Case Studies in War-to-peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and UgandaWorld Bank Publications, 1996 - 348 من الصفحات World Bank Discussion Paper No. 331. With the assistance of Emilio Mondo, Taimi Sitari, and Tadesse A. Woldu. Provides a detailed analysis of the intricate nature of the political, economic, and sociocultural issues that arise during the transition from war to peace in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda. These countries offer a unique range of conditions and program models, as well as a variety of successes and failures from which to learn. A recently released overview, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa (Stock no. 13581; ISBN 0-8213-3581-2), is based on these country studies and a synthesis of reports of demobilization and reintegration programs in several other countries. |
من داخل الكتاب
النتائج 1-5 من 14
الصفحة 5
... Koevoet were violent , disruptive , and repressive until their disbandment in October 1989. Fearing retaliation , many Koevoet members departed for South Africa after independence in 1990. SWATF and Koevoet ex - combatants did not ...
... Koevoet were violent , disruptive , and repressive until their disbandment in October 1989. Fearing retaliation , many Koevoet members departed for South Africa after independence in 1990. SWATF and Koevoet ex - combatants did not ...
الصفحة 131
... Koevoet ( the paramilitary unit of SWATF ) as well as the withdrawal of the SADF . Fighters of the PLAN and SWATF were , therefore , the target group of demobilization and reintegration support . Overall , these armies comprised some ...
... Koevoet ( the paramilitary unit of SWATF ) as well as the withdrawal of the SADF . Fighters of the PLAN and SWATF were , therefore , the target group of demobilization and reintegration support . Overall , these armies comprised some ...
الصفحة 132
... Koevoet range from 2,500 to 4,000 . It is known that 1,600 Koevoet combatants were demobilized by UNTAG in autumn 1989 after having violently harassed communities in northern Namibia ; however , SADF had transferred Koevoet to the South ...
... Koevoet range from 2,500 to 4,000 . It is known that 1,600 Koevoet combatants were demobilized by UNTAG in autumn 1989 after having violently harassed communities in northern Namibia ; however , SADF had transferred Koevoet to the South ...
الصفحة 135
... Koevoet members . Many had served in particularly notorious units and were transferred to SWAPOL before demobilization . It is possible that these , therefore , decided not to register with the government and intentionally gave up ...
... Koevoet members . Many had served in particularly notorious units and were transferred to SWAPOL before demobilization . It is possible that these , therefore , decided not to register with the government and intentionally gave up ...
الصفحة 136
... Koevoet to SWAPOL to avoid the demobilization of these forces . As members of SWAPOL , they consequently were not eligible for any of the support measures but may have been catered to under a separate arrange- ment . These reassigned ex ...
... Koevoet to SWAPOL to avoid the demobilization of these forces . As members of SWAPOL , they consequently were not eligible for any of the support measures but may have been catered to under a separate arrange- ment . These reassigned ex ...
المحتوى
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طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
activities Addis Ababa administrative agricultural AIDB Angola areas army Bank beneficiaries benefits budget capital cash civilian combatants Commission committees component coordination Defense Demobilization and Reintegration Derg ex-soldiers discharge centers donors DVAC DVPO DVRs economic reintegration ELCIN employment EPRDF ESRF established estimated Ethiopian expenditures funds implementation included income-generating initially interventions iron sheets issues Kampala Koevoet lack land million Ministry MLRR monitoring and evaluation Namibia needs NGOs offices OLF ex-fighters overall OXFAM participation payment percent phase II veterans PLAN ex-combatants predischarge orientation problems projects received regional Rehabilitation reinsertion reintegration program repatriation Report resettlement program rural SADF sector settlers skills soldiers South Africa staff SWAPO SWATF target group transition transport Uganda Veterans Assistance UNHCR urban USAID UVAB UVAB's UVAP UVAP's vocational training Windhoek World Bank
مقاطع مشهورة
الصفحة 281 - By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital — tools and training that enhance individual productivity — "social capital" refers to features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in physical and human capital.
الصفحة 345 - Guaranty"), between the Lender and the United States of America, acting through the Agency for International Development ("AID"), hereby assigns to AID, without recourse (i) its entire right, title and interest in and to the Note of the Borrower referred to above (which Note is attached hereto), including its rights to unpaid interest on such Note, and (ii) its entire outstanding right, title and interest arising out...
الصفحة 218 - Program for the Alleviation of Poverty and the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAPSCA...
الصفحة 273 - ... the unemployment rate and the rate of inflation were, in their opinion, somewhat low when fixed values were given for the other objectives. This can at least in part be explained by the fact that the model was not used for forecasting but for optimization purposes, and the feasible region of the decision variables may not have corresponded exactly to the one considered relevant in the current economic situation.
الصفحة xi - The transition from war to peace is a complex process marked by the need to stabilize the economy, demilitarize the country (demobilization and demining being paramount), reintegrate dislocated populations, protect the most vulnerable war victims (children, disabled, and widows), and reestablish civil society and good governance.
الصفحة 168 - The three-year phased implementation will involve 25 percent of stateside hospital locations in the first year, an additional 50 percent in the second year, and the remaining 25 percent in the third year. To the extent that the program is successful in redirecting existing CHAMPUS workload to military medical treatment facilities or network providers, funds budgeted for CHAMPUS will be realigned to support this effort.
الصفحة xviii - Ministry of Education and Culture Ministry of Health and Social Services Ministry of Trade and Industry Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources...
الصفحة 56 - Ethiopian reintegration experience it was explained that "...the urban target group was more complex and difficult than that of the rural ex-combatants because of the diverse social and economic backgrounds of the ex-combatants, the tightness of the urban labour market and different measures required to assist this group
الصفحة xiii - A successful demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) for ex-combatants is the key to an effective transition from war to peace. The success of this first step following the signing of a peace accord signals the end to organized conflict and thereby provides the security necessary for people affected by war to reinvest in their lives and their country.
الصفحة xviii - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees National Union for the Total Independence of Angola...