ship delivery. That is because these components are installed early, and the ship is built around them. Many of these components such as reactor vessels and steam generators, require over 4 years to order and manufacturer from the time funds are made available. That is why we need to get started on long lead components in fiscal year 1976 to meet a delivery of March 1983. The Aegis radar and fire control system equipment is installed later in the construction period. The shipbuilder will not be ready for it until 18 to 24 months prior to delivery, or not before about March 1981, which is compatible with the Aegis schedule. Mr. LEIGHTON. The problem is not just the long lead Government furnished material that the shipbuilder needs. The shipbuilder also has to order long lead materials and machinery that he needs early in the construction period. He must start his engineers in design work and commit his facilities and manpower to the ship construction. That is why the ship construction must be authorized next year, in fiscal year 1977, if we are to have it delivered in March 1983. One of the problems that we face with our shipbuilders is the uncertainty of long-range shipbuilding programs. If the Navy does not get authority to enter into negotiations leading to a shipbuilding contract but is only given authority in increments from year to year to perform limited work, the shipbuilders are forced to defer commitments to the Navy while they seek to book out-year capacity with other customers. Mr. MAHON. If Congress funds the strike cruiser, and you have asked for $60 million now for long leadtime items, but if we fund the strike cruiser, can we eliminate funds for the DLGN-42, which is, as I understand it, a ship of the cruiser type? DLGN-42 CONSTRUCTION Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir. The DLGN-42, or CGN-42 as it was redesignated on the first of July, is the last ship of the Virginia class the same as the Texas. That ship is the best type air defense ship we now have in the Navy, and it has many weapons that no other class of ships has. Furthermore, it can later operate in conjunction with an Aegis ship, when we get the Aegis ships. That is because the Aegis ships are intended to provide weapons direction to non-Aegis ships. Even if it were decided later to convert the CGN-42 to Aegis, the Navy has made studies which show it would be cheaper to build the DLGN42 now and convert it later on than it would be to delay it to make it an Aegis ship as originally constructed. I will give you the figures for that. Mr. MAHON. You can insert it in the record. Admiral RICKOVER. I think I should tell you this now. The Navy estimates that the end cost to build the DLGN-42, a Virginia class ship, and later convert to Aegis in fiscal 1977 program year dollars is $726 million. The comparable estimate to defer the ship until 1982 and build it initially as an Aegis ship is about $930 million. By building DLGN-42 you will get a valuable and necessary ship for the fleet which may never be converted to Aegis anyway since it isn't necessary to have a large number of Aegis ships. Mr. MAHON. Admiral, Navy witnesses testified last year that only the Aegis system will be able to meet the air threat in the 1980's. We were told this year that Aegis could not be installed on DLGN-42 without a major redesign effort. According to present schedules DLGN-42 cannot be delivered to the fleet until 1979 at the earliest. Why should we spend $386 million for DLGN-42 if it will be unable to meet the air threat of the 1980's? Admiral RICKOVER. While it is true that the Tartar D system on DLGN-42 will not be as effective as the AEGIS system, the DLGN42 still be able to destroy aircraft and cruise missiles. The DLGN42 will be able to launch the same missiles used in the Aegis system and by means of data links with an Aegis ship will be able to increase the capability of a single Aegis ship. Furthermore, the DLGN-42 will carry a helicopter and the latest design sonar for antisubmarine warfare and will be able to carry Harpoon antiship missiles to engage other surface ships. Mr. MAHON. What is the relative cost of building DLGN-42 as a follow ship of the Virginia class and converting it to Aegis later, compared to the cost of delaying the ship to build it with Aegis from the beginning? You have commented on that. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes; it is $930 million if you decide delaying it for Aegis, which is more money than it would be to build it and convert it later on if the decision is made to convert Virginia class ships to Aegis. Mr. LEIGHTON. Mr. Chairman, may I introduce in the record at this point Secretary Schlesinger's statement to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on why it is that we should go ahead with this ship and not hold it up for Algis or cancel it? Mr. MAHON. We will put that in the record at this point. EXTRACT FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER'S APPEAL OF JUNE 6, 1975, TO ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES CONFERENCE a. DLGN-42. The House deleted $53.1 million from the amount requested for the final full funding increment of DLGN-42 on the premise that this amount was not required in fiscal year 1976 for contract escalation obligations. The Senate did not authorize DLGN-42 because it would not be built