flow of drugs-at the source and in transit. Implementing this program will require the sustained employment of properly trained and equipped forces for the foreseeable future.

Humanitarian assistance.-Increasingly, U.S. forces are being called upon to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at home and abroad. As one of the few nations in the world with the means to respond to disaster rapidly and effectively, many nations depend on us for assistance. In 1991 alone, we distributed food, supplies and other relief assistance to the Kurds in Northern Iraq through Operation Provide Comfort, assisted cyclone victims in Bangladesh in Operation Sea Angel, provided food, shelter and medical aid at Guantanamo Bay for Haitian refugees, assisted victims of the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the Philippines in Operation Fiery Vigil and, in perhaps the clearest indication that the Cold War is over, we have begun a major airlift of food and other aid under Operation Provide Hope to citizens in the former Soviet Union.

Security assistance. The bonds of collective security can be strengthened greatly through programs designed to aid friends and allies and to meet the needs of their countries. Through security assistance, the United States can demonstrate commitment, reinforce alliance cohesion, build upon bilateral relations, and provide a moderating influence vital to regional stability and cooperation. The use of U.S. equipment, training, and professional military education can increase U.S. influence, foster interoperability, and build relationships which help create the global infrastructure crucial to effective crisis response.

TAILORING THE FORCE—THE ACTIVE/RESERVE MIX

Maintaining strong, capable Reserve and Guard forces will remain essential to our military strategy. Make no mistake-our Total Force policy is alive and well! This was clearly demonstrated during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The Guard and Reserves were critical to the success of the mission-we simply could not have done it without them.

Furthermore, as we draw down to the Base Force, we can move certain units or functions into the Reserves to avoid the costs associated with keeping them in the active force structure. Where we can do this without creating risk to our readiness, we will. For example, as the Navy reduces its active structure to 450 ships, certain ships and their associated personnel will move to the Reserves. The Air Force will be shifting certain functions and missions, such as tanker support, into the Guard and Reserves.

The largest part of the Reserve component which we want to reduce is in the Army. During the 1980's, the Army reserve component increased along with the Active force structure because we sought to be better prepared for the contingency of fighting a massive short-warning war against the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. That threat is gone. We are eliminating large portions of the Army's active structure to reflect this new reality. Retaining Army reserve forces at previous levels, designed for a different and far larger threat, makes no sense strategically or fiscally. To maintain these levels, we would be forced to reallocate funds from other critical areas operations, training, maintenance or procurement solely for the purpose of funding force structure we do not need. This risks a return to the "hollow" forces of the past-unable to execute assigned missions when called upon. Ultimately, it would increase the risk to our servicemen and women, and to our nation.

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

It has now been over five years since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Goldwater-Nichols has enhanced the role of the Chairman of the JCS by making him the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense. It has enabled me and the other members of the JCS to provide the best military advice possible in a most responsive fashion.

The Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, which will soon be released to you, outlines in greater detail how the Goldwater-Nichols Act and its impact on the Defense Department contributed to the success of Operation Desert Storm. It helped to provide the CINC with the authority he needed to organize and employ his forces quickly and decisively to defeat Iraq ad liberate Kuwait. It also clarified the roles of the CINCs, Services and defense agencies which enhanced the timely provision of assistance to USCINCCENT when and where needed.

As you know, Goldwater-Nichols also created the position of the Vice Chairman, which has proven invaluable during peace and indispensable during war. Last year, we proposed legislation to make the Vice Chairman a member of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, a proposal supported by the Secretary of Defense and all of the Chiefs. I continue to believe strongly that this is a sound proposal, and one that makes eminent sense, given the significant roles and responsibilities assigned to the Vice Chairman, and I urge the Congress to enact this needed legislation without any restrictions or constraints.

UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

Title 10, U.S. Code, requires the Chairman of the JCS to review periodically the Unified Command Plan (UCP) for missions, responsibilities and force structure for the combatant commands and to recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes to the UCP as may be necessary. The current review of the UCP has been completed and will soon be forwarded to the President. The most significant proposal was the elimination of the Strategic Air Command as a specified command and the establishment of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as a new unified command, consolidating operational command of all strategic nuclear forces under USCINCSTRATCOM. USSTRATCOM is expected to stand up on

1 June 1992.

PRIORITIES FOR THE DEFENSE BUDGET

America's armed forces today are the best this nation has ever fielded. They have served and sacrificed for their country. To preserve this excellence in a period of shrinking resources requires careful planning and firm priorities.

My most critical priority remains the same people. During my tenure as Chairman, this nation has demanded and received tremendous sacrifices from our dedicated men ad women-military and civilian. During Desert Storm, we had Marines sitting aboard their amphibious ships for almost 10 months, much of that time waiting to go into battle. We have had units that spent two, three and even four Christmases away from their homes and families. We have had dedicated civilians who worked around the clock to support our military forces, in peace and war. And now, as much as we appreciate their sacrifice and dedication, we must tell many of these same men and women that they are no longer needed-their job is done.

