selves confronted with a high level of risk if one or more of these trends should re

verse.

By 1995 we will achieve the following Base Force levels:

-Army divisions will have been reduced from 28 (18 Active) in fiscal year 1990 to 18 (12 Active) plus two Cadre. With the number of Active divisions being cut from 18 to 12 we are eliminating one third of the Active Army.

-Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) will remain at three and, as mandated by law, will include three divisions and three air wings, although there will be manning reductions and readjustments within that structure.

-The Air Force will have dropped from 36 to 26 Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWES), Active and Reserve. Active FWEs will drop from 24 to 15. From 1986 to 1995 the Air Force's active aircraft inventory will have fallen from 7,300 to 5,300-the lowest level since before the Korean War.

-The Navy will have been reduced from 15 to 12 carriers, and from 546 ships down to 451, with accompanying cutbacks in personnel.

We view the Base Force as the right combination of components and capabilities to be able to deter potential aggressors, fulfill our forward presence requirements and respond to any crisis. Conceptually, we have divided the Base Force into four force packages: Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, and Contingency Forces.

STRATEGIC FORCES

We must continue to maintain modern, capable, effective strategic forces in order to deter nuclear aggression and support national arms control objectives.

We are watching carefully the evolution of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, thus far, have been reassured by what we have heard from its political and military leaders concerning the command and control, safety and security of its enormous nuclear stock pile. We are working closely with these leaders to identify areas where we can support their efforts to ensure the continued close control and security of those forces as well as assist in the dismantlement of nuclear warheads.

In the meantime, 27,000 nuclear weapons are still stockpiled in several republics of the Commonwealth, and we must plan accordingly. While the CIS is moving to both consolidate its nuclear weapons and implement the reductions announced by then Soviet President Gorbachev last fall, it is also continuing to modernize—both SS-25 mobile and SS-18 heavy ICBMs continue to enter operation.

That said, the element of our military forces most affected by the changes in the world and the collapse of the Soviet threat has been our strategic nuclear forces. As a result of a variety of factors-the President's Nuclear Initiative (PNI) announced last year, prior-year defense budget cuts, the START Treaty limits, and the President's announcement in his State of the Union address-a number of changes to our strategic nuclear force posture have been implemented or are planned for the near future. In his State of the Union message, the President also spoke of the potential for substantial additional U.S. strategic nuclear reductions if the nuclear states of the CIS will eliminate their MIRVed ICBMs. Finally, in regard to another element of the PNI, we have begun elimination of all ground-launched theater nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft bases.

Today, for the first time since 1957, we have no strategic bombers on alert. The new SRAM II air-to-ground missile has been canceled and production of the Advanced Cruise Missile will be curtailed at 640 missiles instead of the originally planned 1,461. The B-2 program will be capped at 20 aircraft, instead of the 75 requested last year and the 132 originally programmed. Withdrawal of some 60 FB111 aircraft from their strategic mission has been completed, with 35 transferring to a tactical role. We will maintain 136 B-52Gs and Hs capable of performing strategic nuclear and conventional roles, with the 44 remaining B-52G ALCM-carrying bombers scheduled to be retired at the end of next year. 96 B-1Bs will also remain in the inventory with the capability to perform either nuclear or conventional missions.

With regard to our land-based missile force, all 450 Minuteman II ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under START have been taken off alert and will be eliminated under an accelerated schedule pending the ratification of the treaty. We have also canceled the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison program, any further production of Peacekeeper missiles and development of the Small ICBM. In the sea-based leg, the Trident submarine building program has been terminated at 18 subs, instead of the 22 planned, and production of the W-88 warhead for the Trident II/D-5 missile will cease-effectively bringing to a halt all U.S. nuclear warhead production.

As a result of all these measures, as well as the overall reductions mandated under the START Treaty, our strategic nuclear forces will drop by nearly 40 percent between fiscal year 1991 and the end of fiscal year 1999. If the leaders of the nuclear states of the CIS accept President Bush's offer, actual U.S. strategic nuclear warhead levels would be about 50 percent below the number of warheads we planned to have under the START Treaty.

We are establishing a unified command, the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), which would disband the Strategic Air Command and consolidate all elements of U.S. Strategic forces-ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers-under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, USSTRATCOM. I will discuss this in more detail later in my statement.

Unfortunately, the threat posed by global ballistic missile proliferation and by an accidental or unauthorized missile launch resulting from political turmoil is on the rise. Because of these trends, the SDI program has been redirected to pursue a system providing Global Protection Against Limited Nuclear Strikes (GPALS). GPALS will be based on technologies pioneered by SDI, but will be both smaller and less expensive than the initial deployment originally projected for SDI in the 1980's.

