1503 Power 1504 Materials & Structures Survivability Technology, Laser Jamming, Solar Power Tech Development, Survivable 79.00 89.00 6.991 Funding Only), Burst Power Technologies Adv. Resin & Metallic Matrix Composites, Totals 14.00 23.60 1.700 242.20 269.30 14.448 The President's fiscal year 1993 budget request of $5.425 billion represents an increase of about 30-percent over the fiscal year 1992 appropriated level. The LDS and TMD program elements would receive, respectively, 59-percent and 15-percent of this increase. Thus, approximately three-quarters of the President's proposed increase of $1.245 billion is for the two program elements given the highest priority by the MDA. The remaining one-third is to maintain a robust development program for space-based interceptors and other follow-on systems, and to maintain a sound research and support base-as directed by the Congress. I would like now to elaborate on our activities supported by each of these five program elements. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE In response to the President's direction and the MDA, we are developing a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system to protect U.S. forces deployed overseas, and our friends and allies. The TMD program has been expanded in the past year to emphasize the transition from research and development to acquisition of TMD systems. Congress authorized $872.7 million for TMD programs in fiscal year 1992. The budget request for fiscal year 1993 is $1.06 billion. (Both figures include Research, Development and Procurement funds.) Additional information on the TMD architecture and programmatic specifics, including how we plan to downselect from the many options under consideration, will be submitted to Congress in the 180-day report mandated by the MDA. LIMITED DEFENSE SYSTEM (LDS) As discussed above, we have realigned our program to be responsive to the MDA by accelerating our previous development plans to deploy. The "initial" LDS site will be located at Grand Forks, ND, unless the ABM Treaty restraints are relaxed soon enough to permit an alternate first site. It will consist of a Command and Control Element (C2E), Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), a Ground-Based Radar (GBR), and will take advantage of data from existing early warning sensors. Also, as discussed above, we are evaluating several alternatives to cue GBIs in the battlespace prior to the time that the collocated GBR can acquire attacking RVs. If ongoing discussions with the former Soviet Union succeed quickly, the initial site might not be at Grand Forks; rather it might be located in either the northeastern or northwestern part of the United States. Such an event would lead to a savings of $1 to $2 billion for the Limited Defense System called for in the MDA, because one less site ultimately would be required to protect the entire United States. Briefly, the initial site system would work as follows: Our early warning sensors would alert us of an enemy launch. After initial tracks are established, the GBIS are committed and start their flyout. With appropriate cuing data from one of the system alternatives being considered, GBIs could be launched into the appropriate battlespace before the GBR acquires the attacking RVs and associated decoys. Eventually, the GBR will acquire and track the incoming ballistic missile targets and provide discrimination data to help the GBIs select the correct target objects. After the GBR performs fine tracking and discrimination of the reentry vehicles from debris and penetration aids, in-flight updates are issued to the interceptors enroute to their targets. The GBIs autonomously acquire their targets with their on-board sensors, perform any remaining discrimination necessary, and intercept their designated RVs. With ground-based interceptors and a Ground-based Radar, the initial single site defense deployment would provide only limited protection against attacks from northerly directions as shown for the Grand Forks deployment option in Figure 3. Such attacks could come from nations to our north such as the republics of the The TMD-GBR will provide fire control and surveillance for THAAD as well as for other TMD systems. The footprint or area of effectiveness, for such systems will be substantially increased with the deployment around the end of this decade of Brilliant Eyes which will be able to cue interceptors into the battle space well before attacking missiles can be directed by the TMD-GBR. An important element of our THAAD program is the building of a prototype "battery" (called User Operational Evaluation, ÜOE) during the demonstration and validation stage of development. This "operational prototype," including interceptors and TMD-GBR, will be used for early operational assessment and has the potential to be deployed during a national emergency. This approach meets the Congressional mandate by providing an improved near-term TMD capability by 1996 while lowering risk in subsequent phases of the acquisition cycle. The “full-up" operational system will be fielded in the 2000 timeframe. It is important to note that we also intend to evaluate the utility of the THAAD interceptor in a Navy role. Consequently, industry is being directed to provide the necessary data to evaluate the cost and operational effectiveness of making the THAAD interceptor compatible with