious damage to the force. We would just be getting people out, as opposed to getting them out in a rational, manageable way, going to the right skills and going down in certain skills. It would just be decimating the force.

Beyond that, in a very qualitative sense, Senator, it would be breaking faith with an awful lot of people who have put faith in the contract they have with the U.S. Government.

Over time, I can get to any number that Congress wishes to assign us. But if the Congress tries to get extraordinary savings in fiscal year 1993, which begins a few months from now, the only way to do that is by ratcheting down personnel, where the savings are one for one, or ratcheting down operating authority, or operating and support costs, which are the moneys used to keep the force trained, ready, and in supplies.

I think it is very, very difficult to get any more money out with those techniques in 1993 beyond that which the President has suggested.

Senator DECONCINI. Thank you.

PACIFIC FORCES

General POWELL. Pacific, and I will go much faster, Mr. Chairman. On Pacific forces, I do not think there is a great deal of disagreement within this town or within the national security community. We still have responsibilities in the Pacific which warrant full

presence.

It is an economy of force theater. It has never been a place where a large percentage of our forces have been located. We remain a Pacific power. When I go around and I talk to our friends, they say: For God's sake, we have this triangle of eastern Russia, China, and Japan; America is what balances this all out; do not go home; remain engaged.

It is a modest investment of your force structure cost. You can afford it. In Korea, therefore, we will continue to keep a division and a tactical fighter wing, a fighter wing in Japan, a carrier stationed in Japan, at far less expense than we could station it anywhere else, a Marine expeditionary force on Okinawa for crisis re

sponse. We will have forces distributed between Hawaii and Alaska, a division plus, an Active component fighter wing, and a Reserve component fighter wing, and five carrier battle groups oriented toward the Pacific from the west coast of the United States. Because of the long distances in the Pacific and the operating pattern, you need that many carriers to keep a couple deployed in the western Pacific, East Asia, and then going around to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

Senator INOUYE. What is that one division? We have two right

now.

General POWELL. Yes.

Senator DECONCINI. Afraid you might see that, Mr. Chairman. Senator INOUYE. This is a classified hearing.

General POWELL. I am not ducking the question. Right now both flags are there, the 6th and the 25th, and the Army is going to distribute something in the neighborhood of five brigades over those two flags. But I do not want to prejudge what we might have to do after the Congress works its will in the course of this year and next year as to how many flags will be kept.

Senator INOUYE. I would hope you will confer with us first.
General POWELL. Senator, you can be sure.

Next.

Senator INOUYE. Just checking, that is all.

General PoWELL. This is what our Pacific drawdowns look like. Even though I make a case for the Pacific, we are coming down in these next couple of years by 32,000 personnel. We have reduced