Another key element of our strategic defense program is the emphasis on theater missile defenses. Iraq's indiscriminate use of ballistic missiles during the Gulf war demonstrated the ongoing requirement for advanced theater missile defense systems capable of countering the missile threats of the 1990's and beyond.

ATLANTIC FORCES

Across the Atlantic, we continue to have vital interests in Europe and a major role to play in preserving stability on the continent. Our European friends and allies are counting on us as the underpinning to stability. Our forward presence in Europe remains essential as tangible evidence of our commitment to NATO and, while it will be a reduced presence, we must be careful not to pull out too much, too fast. We plan to retain a European forward presence which provides a committed Army corps, 3 to 4 fighter wing equivalents, a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group. These forces will be the leading edge of our contribution to the new NATO strategy. The Army corps, with its two divisions, is the foundation for the U.S.-led multinational corps and provides the U.S. division for the German-led multinational corps, as well as forward-based elements of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Force (ARRF). In addition, other U.S. forces supporting the Belgian-led Tri-national Corps will come from CONUS.

We are committing a corps to Europe because it represents the smallest fighting element with sufficient combat, logistics, communications and intelligence capabilities to conduct and sustain combined combat operations. In addition, a corps combines the requisite speed and mobility for broad regional deployment and can support the arrival of reinforcing units from the United States to Europe, if needed. Maintaining adequate force in Europe also increases our ability to deploy rapidly in response to crises in other areas such as Southwest Asia.

Our Air Force, Navy and Marines also play vital roles in our European strategy. Our land and sea-based air forces provide a full spectrum of capabilities to conduct interdiction, counter air and close air support missions throughout the Atlantic region. Naval surface ships, submarines and Marine amphibious forces will ensure continued stability, especially in the Mediterranean and the rest of the increasingly important Southern region of Europe.

Active forces based in CONUS, tailored principally to respond to crises in the Atlantic region, include: a reinforcing Army corps with three divisions, each with a reserve roundout brigade; about two Air Force fighter wing equivalents; one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF); and four carrier battle groups.

The process of reducing our forward presence in Europe to about 150,000 personnel by 1995 is well underway. In 1990, we had over 314,000 troops in Europe, including two army corps of 43 divisions and 8.8 fighter wing equivalents. Today, we have reduced our troops by over 87,000 to 227,000 and expect by the end of 1992 to have drawn down to 207,000-less than two-thirds of our previous presence. We have also announced the closure of over 490 military sites overseas, another 83 just a few weeks ago. Almost 95 percent of these sites are in Europe.

Drawing down in Europe is a difficult mission which involves detailed logistical planning and requires an extraordinary effort by U.S. troops. For example, with those 87,000 troops we have withdrawn since 1990 came over 100,000 other family members. Accomplishing reductions must be done while providing for the welfare of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and their families. Maintaining morale in units as they are in the process of disbanding is a difficult task, indeed.

To illustrate the kind of hardship this can cause, in one Army unit scheduled to pull out of Europe this May, one hundred family members who are high school senlors were told they would not receive credit for the full year unless they stayed in school until June. The unit commander has decided to keep the housing complex of the closed post open an extra month for these families so the students can complete their school year.

As you know, many of the units that served in Operation Desert Storm came from Europe and, after successfully completing their mission, returned to Europe only to learn they had been eliminated, they were no longer needed. Included among these was the 3rd Armored Division, a unit in which I served thirty-two years ago as a second lieutenant, a proud unit which participated in the breakout from Normandy and the drive across France and which helped devastate Iraq's Republican Guard forces. It is gone, having furled its flag on 17 January.

We are bringing home our fighting men and women, their equipment, and their dependents as fast as we possibly can while continuing to maintain a forward presence in Europe to protect our vital interests, enhance stability, and reassure our allies.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

We include Southwest Asia in our Atlantic Force concept. While the successful defeat of Iraq and the destruction of much of its military force eliminated the principal offensive threat to the region, both Iraq and Iran retain considerable potential to threaten long-term regional stability.

The redeployment of our ground equipment and personnel deployed to the Gulf during Operation Desert Storm is now complete. We retain a significant air and naval presence in the region to assist the continued enforcement of sanctions against Iraq and support other U.S. and U.N. objectives there, including the critical task of fulfilling UN Security Council Resolution 687 which mandates the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological and missile capabilities.

