ever, you caveated many of your answers by saying "it is to early to tell" if the DOE plan will work and that it was "possible" that the DOE plan would not work. Have the concerns you articulated last spring been alleviated? Do you see any vulnerabilities with the Department's plans to maintain the stockpile at current requirement levels? Do you feel DOE will be able to deliver required quantities of tritium and limited life components?

General HABIGER. This year's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan is near final publication, and it is a significant improvement over last year's plan. The Department of Energy plans appear to meet DOD needs in maintaining the required stockpile levels. Given the importance of the issue and the uncertainties about the future, their plans must stay on track. We will be a vigilant customer in that regard. It is crucial that the Nation support these efforts.

NUCLEAR WARHEAD CERTIFICATION

Senator GLENN. What confidence do you have in our ability to certify warheads in the year 2010 and beyond? How might any uncertainties in warhead certification impact your ability to carry out your mission?

General HABIGER. The Department of Energy is required to certify the reliability and safety of the Nation's nuclear stockpile. I am charged with reporting on my confidence in the safety and reliability as part of a new annual certification process directed by the President. This job will certainly be more difficult without nuclear testing, but the experts testify that they are confident they can do the job provided the promised tools of the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program are delivered on schedule. As the number of warheads in the stockpile declines, each weapon plays a commensurately greater role in our warplans.

Senator GLENN. How would you propose that the U.S. certify its enduring nuclear stockpile and inactive Reserve if we find that the Department of Energy's Science Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program fails to produce useful test data, either because a facility is shut down as a result of a lawsuit or a technical barrier cannot be successfully overcome?

General HABIGER. DOD will continue to look to the Department of Energy's Laboratory Directors to certify the reliability and safety of their respective warheads. I will also use the expertise of the Strategic Advisory Group to assess independently the safety and reliability of the stockpile based upon the same information available to the Lab Directors and other involved government agencies. Ultimately, if the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense lose confidence in the safety and reliability of a weapon critical to the Nation's deterrent, the President has declared his willingness to withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty under the Supreme National Interest clause and conduct necessary nuclear tests.

DOE FLIGHT TESTING PROGRAM

Senator GLENN. Can you give us your assessment of how well the nuclear weapon flight testing program is being carried out under the auspices of the Department of Energy? Is the program on schedule? Is there sufficient funding and vehicle flexibility (i.e., spare platforms) in this program to allow follow-on flight tests, should a significant problem be identified?

General HABIGER. This is primarily a question for the Air Force and Navy. I support their efforts in this area and will stay engaged as required. The flight test program appears to be in satisfactory condition. The DOE expects to be back on track by fiscal year 1999.

REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN THE INACTIVE STOCKPILE

Senator GLENN. Have you established a specific requirement that the Department of Energy maintain the inactive nuclear weapons stockpile in the same state of readiness as the active stockpile? In your opinion, is DOE maintaining the inactive and active stockpile in the same state of readiness?

General HABIGER. This year's Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum and its accompanying Long Range Planning Assessment stipulate that the active and Inactive Stockpiles will be maintained to the same standards. The Secretary of Defense has signed the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum, and it is awaiting signature by the Secretary of Energy.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHARLES S. ROBB

COMMERCIAL AUGMENTATION OF AERIAL REFUELING

Senator ROBB. The AMC Master Plan of 1997 indicates that you have a significant deficit in your aerial refueling capability at least through 2003. A General Accounting Office Report on aerial refueling estimates cost per flight hour of over $6,000 in fiscal year 1996 to over $11,000 in fiscal year 2002. Commercial sources will be provided to the Canadian Air Force commencing in September 1997 at a cost of $5,500. Have you evaluated or will you evaluate whether or not contractors or civil aircraft could be used successfully to supplement your existing assets?

General KROSs. While the option of commercial augmentation looks good on the surface, there are several reasons why commercial augmentation of aerial refueling will not increase our ability to meet requirements.

The deficit in aerial refueling capability lies in our wartime requirement. The utility of commercial augmentation is minimal because its use would be limited to nonor very low-threat environments. An OSD study on privatization noted that all tanker aircraft and aircrews may be called upon to support employment of combat aircraft in theater or to support Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) bombers. Although tanker aircraft may fly noncombat aerial refueling missions during the early portion of the deployment phase, they will be required later in the scenario for direct combat support. These missions are not candidates for commercial augmentation.

During peacetime, there is no known deficiency of receiver training due to tanker availability. Again, the OSD study noted the primary objective of peacetime aerial refueling is to obtain and maintain proficiency and currency in all aspects of refueling operations, for both the refuelers and the receivers. This objective requires consistency in training, where refuelers and receivers train exactly as expected to fly in combat.

You mentioned the GAD figures for flying hour costs. These figures are misleading as they do not resemble any Air Force standard cost figures. The GAO figures seem to be an average of all KC-135 Program Elements divided by the total number of flying hours. These figures inappropriately include all dollars associated with operations of a base such as manpower and infrastructure costs not related to the KC135. Current figures for KC-135 flying hours are approximately $2,000 per flying hour, far short of the GAO $6,000 estimate.

In conclusion, I find no compelling evidence of any cost savings to the DOD by privatizing air refueling. While privatization is beneficial and cost-effective in many areas, air refueling is not one of them.

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1997

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

U.S. SENATE,

Washington, DC.

UNIFIED COMMANDERS ON THEIR MILITARY
STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Coats, Smith, Inhofe, Snowe, Levin, and Robb.

Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; Scott Stucky, general counsel; and Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, Lucia M. Chavez, Paul M. Longsworth, Stephen L. Madey, Jr., Bert K. Mizusawa, and Cord A. Sterling.

Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, minority staff director; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Andrew W. Johnson, professional staff member; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Shawn H. Edwards, Cristina Fiori, and Sharen E. Reaves.

Research assistant present: Pamela L. Farrell.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley and Joe Sixeas, assistants to Senator Warner; Christopher J. Paul, assistant to Senator McCain; Pamela G.D. Sellars, assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford and Dino L. Carluccio, assistants to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; John F. Luddy II, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier, assistant to Senator Santorum; Suzanne M. McKenna and Randy J. Rydell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Martin McBroom, assistant to Senator Byrd; William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; and Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts.

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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

The Armed Services Committee convenes this morning to complete a series of hearings with our Nation's combatant commanders. Our witnesses this morning are Gen. George A. Joulwan, Commander in Chief of U.S. European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Adm. Joseph W. Prueher, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command; and Gen. John H. Tilelli, Jr., Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and Combined Forces Command, and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea. We have great respect for each of you, and appreciate your dedication and service to our Nation. It is a pleasure to welcome you all here today.

Together, our witnesses command U.S. armed forces responsible for carrying out U.S. military operations in the strategically vital European and Asia-Pacific Areas of Responsibility which comprise over half the world's land mass, population, and economic might. Currently, General Joulwan's European Command has forces deployed to Bosnia as part of Operation Joint Endeavor, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of Task Force Able Sentry, and Northern Iraq and Turkey as part of Operation Northern Watch. While we all breathe a sigh of relief at the extremely low casualties thus far in Bosnia, we are concerned with the costs of that operation and its effects on our readiness to deploy forces elsewhere, as well as the effect it has had on the quality of life of our service personnel and their families. Quality of life issues are becoming more important to readiness, as the Army, which has borne the brunt of the Bosnia operation, experiences difficulty in recruiting the soldiers it will need for future operations.

In Admiral Prueher's Pacific Command area of responsibility (AOR), the increasing strategic importance of Asia, and the challenges posed by a resurgent China, will continue to demand our attention and shape our operations. Additionally, the Korean Peninsula will remain a primary concern and a major factor in determining military requirements as a volatile North Korea struggles with its future. The committee is interested in learning how the Pacific Command is responding to these challenges and the extent to which its resources are adequate both to conduct daily operations and to prepare to support a major regional conflict in Korea.

General Tilelli's sub-unified command in Korea demonstrates our steadfast commitment to continued stability on the Korean Peninsula and to a smooth transition to reunification when that occurs. The committee would like to know what it can do better to enable the Combined Forces Command to defend effectively against North Korean conventional and asymmetric military capabilities, including ballistic missiles, special forces, and chemical and biological weapons. Of course, the quality of life of our service personnel in Korea, as well as throughout the Pacific Command, is also a continuing concern.

The collective responsibility of our Nation's combatant commanders is to translate our national military strategy into successful operations. The committee wants to ensure that the combatant com

manders before us today have sufficient military resources to accomplish their missions without unnecessary risk.

I should say in closing that this is likely to be General Joulwan's last appearance before this committee, as he will retire this summer after 36 years of active military service. General Joulwan, I salute you for your long and distinguished career in the service of our Nation, and wish you and your wife Karen all the best in your future endeavors.

Again, I extend to each of you a warm welcome on behalf of the committee, and we look forward to your testimony.

Before the witnesses begin their prepared statements, I would like to give the ranking minority member, the distinguished Senator Levin, the opportunity to make a statement if he cares to do

So.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me join you in welcoming our witnesses. General Joulwan, also let me join in the chairman's commendation and special greeting to you on your visit here and your pending retirement, well deserved.

In January I made a week-long trip to Bosnia and the Balkan region, and as a result I concluded that we would need to have a follow-on force after the NATO-led stabilization force's 18-month mission ends in June of 1998. I also concluded that the United States worldwide commitments precluded the continued participation of U.S. ground combat units in Bosnia, but that the European security and defense identify within NATO was tailor-made, at least potentially, for a Western European-led follow-on force, again. inside of NATO.

In an assessment that echos my conclusion, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Hughes, testified before this committee in early February that we do not foresee the outbreak of widespread fighting between the Bosnian factions over the next 18 months so long as SFOR remains a credible military force. However, if civil implementation of Dayton lags, the prospects for renewed fighting would increase significantly following SFOR's withdrawal due to the unrealized aims of the Bosnian factions, closed quote.

So I was disappointed with the results of the recent trip to Germany, Italy, Bosnia, and NATO headquarters of Secretary Cohen. He and General Shalikashvali had agreed with me during their testimony earlier this month and last month that the United States ground forces will not stay in Bosnia beyond June of 1998. He also agreed that the creation of a European security and defense identity within NATO which is designed to allow the Western European Union to conduct military operations, would be one possible avenue for a follow-on force to SFOR.

Secretary Cohen stated that he intended to inform our NATO allies that U.S. ground combat forces would be leaving in June of 1998, and that he intended to raise the possibility of a Western European Union follow-on force. Unfortunately, our European allies expressed no interest in staying in Bosnia after American ground forces leave. This response of our European allies leads me to wonder, and I will be talking to General Joulwan about it this morning,