the Vertical Launch System carried on our Cruisers and Destroyers. We passed a major milestone this past year in moving the THAAD-GBR system through Milestone I and into the demonstration and validation phase. RFPs were issued in January 1992; we anticipate receiving proposals shortly and contract award by July 1992. Supporting our near-term efforts are a number of technology and analytical/simulation efforts. For example, our US/Israeli cooperative ARROW and ARROW Continuation Experiments (ACES) programs will provide (a) significant data on theater missile defense interceptor technology, and (b) valuable flight test intercept results for targets (specifically, CW warheads) where the US has done little testing. The Extended Air Defense Test Bed (EADTB), which will include nodes at the Advanced Research Center (Huntsville, Alabama), the Army's Air Defense School (Fort Bliss, TX) and the united Kingdom's Defense Research Agency Malvern Facility, provides the necessary analytical tools to evaluate theater missile interceptor, sensor and BM/C3 interceptors. To support their architecture and system engineering efforts, Israel has just completed their Israeli Test Bed, the result on another US/Israeli cooperative program. Our far-term architecture is illustrated in Figure 11. In the longer-term, we plan to add a sea-based area TMD system, the highly mobile Corps defense system, CORPS SAM, and the capability to augment sensor elements by utilizing Brilliant Eyes data for cuing. As noted above, we will examine the option of a common missile for THAAD and the AEGIS/VLS system, as well as a dedicated Navy version. Ultimately, space-based interceptors could contribute to the TMD mission by intercepting missiles with ranges greater than about 500 kilometers, as discussed in our March 1992 Report to Congress on Brilliant Pebbles conceptual and burdensharing issues. This would be particularly useful in scenarios where other TMD capabilities are not readily available. The TMD program involves all four services and several U.S. allies in the development of technology and the selection of systems to provide an anti-missile defense. For example, I have already noted that the potential improvement of U.S. Naval capability to provide a rapidly deployable anti-missile defense for wide area protection is an interesting option for the Defense Department's TMD program. The Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations have indicated that their Service will play a role in the theater missile defense mission, and a flag-level office has been established within the Department of the Navy to integrate Navy TMD efforts. Congress authorized $872.7 million for TMD programs in fiscal year 1992. The budget request for fiscal year 1993 is $1.06 billion. (Both figures include Research, Development and Procurement funds.) Additional information on the TMD architecture and programmatic specifics, including how we plan to downselect from the many options under consideration, will be submitted to Congress in the 180-day report mandated by the MDA. LIMITED DEFENSE SYSTEM (LDS) As discussed above, we have realigned our program to be responsive to the MDA by accelerating our previous development plans to deploy. The "initial" LDS site will be located at Grand Forks, ND, unless the ABM Treaty restraints are relaxed soon enough to permit an alternate first site. It will consist of a Command and Control Element (C2E), Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI), a Ground-Based Radar (GBR), and will take advantage of data from existing early warning sensors. Also, as discussed above, we are evaluating several alternatives to cue GBIs in the battlespace prior to the time that the collocated GBR can acquire attacking RVs. If ongoing discussions with the former Soviet Union succeed quickly, the initial site might not be at Grand Forks; rather it might be located in either the northeastern or northwestern part of the United States. Such an event would lead to a savings of $1 to $2 billion for the Limited Defense System called for in the MDA, because one less site ultimately would be required to protect the entire United States. Briefly, the initial site system would work as follows: Our early warning sensors would alert us of an enemy launch. After initial tracks are established, the GBIs are committed and start their flyout. With appropriate cuing data from one of the system alternatives being considered, GBIs could be launched into the appropriate battlespace before the GBR acquires the attacking RVs and associated decoys. Eventually, the GBR will acquire and track the incoming ballistic missile targets and provide discrimination data to help the GBIs select the correct target objects. After the GBR performs fine tracking and discrimination of the reentry vehicles from debris and penetration aids, in-flight updates are issued to the interceptors enroute to their targets. The GBIs autonomously acquire their targets with their on-board sensors, perform any remaining discrimination necessary, and intercept their designated RVs. With ground-based interceptors and a Ground-based Radar, the initial single site defense deployment would provide only limited protection against attacks from northerly directions as shown for the Grand Forks deployment option in Figure 3. Such attacks could come from nations to our north such as the republics of the |