Today, in and around Southwest Asia, we retain about 35 ships, over 200 combat aircraft and about 25,000 personnel to support these various missions and any other contingencies which might arise. We have also deployed six Patriot batteries from Europe to Saudi Arabia at the request of the Saudi government. This level of forward presence is not permanent-it is there to reassure our friends, to chill our potential adversaries, and to discourage emerging threats.

Over the long term, we will protect our vital interests in this region through a range of measures. We will continue to maintain an over-the-horizon capability through our continuous naval presence, frequent joint exercises and defense cooperation agreements with countries in the region, and security assistance to enhance the self-defense capabilities of our friends and allies. Two defense cooperation agreements have been signed with friendly states in the region since the end of the war and negotiations are continuing with others. We are also working with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to improve its contribution to regional stability.

Finally, we continue, under Operation Provide Comfort II, to support the United Nations in its effort to distribute food, tents, clothing and other relief assistance to the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq. Since the beginning of Provide Comfort in April 1991, U.S. forces have flown over 6000 sorties and delivered over 50,000 tons of supplies in support of that operation.

PACIFIC FORCES

The Pacific region is one of long-standing importance to the United States. We fought three wars there in this century. Many of our important trading partners are there. The presence of U.S. forces serves as a stabilizing influence in this economically and historically important region and, for the benefits we receive, represents a considerable "economy of force."

This past November, I visited several countries in the Pacific region and met with military and political leaders there. I came away more convinced than ever that countries in the Pacific trust us, look to U.S. for leadership and security, and want us to remain actively engaged there. Nor can we ignore the fact that the seven largest armies in the world today operate in this region, or that nearly every nation in the region holds some kind of geographic, ethnic, religious or political complaint against one or more of its neighbors.

The withdrawal of 15,000 forward-deployed personnel under Phase I of the Strategic Framework plan is on track and will be completed by the end of 1992. Our forward presence will remain primarily maritime, with half of our projected carrier and amphibious forces oriented towards the Pacific, including one forward-deployed carrier battle group along with a Marine Expeditionary Force. An aircraft carrier and

an amphibious ready group will remain stationed in Japan, where they can be maintained at a cost considerably less than if they were returned to the United States. Regionwide, we will be reducing our Army presence to less than a division and our Air Force presence to 2-3 fighter wing equivalents.

Part of this reduction will come from South Korea as that country continues to gain confidence in its own military capabilities. We have also been monitoring closely the talks which have been taking place between North and South Korea, and hope that they will produce a major long-term lessening of tension on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. has taken a number of significant steps in cooperation with the South Korean government, including the suspension of the Team Spirit 92 exercise, to encourage the North to move towards a less provocative military posture.

The signing of the non-nuclear accord between North and South Korea late last year was a constructive and encouraging step forward. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about North Korea's ongoing work towards development of a nuclear weapons capability. In that regard, I fully supported the decision of President Bush and Secretary Cheney last fall to temporarily suspend the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea, pending satisfactory resolution of our concerns about North Korea's nuclear program. While we await further progress in the North-South dialogue, we remain committed to protecting South Korea.

Turning to Southeast Asia, much attention has been focused on our decisions to close Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base. Clark was shut down after the Mount Pinatubo eruption. At Subic, we plan to terminate all activities by the end of this year and all units stationed there will either be disestablished or relocated elsewhere.

Our withdrawal from the Philippines does not indicate a reduction in our involvement in the region, but rather a more widely distributed presence. We maintain other military facilities and access throughout East Asia. As President Bush announced during his recent trip to the region, we have signed an agreement with Singapore moving the Seventh Fleet's Logistics Support Force there. We are continuing discussions with other countries which have expressed an interest in providing similar logistical support to U.S. naval vessels transiting the area. We also expect to remain fully engaged in Southeast Asia through a program of frequent exercises, short-term deployments and visits by units stationed in the United States.

Finally, our crisis response forces focused on the Pacific region will include forces in Hawaii, Alaska, and CONUS. These include one plus division, one MEF, one fighter wing, and five carrier battle groups.

CONTINGENCY FORCES

The "come as you are" arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable crises requires fully-trained, highly-ready forces that can deploy rapidly, are largely self-sufficient, and therefore have to be drawn primarily from the active structure. Our military strategy requires forces specifically tailored to this challenge.

Each Service brings unique combat capabilities to contingency forces. The Army contributes airborne, air assault, light infantry and rapidly deployable heavy forces. The Air Force brings its entire range of fighter and bomber forces. The Navy provides carrier-based naval air power and the covert capabilities of attack submarines. The Marines bring their unmatched amphibious combat power, particularly when access ashore is contested. We also have the unique capabilities of our special operations forces.