with AEGIS and, in addition, levied a $75 million recoupment objective against the $111 million provided in prior years as advance procurement for this ship. DLGN-42 is the fifth and last of the Virginia class guided missile frigate, four of which are already under contract with Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. A valid, priced contract option for this ship exists and must be exercised by February 1976 or be lost. The fact that the ship is not going to be initially configured with AEGIS is not considered a sound reason for not building the ship. First, AEGIS development is not compatible with the construction schedule of DLGN-42. Second, the contract option for DLGN-42 requires that the ship be built as a follow ship of the DLGN-38 class. Third, additional nuclear powered surface combatants are required to operate with four nuclear carriers already funded-all of which will be in the fleet in 1981. Failure to build DLGN-42 denies to the Navy the services of a highly effective and needed ship. The Navy has never planned to equip all major surface combatants with AEGIS, but desires to have sufficient AEGIS-equipped ships that will, when combined with other missile ships, provide an effective air defense for carrier task groups and for missions independent of carriers. Additionally, it is planned that AEGIS cruisers will provide weapons direction to non-AEGIS missile ships to further enhance the air defense capability of any force. To accommodate AEGIS, the design of the DLGN-42 would have to be altered significantly and a new shipbuilding contract negotiated. Further, AEGIS devel 58-991 O-75-2 opment schedule will not provide a system for ship installation before 1980 at the earliest. These actions would necessitate a delay in delivery of the DLGN-42 from the contract schedule of June 1979 to at least 1982. Navy studies have consistently shown that it is cheaper to build DLGN-42 now in accordance with the present contract and modify it later, than it is to delay its construction until AEGIS is available. The current Navy plan is to update existing missile ships, including DLGN's, in the 8th to 12th year of their service life. The Department recommends restoration of DLGN-42 in fiscal year 1976 at $257 million. As with other ships in the fiscal year 1976 shipbuilding program, the Department recommends full funding of the DLGN if it is to be authorized. A discussion of the full funding concept and the implications of the House action regarding it are appended to this appeal. Mr. LEIGHTON. This is one case where the Defense Department and Admiral Rickover are in agreement. The Defense Department does support continuing with this ship even though they want the Aegis ship later. MISSION OF STRIKE CRUISER Mr. FLOOD. Doesn't she have to operate with the task force carriers? She will flank carriers port and starboard? A strike ship? Mr. LEIGHTON. She will be a strike force ship, sir. But she can operate either with carriers or independently on missions where the full power of our carriers is not needed. Except for carriers, the CSGN will have more offensive capability than other ships. The reason this new Aegis ship has the designation strike cruiser, Mr. Flood, is to differentiate it from the other cruisers we are building in that this new ship will be designed to carry a long-range cruise missile. The other cruisers we are building are not planned to have that long-range cruise missile. The long-range cruise missile planned for the CSGN is expected to be able to hit targets hundreds of miles away from the ship. That missile could have either a nuclear warhead or conventional. Mr. FLOOD. That has nothing to do with the Aegis system. Mr. FLOOD. Why do you call Aegis a defense mechanism? Mr. LEIGHTON. It is basically a radar system for detecting enemy aircraft and missiles and controlling your own missiles to shoot down the enemy missiles and aircraft. You could call it either defensive or offensive, defensive because you are defending yourself from the enemy attack or offensive because you are destroying the enemy. Mr. FLOOD. I can't put it together. Mr. LEIGHTON. The strike cruiser is considered an offensive ship. But it needs defensive systems so that it can go on offensive missions without other forces for protection. Mr. FLOOD. And the system is defensive, so put that together. Mr. LEIGHTON. It also has on it defensive systems. This ship has on it a full antisubmarine capability with helicopters and the best submarine weapons we have today, both sensors and missiles and torpedoes. It will have on it a long-range cruise missile to give it offensive capability where the ship can operate independently and fire a longrange cruise missile against enemy targets. It will have antiair capability which can be considered defensive or offensive, whichever way you look at it. It will have a surface-to-surface Harpoon system for destroying ships at up to miles. She will also carry advanced electronics countermeasures and the Navy is looking at putting guns on it. Mr. FLOOD. As against a carrier, what is the speed? Mr. LEIGHTON. The speed is not finalized, but about The carrier makes STRIKE CRUISER IS OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE knots. Mr. GIAIMO. May I ask a question or two to get clear in my mind what we are talking about here? I want to make sure I understand