Central America. We believe that the support has been successful largely because we have taken a team approach to the problem. Support is provided through whichever agency or service is best able to provide the support for all personnel at a site, regardless of Service.

SOUTHCOM is providing outstanding command, control, and communications with limited assets and personnel. Suspected narcotrafficking aircraft information is coordinated with the Joint Air Operations Center from U.S. provided Ground Based Radars (GBRS) in the participating nations, air platforms, and PATS through an established Single Channel Tactical Satellite Radio network which is heavily used. The GBRs are military assets manned with U.S. military personnel. Each GBR site requires a Multi-Channel Tactical Satellite van which provides secure and nonsecure telephone access, fax capability, and message traffic. Connectivity with some participating nations include secure air-to-ground and air-to-air communications, allowing Detection and Monitor (D&M) aircraft to provide real time information to participating law enforcement agencies during on-going operations. SOUTHCOM, in conjunction with DOS, provides releasable secure telephones, allowing each participating nation to coordinate with the country team or other participating nations during CD operations. SOUTHCOM also provides communications support to interagencies such as U.S. Customs, NSA, and DEA. DEA receives its support through the SOUTHCOM-provided Counter Narcotics Command Management System.

FORCE PROTECTION OF OUR FORCES IN YOUR THEATER

Senator LIEBERMAN. It seems to me that there is great potential of attacks on U.S. troops in certain parts of Latin America based an our involvement in the drug interdiction effort. What has been accomplished in your command beyond mere policy revisions that has improved the posture of force protection for our forces in your theater?

General CLARK. Per Secretary of Defense Directives, I am assigned to protect Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and their families, facilities, and other material resources from criminal attacks and acts of terrorism. The objectives of SOUTHCOM's Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) program are to assist units, teams, and personnel in avoiding situations that facilitate crime and terrorist attacks, and deter or mitigate the severity of criminal or terrorist attacks.

Here are some of the actions we are taking: Added Antiterrorism/Force Protection shortfalls (personnel requirements, MilGrp armored vehicles, MilGrp communication upgrades) to our Integrated Priority List for Fiscal Years 1998-2003; inspected Ground Based Radar (GBR) sites in Peru and Colombia and improved their physical security; established GBR site deployment standards; initiated Inspector General (IG) AT/FP inspections of Military Groups and helped them strengthen force protection procedures and capabilities; provided guidance to Commanders of our Military Groups on AT/FP Directive Authority and have insured that they will require transient and temporary personnel to comply with strict force protection measures; assessed Naval Station Panama and new Miami HQ AT/FP postures and implemented new requirements; completed DOD IG inspection checklist to improve overall security awareness; and inspected DOD's education activities in Panama and upgraded security there.

SOUTHCOM is in the process of completing: inspecting Components' force protection posture; assessing deployment directives for AT/FP JCS requirements; updating the SOUTHCOM AT/FP regulation; incorporating AT/FP requirements in theater/ country clearance; establishing a sub-directory on GCCS-SOUTHCOM Homepage for Anti-Terrorism with pre-deployment AT/FP requirements and AT/FP regulations and directives, threat information and links to other AT home pages; and scheduling DSWA inspections of MilGrps and GBR sites.

Our desired end state is: AT/FP Assessment standards formalized and pre-deployment training accomplished and certified; and inspections accomplished and assistance provided as needed. AT/FP becomes a mindset-second nature in all operations. AT/FP objectives reinforce avoidance of situations which aid terrorists and promote preparedness when avoidance is not possible.

JCS directed training completed to date:

• Level 1-Individual personal protection awareness: Staff currently trained at 50 percent; Goal is 100 percent by 30 April.

Level 2-Train the Trainer: SOUTHCOM AT staff (1 person trained).

• Level 3-Leadership Commanders (No JCS guidance to date).

• Level 4-Senior "Executive" NDU Seminar: SOUTHCOM 0-6 scheduled for April 97. INTAC-Individual Terrorism Awareness Course: Two AT/FP action officers attended.

CURRENT AND FUTURE THREATS IN THE THEATER

Senator LIEBERMAN. With democracy flourishing in most of Latin-America, what do see as the current threat to the region and U.S. interests? In your opinion, what might the threat posture look like 5, 10, and 20 years hence?

General CLARK. Foremost among our current challenges are the transnational problems of narcotrafficking, illegal migration and terrorism.

Illegal drugs from Latin America cause profound harm to American society. More than 20 years of narcotrafficking have led to well developed trafficking organizations and embedded infrastructures, which are often sustained by efforts to corrupt governments and security forces in many countries.

