From 1989 to 1990, we drew down 150,000. You see them by Active component in the blue, Reserve component in the green, and the orange are civilians. These are cumulative numbers. By the next year it will go up another 85,000 from 1990 to 1991, and then to 435 in 1992, 690 in 1993, 865 in 1994, and at the end of 1995 we will have drawn down by 940,000 people from a period of about fiscal year 1989.

There are still some more drawdowns to take place in 1996 and 1997, but the bulk of this drawdown-these are cumulative. The bulk of this drawdown, we are well into it now. We are right into this period now, and this is what I am very reluctant to try to accelerate.

Senator DeConcini asked, essentially saying trying to bring the 1995 into 1994 and 1994 into 1993, and the management problem associated with that subject gives me great, great heartburn.

One final, chart, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you for your indulgence.

DRAWDOWN PLAN

Prudent, Fiscally Responsible

Strategic Forces Realigned

Active Component Drawdown Accelerated

Non-essential Reserve Structure Reduced

Only Essential Modernization and
Sustainability Continued

Preserves Decisive Joint Warfighting
Capabilities

It merely says that we believe that we have got a sound plan, we believe it is prudent, we believe it is fiscally responsible. Our strategic forces are being reduced by two-thirds. Our nuclear force is being reduced by two-thirds.

The Army is going out of the nuclear business for the first time in 40 years. There will be no nuclear weapons in the Army at all. We will rely on the Air Force and Navy aviation if they ever have to have a requirement for nuclear weapons.

The Active component drawdown is being accelerated as much as we think we can do it. I get a little frustrated when people say: Why are you not cutting? If we are not cutting, I do not know what we are doing, because we are making massive cuts in the Active component. We need the Congress' support of the Reserve component realignment, restructuring, and only essential modernization and sustainability is continuing.

I think at the end of the day we are going to preserve our joint warfighting capabilities. The measure I have to use throughout this entire process: Is the Nation as secure as it was yesterday? At the end of this process, if we have a force that, if called upon, can go in harm's way and do the job without putting American lives at unnecessary risk and without risking the security of the Nation, if I cannot answer that question in the affirmative I have failed in my job.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF GEN. COLIN L. POWELL

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Defense Subcommittee, when I met with the Congress almost one year ago to discuss our military posture, our nation was in the midst of a war in the Persian Gulf. We had over one half million troops deployed to the theater. Our air operations to destroy Iraq's strategic military targets had begun. Our naval ships and submarines were patrolling the waters of the Middle East intercepting commerce bound for Iraq or launching aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles. Our Marines were poised in amphibious ships off the coast

of Kuwait. And Army and Marine forces were preparing to begin, with other coalition forces, one of the largest and most successful ground operations in the history of warfare.

We won that war and fulfilled all of the objectives given to us by the President. The Iraqi Army was soundly defeated and ejected from Kuwait. The threat to the region posed by Iraq's conventional and unconventional military capability was severely curtailed. The legitimate government of Kuwait was restored. American lives and interests were protected. And our troops have come home, just as we said they would, their mission completed

It is ironic that, only 11 months after the conclusion of Operation Desert Storm, the principal purpose of my appearance here today with Secretary Cheney is to outline further the sweeping reductions now taking place in the size of our military structure to bring us down to what we have called the Base Force-the right size force needed to deal with the new geopolitical situation as it has evolved to date and as we expect it to evolve in the future.

America's armed forces today are the proudest, best-trained, best-equipped, most capable fighting force in the world. The critical task of Secretary Cheney and myself over the next year will be to preserve the capability that enabled us to achieve such an overwhelming and decisive victory in the Gulf and to do it while implementing these wide-spread reductions in our military forces. To be successful we will need the Congress' help and support in ensuring that these changes are carried out wisely, cautiously and judiciously.

Several times during the past year I have appeared before the Congress to outline both our evolving military strategy and our changing force structure. Recently, you received several documents, including the just completed "National Military Strategy," which provide additional information on our response to the changes in the world and our resulting security requirements.

Today, I plan to update you on how the United States military is responding to the fundamental changes taking place around the world, to the radically altered security and threat environment, and to the economic realities we face as a nation, while safeguarding our national security.

STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

Over the short span of the last three years, we have witnessed sweeping changes in the world that directly affect our strategic focus. The Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, Germany reunified, democracy took hold in Eastern Europe and grew stronger in Latin America, an international coalition successfully defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, Communism collapsed in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and, finally, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Today, global war is far less likely because the principal threat which has guided our military planning over the past 45 years-a Soviet onslaught into the heart of Western Europe-has disappeared.

These changes have already been reflected in our "National Military Strategy." Equally important, many of the favorable developments which have taken place were anticipated and planned for in the design of the Base Force. We purposely designed the Base Force to be able to adapt and adjust to a rapidly changing and evolving world. Obviously, as that world changes, our strategy and accompanying force structure will change with it. The additional cuts announced by the President earlier this week, prepared with the full knowledge and assistance of Secretary Cheney, myself and the Service Chiefs, confirm that we are continuing to adapt, restructure and reduce our forces as appropriate and prudent without undue risk to our national security.

It bears repeating that our defense budget has already been shrinking since the mid-1980's-29 percent, in real terms, since 1985. By 1997, the real reduction in buying power will be almost 37 percent. Today, we have the smallest active duty military since before the Korean War-before we have even fully implemented the Base Force.

Nor are we simply cutting across the board, without any thought to reshaping the forces to fit the new world we face. In August 1990, when he first outlined the new strategy, President Bush said, "The United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shunken-down version of the ones we possess at present." The President was well ahead of his critics, when he explained further that, "What we need are not merely reductions but restructuring."

As we accomplish this restructuring and survey the strategic landscape, we must recognize that we are the preeminent force for stability in the world. We are also the world's sole remaining superpower. Seldom in our history have we been in a stronger position relative to any challengers we might face. This is a position we

should not abandon. As a people and as a nation, we cannot ignore our responsibility to help lead the world community along the path to peace and prosperity.

Those who would have us retreat from our position of leadership and involvement to one of disengagement and isolationism would do well to remember history. It is widely recognized that our precipitous withdrawal from the world during the 1920's and 1930's contributed to the causes of World War II. Moreover, our rapid demobilization after World War II helped create the circumstances which led North Korea to attack South Korea. Now, as we stand poised to reap the benefits of winning the Cold War, we must prevent a return to the mistaken isolationism of the past.

We must remain engaged. Our allies around the world want and expect us to do so. Our continued presence in Europe undergirds stability in the West while helping to build stability in the East. Our engagement and presence in the Pacific for over 40 years have provided a security shield for us and our friends in that region.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

In response to the requirement set forth in the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, the new National Military Strategy has just been completed and delivered to you. We are proud of it and believe that it accurately takes account of the changes in the world and preserves the capability and flexibility we need to protect our nation's security.

You will see that we have dramatically altered the strategic assumptions upon which we build our forces. We no longer plan to be able to fight a major war in Europe on short notice, nor the global conflict such a major war presupposes. This change alone has had profound implications for how we plan and structure our forces both in Europe and in the continental United States (CONUS).

The growing uncertainty of the international security environment makes it increasingly difficult to predict and estimate the circumstances under which U.S. military power might be employed. Therefore, we have shifted our planning focus from a single monolithic global scenario to an array of regional scenarios-similar to the type we experienced in confronting Iraq in the Gulf.

THE THREAT

The decline of the Soviet threat has fundamentally changed the concept of threat analysis as a basis for force structure planning. We can still plausibly identify some specific threats-North Korea, a weakened Iraq, perhaps even a hostile Iran. But the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain. In a very real sense, the primary threat to our security is instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one expected or predicted.

To hedge against uncertainty, we must structure our forces relative to the capabilities of other military forces in regions where we retain vital interests, whether or not there is a specific, well-defined military threat, and ensure that we have the ability to carry out a wide range of tasks.

When I first became Chairman, if someone had asked me to bet on whether we would be involved with major deployments to Panama and the Persian Gulf within the space of 18 months, I would have given high odds against it. That is why we must build into our forces varied capabilities and versatility-to respond to unexpected crises.