A million people, civilian and military, will be released from the rolls of the Defense Department by 1996. Most are not leaving voluntarily, they are happy with the career they have chosen. We must do all we can to ease the transition of these dedicated public servants into productive civilian occupations.

Equipment and training are the next two priorities. We must continue to ensure that our forces are the best equipped and best trained in the world. This means adequate investment in research and development, to maintain our qualitative edge, and preventing short-sighted reductions in O&M accounts-reductions which would have to come straight out of training and readiness-in order to achieve false savings in the budget.

Finally, we must continue to exhibit the kind of leadership at all levels that contributed to the success of Desert Storm. From the clear strategic guidance given the military by our commander-in-chief, down to the leadership demonstrated by unit commanders at the tactical level, Desert Storm set the example for the future. The leadership_demonstrated by the Congress in supporting our men and women deployed to Southwest Asia was also a key to our success, as has been your support throughout these past many years.

In conclusion let me assure the members of this committee that we have given a great deal of thought to developing a sound strategy and structuring the proper mix of forces and capabilities to meet the security challenges of the next decade. Both our strategy and our force structure have been carefully crafted to preserve our military strength in a time of fiscal austerity, reduced threat, but residual dangers. We are fully committed to implementing the reductions directed by the President in a prudent and balanced fashion.

We urge you to support our effort.

MARINE CORPS REDUCTIONS

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.

As you know, General, I have said on many occasions publicly I personally believe that the drawdown is going down too fast. But I am also well aware of the realities of life, such as our fiscal condition. It happens to be a bad time in our history, election time, and we have economic problems, et cetera.

This is just a small area, but you are reducing everything, and I realize that in 1951 we passed a law that said we have got to have three Marine divisions. Are you considering reducing that?

General POWELL. No; I am not considering that. I think that the size of the Marine divisions is an open issue, but there is no intention of reducing the number of Marine division flags.

There is a debate within the Department at whether we ought to stop at 177,000 as we go down in the Marine structure or whether we ought to go down to 159,000. Every service has had a debate with the base force. Everybody wanted to be higher. The Marines have a case that has to be very seriously considered, because they are running the highest op tempo of any service.

It is for that reason that as we structured the Marine drawdown to 159,000 we left their reduction down to 159,000 to occur in the last year or two, 1996 and 1997, whereas the other services are racing to get down to their base force level as soon as possible to generate savings, 1993, 1994, 1995. The Marines are going down to their base force level in 1996 and 1997.

That will give the Secretary and me and the Commandant of the Marine Corps and others the chance to see whether the op tempo slacks off any, whether we can reduce some of our forward presence requirements. If we cannot do something to reduce the op tempo of the Corps, then we will have to review what their right base force number is.

But it is not my intention, nor the Secretary's intention, to do anything violative of the 1951 legislation.

RESERVE COMPONENT REDUCTIONS

Senator INOUYE. As Senator Hollings was telling you during the recess, one of the most contentious areas will be on Reserve and National Guard. There are three areas that I would like to explore with you.

One, every State and territory has a Reserve unit, at least one, or Guard unit. All have State missions other than the Federal mission.

Second, they happen to be the most vocal and public supporters of DOD budgets.

Taking those things into mind in your consideration, have you considered transferring some of the Active component missions to the Reserves?

General POWELL. Yes, sir; we should transfer every mission that does not require full-time Active troops to perform to the Reserves. We have no reluctance to do that. The divisions that are coming out of the Active structure are coming out because there is no longer a need for them, either in the Active structure or in the Reserve structure.

The divisions are coming out of the Reserve structure because there is no longer a need for them. I do not think it is appropriate to keep structure in the Reserves just because it is in the Reserves or it is coming out of the Active. If it is not needed, it should go totally out of the force.

The argument is made that it only costs one-quarter to one-third of the Active. That is not entirely true. It depends on the particular

kind of unit, the amount of Active support you have to provide for it, and what the investment cost is.

My view is if you do not need it it should not be in the Reserves or in the Active.

Senator INOUYE. I believe that in all the years I have served on this committee, this fiscal year's budget may be the year's most difficult to defend and protect, because when you combine the economy and the recession and the election, the bill is going to come under intense attack.

We will need all the assistance, and that was my second point. I am afraid that if we slash the Reserves too much you will lose that built-in support that we have had all these years. I think that should be taken into consideration. I realize that has nothing to do with the military mission that you have.