U.S.-based contingency forces include an Airborne Corps headquarters, 5 Army divisions, 7 Air Force fighter wing equivalents, and one MEF. Contingency forces will also include forward-stationed and deployed Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Forces; special operations forces; and pre-positioned equipment and supplies.

BASIC MILITARY SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES

Potent though these four force packages will be, they are highly dependent upon, and incomplete without, basic supporting capabilities: Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and Research and Development.

Transportation.-Regional focus, flexible and adaptive planning and reduced forward presence have all combined to significantly increase our reliance on transportation and the strategic mobility provided by our lift forces. As demonstrated so vividly during the last 18 months, the ability of the United States to project and sustain combat power is vitally dependent upon the cornerstone of a responsive and reliable lift capability.

It is essential to our new focus to possess the ability to move quickly anywhere in the world with sufficient combat forces and accompanying support elements. To

52-776 0-92.

meet our future mobility requirements, we have developed an integrated program to improve and modernize our strategic lift forces.

I commend the Congress on the foresight it has demonstrated in funding the sealift programs in previous years. We again plan to emphasize sealift this year, providing $1.2 billion for modernization and enhancement. Some funding will go towards the construction of ships for both prepositioning and surge shipping. This long-term program, which will take us into the 21st century, will add to and modernize the sealift capability to meet the nation's military strategic mobility require

ments.

While the sealift construction program is underway, we must continue to rely on the Ready Reserve Force and fast sealift ships. These programs must have adequate funding to provide the responsive, reliable heavy lift capability to meet the requirements of a major regional conflict similar to Desert Storm.

Future threats and contingencies will likely require forces which can be deployed quickly, primarily from CONUS. Earlier operations, such as Just Cause (Panama) and Urgent Fury (Grenada) demonstrated the importance of the military airlift fleet. Additionally, in a major conflict, as demonstrated in Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, airlift provides the bulk of the initial forces and the capability to deliver additional personnel and equipment for the pre-positioned forces. Continued Congressional support for the C-17 program is essential to maintain our airlift capability into the future. Flight testing of the C-17 is going well and is ahead of schedule. Delivery of the first production aircraft is expected this spring.

I am also pleased to report that the Mobility Requirements Study has been completed. To meet our total mobility requirements, the Department of Defense has developed an Integrated Mobility Plan. Its major components include: the acquisition of additional sealift capacity, including large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships and an expansion of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF); additional forward prepositioning afloat of material and equipment; greater use of “containerization"; COÑUS infrastructure improvements to allow for more rapid movement "from fort to port"; procedural improvements to streamline the deployment of forces; and continuation of the C-17 program to improve the airlift component of strategic mobility.

Space.-Effective employment of Strategic, Atlantic, Pacific and Contingency Forces requires an extensive space capability. One of the most important lessons we learned from Desert Storm was the requirement to achieve total control of space if we are to succeed on the modern battlefield. Early warning, intelligence, weather, surveillance, navigation and C3 requirements dictate the need for a wide variety of space systems, including the means to provide information to field commanders in a timely manner.

Research and development.—As Desert Storm proved, the U.S. produces the most technologically advanced weapon systems in the world. This gives us the edge against any potential enemy and reduces the risk to our own forces. We need to protect this capability, particularly as we move towards a smaller force structure. However, fiscal constraints will force us to make difficult choices and we will not have the luxury, as in the past, of moving from prototyping to full-scale production on every weapon we wish to have. To maintain a critical edge, there is an ongoing and compelling need for continued and significant R&D in a wide spectrum of technologies, applications, and systems.

Reconstitution.-Our final supporting capability is reconstitution. In the event of a reversal of favorable trends in the world-especially in the former Soviet Unionthe United States will face the formidable challenge of building new forces in response. We will need to lay away elements of our current forces' equipment and our military infrastructure, protect the defense industrial base, sustain a cadre of quality leaders, and invest in basic science and high-payoff technologies. We must also keep in mind that, for reconstitution to work, our national leaders must also take action and make decisions in response to early warnings and indications.

FORWARD PRESENCE OPERATIONS

U.S. military forces are often called upon to conduct operations in support of a wide rage of national security objectives. Such activities permit U.S. forces to promote peace, prevent crises from escalating to armed conflict, build relationships, lend a stabilizing presence, protect America lives and property (to include conducting non-combatant evacuations, when necessary) and respond to crises when called upon. Some of the key missions we will continue to be called upon to perform include:

Combatting drugs.-The detection and significant reduction of the production and trafficking of illegal drugs is a high priority mission of our armed forces. To accomplish this mission, we have established a comprehensive program for attacking the