Thus, the strategy recognizes a historical fact-for the most part we have fought wars or dealt with crises using forces that were not specifically prepared or purchased for that particular contingency. For World War II, for Korea, and for Vietnam, we used our neglected pool of general purpose forces until we could rebuild a warfighting force. We did not have forces tailored to "the Panama threat" or "the Iraqi threat." In each contingency we used general purpose forces and, in the case of Desert Storm, we also used forces brought from Europe, where they had been deployed to address a far different threat.

I cannot tell this committee where the next Noriega or Saddam Hussein will arise to threaten stability in the world, but you can be certain that somewhere it will happen. It may be in the Middle East, in Europe, in East Asia, or in Latin Americawherever it occurs, we must be prepared to respond. The key to preparedness is building forces flexible enough to react to the unknown.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

As you review our strategy, you will see that deterrence remains the primary and central motivating purpose of our national military strategy. The fundamental objective of America's armed forces will remain constant: to deter aggression and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe. Our

national military strategy is built upon four foundations which I have referred to previously: Strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution.

Strategic deterrence and defense.-While recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives will allow us to achieve real and substantial reductions in our strategic nuclear forces, we must continue to maintain a modern, fully capable, and reliable strategic deterrent and develop a defensive system for global protection against limited nuclear strikes.

Forward presence.-Over the past 40 years, the day-to-day presence of U.S. forces in regions vital to our national interests has been key to averting crises and preventing war. Our forces deployed throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis-response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Although the numbers of U.S. forces stationed overseas are being reduced significantly, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to crises will continue to depend on maintaining forward presence forces capable of joint and combined operations.

Crisis response.-The capability to respond appropriately to regional crises which affect our interests is one of the key critical requirements of our strategy. Such crises can include a wide range of contingencies and potential levels of force. Some contingencies may occur on short-notice, and U.S. forces must be able to respond rapidly to deter and, if necessary, to fight. The ability to reinforce our forward presence wherever a crisis erupts is a critical element of our crisis response capability. We must be able to project power to Europe, the Middle East and Asia rapidly and in sufficient strength to defeat any aggressor who has not been deterred by our forward presence: At the same time, we must retain sufficient force to deter or deal with another crisis happening elsewhere in the world.

Reconstitution.-We are reducing the size of our military force structure in response to the demise of any foreseeable global threat. In the event such a threat reemerges, we must preserve a credible capability to forestall any potential adversary from competing militarily with the United States. This means maintaining the capability to field new fighting units, mobilize previously trained or new manpower, and activate the industrial base on a large scale, if needed. Reconstitution also involves maintaining technology, doctrine, and experienced military personnel necessary to retain our competitive edge in decisive areas of potential military competition.

THE BASE FORCE

To meet the demands of strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution, we are restructuring our military forces to achieve the Base Force. To reiterate, the Base Force is not today's force but the force we are reducing towards in order to implement the new strategy. We have set an active endstrength goal of 1.6 million by 1997. To reach this level, we are making significant reductions in our force structure, including eliminating entire units. By fiscal year 1995 our active endstrength will be down by 530,000 from its post-Vietnam peak of 2,174,000 in fiscal year 1987.

To assist us in determining the size and shape of the Base Force, we have used several criteria. First, we considered the potential threats to U.S. interests around the world. While we recognize that we cannot predict the exact location and nature of future threats, we have developed planning scenarios that focus on regions where U.S. vital interests are likely to be threatened.

Secondly, we recognized that the United States must retain certain capabilities to protect its interests around the globe. These include maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority and decisive force. Moreover, as proven by our experience in Desert Storm, the nature of modern warfare demonstrates the need for constant training with advanced equipment in order to achieve the level of proficiency and competency necessary to win. This dictates a requirement for sufficient active forces to provide this base of capabilities. Thirdly, we realized that we must maintain coherence in our force structure. By this I mean that each element of our force must be maintained at a minimum level necessary to support the rotational base, training network and school system. The various force elements must also remain balanced with one another. This balance does not denote proportionality but the level of force in one element needed to produce decisive, successful results when operating with other elements of the force. Finally, we concluded we must take account of the rate of change around the world. With the international political situation as unsettled as it is today, it would be imprudent to make massive cuts too quickly. The rate at which we reduce our forces must be linked to these global trends so that we do not suddenly find our