General POWELL. I think I understand that, Senator. We are not trying to destroy the Reserves, but there has been a view expressed by some that we should not suggest any changes in the Reserves and that they become almost an entitlement program, that once they have been created they cannot be brought down, and once you increase them the number cannot be brought down.

I think the number can come down and still have a good solid Reserve. But arguments are being made that that is money going into communities, armories being built. It is my responsibility to let the Members of Congress know when I think that that is an unnecessary expenditure of the taxpayers' money for national security that is not needed at this time.

Senator INOUYE. I am sorry for this interruption, but we will have to go to vote again.

Senator RUDMAN. Colin, I cannot come back. Thank you so much. General POWELL. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for your continued support

[A brief recess was taken.]

SEPARATION PROGRAMS

Senator INOUYE. I realize that the members are still not here, but we anticipate another vote in about 30 minutes.

I just have one more question. I have got a whole flock of these questions I would like to submit to you. Together with about 10 million GI's, when I left the service after World War II, there was very little commotion or concern in the community, because most of the men were draftees and they wanted to get out.

Second, we had a great program, the GI bill, so many of us were occupied, and we were being prepared for the next life.

A lot of the job slots had been held by women during the war, and when the war ended they very peacefully left and the men came back again.

Now, this situation does not exist today: No GI bill; your manpower are all made up of volunteers, who believe they have a contract with the Government of the United States; and we have great unemployment today.

Are we doing anything to prepare these men and women? Or are we just giving them the pink slip and say, thank you very much? General POWELL. We are doing a great deal to help with the transition process, Senator. We feel very strongly that we ought to

help our troops. Some of them, of course, do have Montgomery GI bill benefits at the end of their term. Those that are taking advantage of a separation bonus will have a lump sum cushion they can use for education or to tide them over.

All of our posts now have in place transition planning offices, job opportunities offices. We are running job fairs at all of our posts. We are teaching folks how to prepare resumes.

What we are not doing, what we cannot do, is find them a job. Senator INOUYE. Can you give us a memo on this?

General POWELL. Yes; I would be delighted to provide you with that.

Senator INOUYE. As to how many men and women are finding jobs.

General POWELL. We will try, we will see if we can do that. I will also, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, give you a laydown of the programs we do have to help with the transition of our troops. [The information follows:]

Neither OSD nor the Services are maintaining statistics on the number of jobs found by personnel who have transitioned out of the military. The intent of the DOD transition program is to provide a vehicle for potential employers to reach our departing Service members and educate our personnel in interviewing techniques, resume writing, etc. giving them the skills and confidence to face the civilian job market. Actual job placement is beyond the scope of the DOD transition program, hence, no mechanism is in place to measure how many men and women are finding jobs. The DOD program is designed to assist separating personnel determine their bestfit private sector opportunities. DOD has also developed a number of programs in conjunction with other Federal agencies to benefit our departing personnel. Additionally, as a supplement to the programs developed DOD-wide, a number of Service specific initiatives have been implemented.

The Defense Outplacement Referral System, or DORS, is the automated registry and referral of military, civilian, and spouse applicant mini-resumes to potential employers. Resumes will be provided to employers based on an individual's geographic and occupational preferences. All Services are providing DORS to their separating personnel. Applicant participation is on a voluntary basis via personal computers located in Service transition offices worldwide. Employers may request resumes by phone or mail.

The Transition Bulletin Board, an electronic bulletin board accessible to Service members, DOD employees, and spouses at transition offices, will allow employers to place ads for employment openings via a toll-free PC modem call. It will also provide a vehicle for disseminating other announcements pertinent to DOD transition. Verification of Military Experience and Training will assist Service members in verifying previous experience and training to potential employers, writing resumes, job interviews, negotiating school credits, and obtaining certificates or licenses. A standard DOD document will be provided to all eligible military departees verifying their military experience, training history, associated civilian equivalent job title(s), and recommended educational credit information.

The Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is a joint program between DOD, the US Department of Labor (DOL), and US Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) which consists of, a series of career options and veterans' benefits workshops. Currently, these workshops are held on a routine basis at over 125 military installations across the United States with a projected increase to 178 installations by the end of 1992. A typical TAP workshop is 3-days long and covers resume and cover letter writing, job interview preparation, skills analysis, dress and grooming, veterans' benefits, and stress management.

The Disabled Transition Assistance Program (DTAP) is similar to and conducted in conjunction with TAP, but includes a 1-day seminar with a DVA counselor for those Service members separating due to a disability.

Job Fairs sponsored by the Non Commissioned Officers Association (NCOA) are offered free of charge to all separating or retiring military personnel, all veterans, and all spouses. One does not have to be a member of the NCOA to participate and all ranks and grades are welcome. Job fairs are 2-day events conducted on or near a military installation and are held throughout the continental United States and Europe. The fair provides a Career Transition Seminar to help develop interviewing