Increasingly, the governments and societies of the region recognize that billions of dollars of illicit funds and the production and transit of these illegal drugs damage their people, institutions of government and environment. The once popular cry that drugs were solely an American problem is now seldom heard. But as these societies turn increasingly to combat this cancer-each in its own way and at its own pace-they are also recognizing that a truly multilateral approach is needed, and, in particular, that they need help from the United States.

Combating illegal immigration is another concern we share with our hemispheric neighbors. Approximately a million and a half illegal migrants traveling from Mexico, Central America, and South America were apprehended in the United States last year. However, each year approximately 275,000 illegal migrants succeed in gaining entry into the United States. People smuggling is a $10 billion industry. Maritime offloads into El Salvador and Guatemala result in the movement of thousands of illegal Chinese and Indian aliens toward the United States each year.

This is not just a United States problem. In Costa Rica there are more than 600,000 illegal Nicaraguans, 14 percent of the Costa Rican population. There are estimates of 20,000 illegal migrants in French Guyana, 20,000 in Bolivia, several hundred thousand in Brazil, and between 3 and 5 million Colombians residing illegally in Venezuela. Often, these migration flows cause domestic instability and higher tensions between neighbors.

Another source of tension is terrorism, long a characteristic of the profound political stresses in many countries of this region. In 1996, there were 84 international terrorist acts in Latin America, a 9 percent decrease over the previous year's 92 incidents. The terrorist takeover of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru by Peruvian terrorists and its subsequent hostage crisis is clearly the year's most serious event in Latin America. Although no Americans are still being held captive, seven were initially taken and detained for almost a week before being released. While this region follows Europe in total international terrorist incidents, it leads the world with the most anti-United States attacks.

While bombings of multinational oil pipelines and kidnappings-for-ransom are still the most common form of terrorism, major transnational groups in the region include Hamass, Hizballah and others. Hizballah is believed responsible for the 1992 and 1994 car bombings against Jewish targets in Buenos Aires. Other Islamic extremists were arrested last October for a suspected plot to bomb the United States Embassy in Asuncion, Paraguay. Middle East-based groups also use Latin America as a safe haven and support base for operations world wide. But we also have to think of our security interests in broader terms than just "threats." For example, over two thirds of the 13,500 annual transits of the Panama Canal are headed to or from the U.S. Any disruption of this shipping would have a significant economic impact. Moreover, the increasingly favorable trends toward free markets and democracy in Latin America rest on fragile institutions. Continued U.S. engagement, including engagement by U.S. military elements, is needed to reinforce these trends and work to prevent a return to the old patterns of widespread corruption, autocracy, and military rule.

Latin American and Caribbean nations are moving together in an unprecedented spirit of political and military cooperation and economic integration. This and past trends indicate the threat of major conflict in the region will remain small-to-nonexistent through the next 20 years. While some traditional disputes between neighbors such as Ecuador and Peru-may occur, they will likely be small-scale and limited in duration, damage, and casualties. As economic integration and democratic governance increasingly solidify, this already low threat of major conflict will further diminish.

Narcotrafficking, violent crime, domestic and regional terrorism and insurgencies will continue to challenge the region in varying degrees. Narcotrafficking profits assure the continuity of this criminal pursuit for the long term. Proliferating war materials from resolved regional insurgencies, ex-combatants unable to integrate into national work forces, increasingly skewed economic distribution, corrupt police

forces, and porous international borders will support violent crime and remaining insurgencies. Social issues will continue to challenge countries with less developed political institutions. Continued economic austerity measures-essential to regional growth-will fuel domestic discontent in the short term, diminishing as populations experience benefits from these reforms. Natural disasters will continue to call for United States Forces' involvement in humanitarian efforts.

Socioeconomic imbalances will continue to fuel illegal migration to the United States and within the region. Cuba's inevitable transition will be a destabilizing event as economic and political and social readjustments occur. Economic and social turbulence could pose a situation in which United States forces could become involved.

In addition, the U.S. must not take for granted its current preeminence throughout much of the hemisphere. As other economies grow-in Latin America, Europe, and perhaps most significantly, Asia-our influence is likely to be increasingly challenged. Geostrategic competition emerging elsewhere could be echoed in our own hemisphere, with unforeseeable but potentially profound consequences.

COUNTERPROLIFERATION PREPARATIONS AND CHALLENGES

Senator LIEBERMAN. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the clear advantage that U.S. military forces now have in conventional arms suggests that potential adversaries may attempt to engage us by unconventional means. How are you preparing for this type of threat and what do you see as your most difficult challenge?

General SHELTON. We have several initiatives underway at USSOCOM designed to counter the proliferation and deter the use of weapons of mass destruction. We have conducted three separate mission analyses of the counterproliferation mission. The first analysis identified 39 specific technologies required to assist our forces in dealing successfully with weapons of mass destruction. We are pursuing development and testing of these technologies. The second analysis examined the requirements of our components. The third analysis sought to develop the geographic combatant commanders' requirements for our forces in support of their counterproliferation concept plans.