this. I gather from what you are saying, Admiral, that the strike cruiser we are contemplating has an offensive capability as distinguished from the Virginia class cruiser, which is strictly a defensive or antiaircraft ship? Admiral RICKOVER. It is a very difficult thing to describe any ship as being defensive or offensive. The other cruisers can be used either way. For example, they are designed to carry the Harpoon antiship missiles that are being developed to destroy other ships up to miles away. They also have guns with a range of over miles and carry the same antisubmarine warfare suit as is planned for the strike cruiser. But the new strike cruiser, the CSGN, has been designated strike cruiser to emphasize the increased offensive capability this ship will have because of its sea-launched cruise missiles. Mr. GIAIMO. Didn't I just understand you to say that those other cruisers, and I assume you are talking about the Virginia class Mr. LEIGHTON. Yes; that is correct. But neither the conventional nor the nuclear ships we are building today now carry a long-range sea-launched cruise missile. These cruise missiles are being developed to give ships the ability to deliver nuclear or conventional warheads at ranges of hundres of miles. This missile clearly will give increased offensive power over that we have on ships today. Mr. GIAIMO. What does a DLGN-42 do? Admiral RICKOVER. The DLGN-42 is intended primarily to defend aircraft carriers from air, surface, and submarine attack. But the DLGN-42 can independently engage enemy forces without the company of an aircraft carrier. Mr. GIAIMO. The Virginia class? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Mr. GIAIMO. Didn't I understand in the past that we spoke of these cruisers as not having offensive capability built into them, since they actually didn't have any offensive weapons? Admiral RICKOVER. They do have guns. Mr. LEIGHTON. Guns, missiles, antisubmarine rockets, and torpedoes. Mr. GIAIMO. Why do you need a strike cruiser? To put the Aegis system on? Admiral RICKOVER. It is another name to differentiate a more advanced type cruiser. That is all it means. I suppose it has some sex appeal to call it a strike cruiser, because it indicates more offensive capability. Mr. GIAIMO. We are the Appropriations Committee. We are not interested in the sex appeal. Admiral RICKOVER. Yes; I understand that. But what is a submarine? Is it a defensive weapon or offensive weapon? Mr. GIAIMO. I think it is offensive, but I am not going to argue with you. Mr. FLOOD. I asked you that question a long time ago. Admiral RICKOVER. I have been asked that question for over 25 or 30 years about every ship and particularly the frigates. An aircraft carrier you can say is an offensive weapon because the purpose is to fly planes, but the planes can perform defensive duties, too, in their mission. The cruisers and the strike cruisers are both offensive and defensive. It is just that the strike cruiser will have more offensive capability than the other cruisers have. Mr. GIAIMO. This is why I asked these questions. I got the impression that we have distinguished here between the DLGN-38 class frigates which were defensive in nature, but now you, the President, and the DOD are saying you want a real attack cruiser, that is why you want this strike cruiser. Admiral RICKOVER. If you leave out the word "strike" and call it a cruiser, let me put it in simple language. It is a ship that has more capability for defensive purposes than any other ship we have ever had in the Navy. Mr. GIAIMO. Because of Aegis? OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MISSIONS COMBINED Admiral RICKOVER. That is right, sir. On the other hand, it also carries more offensive weapons than any other cruiser. And because it has better defensive weapons, it can go on offensive missions where ships with less capable defensive weapons couldn't. A warship that has a purely defensive role would be almost completely useless; so would a ship with only offensive weapons that can't defend itself. Mr. GIAIMO. May we go back to the chairman's question about using the DLGN-42? Admiral RICKOVER. We need both ships, sir. You need some ships with the new weapon system to identify and to direct the attack on supersonic cruise missiles fired from enemy submarines, surface ships, and aircraft in high threat areas where we can expect massive attacks that would saturate the capabilities of our present fire control systems. Mr. GIAIMO. You mean that new weapon system you are talking about is the Aegis? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. Mr. FLOOD. You mean the flyboys have sold you a package, and you are giving birth to a cruiser to protect an aircraft carrier's task force? Admiral RICKOVER. It can protect any ship. It is needed to insure that any ship can operate against enemy attack. Mr. FLOOD. What you are doing is you are going to have a defense mechanism existing primarily for the purpose of defending large carrier task forces? Admiral RICKOVER. That is in one sense correct. The Navy's theory on warfare, which is backed by the Defense Department, is that the aircraft carrier is the primary offensive force in the Navy. Mr. FLOOD. That is right; the Navy is going to operate with aircraft carrier task forces, and they need something to defend it, and that is the strike cruiser. |