In an effort to further define combatant commanders' requirements for special operations forces, elements of my staff and the staff of the United States European Command conducted a series of table-top assessments focused on three specific proliferation pathways. [Deleted]. These results will be provided to all of the combatant commanders to assist them in the continued refinement of their counterproliferation plans.

We routinely coordinate with the interagency community regarding the counterproliferation mission area. We participate in upper level, table-top exercises and workshops designed to assist the interagency community in more clearly defining policy and delineating responsibilities in the counterproliferation arena.

All of these activities work to improve the capabilities of our forces to deal with weapons of mass destruction. [Deleted.]

JOINT FORCE ASSISTANCE

Senator LIEBERMAN. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the clear advantage that U.S. military forces now have in conventional arms suggests that potential adversaries may attempt to engage us by unconventional means. How can Congress assist in building a more joint force?

General SHELTON. We are satisfied with the current status of joint interoperability on the military side of the house. Our forces over the past 10 years have matured and developed into a truly joint force, capable of task organizing to engage in and successfully execute a wide variety of contingencies and missions.

However, because counterproliferation must be viewed as a process rather than an isolated event, it demands a daily level of interagency coordination and integration far more extensive than required in other activities. United States government policy on counterproliferation is developing and evolving daily. We have identified counterproliferation related material and technology shortfalls that are being addressed through the Department of Defense budget. The continuing maturation and refinement of our capabilities and technologies against weapons of mass destruction provides the United States a narrowly focused but highly capable response to weapons of mass destruction incidents.

[Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 1997

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC.

UNIFIED COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY
STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Thurmond, Kempthorne, Inhofe, Levin, Robb, and Cleland.

Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; Scott Stucky, general counsel; and Christine K. Cimko, communications director.

Professional staff members present: Bert K. Mizusawa, Cord A. Sterling, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, minority staff director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, minority counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Patrick T. Henry, professional staff member; Andrew W. Johnson, professional staff member; Peter K. Levin, minority counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member. Staff assistant present: Jennifer L. Wallace.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; G. Wayne Glass, assistant to Senator Bingaman; John P. Stevens, assistant to Senator Glenn; William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; Mike Williams assistant to Senator Cleland; and Peggy Kleia, assistant to Senator Snowe.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND,

CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order. The committee meets today to receive testimony from the Unified Commanders on their military strategies and operational requirements and defense authorization requests for fiscal year 1998. We would like to welcome Gen. John J. Sheehan, Commander in Chief,

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United States Atlantic Command-raise your hand, please Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command; Gen. Howell M. Estes III, Commander in Chief, United States Space Command; and Gen. Walter Kross, Commander in Chief, United States Transportation Command.

We appreciate your appearing before the committee today.

The committee attaches a high degree of importance to the views of our senior operational commanders. We are particularly interested in operational requirements and the needs of our military forces in the field. Gentlemen, the committee requests that you address the missions your forces are conducting or must be prepared to conduct, and the strategy you have formulated to achieve your command missions.

We are especially interested in whether the forces and capabilities assigned or available to your commands are sufficient to accomplish your mission, and whether you are satisfied with the current and projected state of readiness. The committee also asks that you share your views on the fiscal year 1998 defense budget request and the future years defense program. Do these requests adequately support your requirements? Were any major initiatives or programs underfunded?

I look forward to the testimony and exploring a number of issues with this distinguished panel. Before recognizing our witnesses, however, let me turn to the ranking minority member, Senator Levin, for any opening statement he may wish to make.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, first, let me join you in welcoming our witnesses this morning. They are all distinguished professionals. They are well-known to this committee and to each of us on this committee. They play a key role in some of the most important issues that we face in Congress and that the Defense Department faces in its own internal deliberations for the Quadrennial Defense Review.

I look forward to hearing from them and to asking many questions and hearing their answers to the questions of this committee, including the ones that our chairman has enumerated. But let me at this point simply welcome them and thank them for their service to our Nation.

Chairman THURMOND. We are now pleased to hear from you distinguished gentlemen. You can place your entire statement in the record and brief it. After all, briefness is a very important quality. [Laughter.]

Chairman THURMOND. We are glad to hear from you, General. STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN J. SHEEHAN, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

General SHEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before the committee. As you mentioned, I would ask that my formal statement be submitted for the record, and I will be very brief in my summation. The year 1996 was a relatively quiet year for U.S. Atlantic Command, in the Caribbean especially. Although we still do have 484 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in Haiti providing U.S. pres