Mr. LEIGHTON. I would be glad to use the word inexpensive rather than cheap, Mr. Chairman. Of course, $667 million isn't inexpensive, either, except in relation to the $1.85 billion estimated for the fourth ship of the same class.

Admiral RICKOVER. It is extremely unfortunate we have to spend these large sums for defense. It is not only the money, it is also the irreplaceable raw material we use. You know, I once testified to this committee that I characterized World War II partly as the taking of a lot of raw material, important minerals from the ground, and casting them into the ocean. That is what we really do in war. I do not have the authority to decide whether or not we have a large Navy or what the mission of that Navy is to be. I am merely the technical man. It up to Congress to decide what kind of a Navy we will have. That is the responsibility of the Congress. I can only give you my views. If you are going to have a Navy, and if you want it to be a viable Navy, in my opinion, you must have modern and capable ships. If you decide not to have such ships, then I see little good in having a large Navy whose ships cannot stand up in combat. I would rather have fewer good ships than many that can't fight in a real war. That is my philosophy about naval ships, sir.

is

Mr. EDWARDS. May I reclaim the floor?
Mr. MAHON. Proceed.

PLANS FOR AEGIS SHIPS

Mr. EDWARDS. Admiral, I have about five basic questions that you can answer almost in one or two words, I hope.

Would every strike cruiser be an Aegis ship?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, as the term strike cruiser is now defined. But we are only talking about the first one now.

Mr. EDWARDS. Over a period of time we would be talking about 15 or 20 AEGIS ships? Is that correct?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, eventually. That is what I understand is the Navy's plan. Of course that changes.

Mr. LEIGHTON. We would like to get to two a year.

Admiral RICKOVER. Until you get that number, the most prudent thing would be to have each strike cruiser have Aegis. We need that type of ship. From a standpoint of mastery of the sea, we need aircraft carriers, strike cruisers, and submarines more than anything else.

Mr. EDWARDS. You could have a strike cruiser that would not be an Aegis ship; is that right?

Admiral RICKOVER. Conceivably, but right now the only ship referred to as a strike cruiser has the Aegis system.

Mr. EDWARDS. The 15 or 20 that you are talking about would all be Aegis ships?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, but the Department of Defense has not finally made up its mind as to what ships they will have. There is no final decision as yet. Some of the Aegis ships they plan may not be nuclear strike cruisers. I think that would be a mistake, for the reasons I have already mentioned.

Mr. EDWARDS. When Mr. Leighton spoke of 15 or 20 ships, what was he referring to?

Mr. LEIGHTON. I think I can clarify that. The Navy proposes to build somewhere on the order of 18 to 24 Aegis ships in the foreseeable future. The lead ship of Aegis has been decided to be a nuclear powered strike cruiser which will have Aegis. But the term strike cruiser could be applied to other types of cruisers that have a strike capability. Right now, the term strike cruiser means an Aegis ship with a long-range cruise missile on it. I don't think there is anything in the basic Navy lexicon that defines it strictly to an Aegis strike cruiser alone. That happens to be the jargon at the present time.

Mr. EDWARDS. That is the reason I am asking these questions. I want to know what you are talking about when you use the term strike cruiser.

Mr. LEIGHTON. We are talking about an Aegis ship with a longrange cruise missile on it. That is what we are talking about with the present terminology.

COST OF AEGIS IN U.S.S. LONG BEACH

Mr. EDWARDS. How much will Aegis cost?

Mr. LEIGHTON. Do you want to know how much the prospective Aegis nuclear strike cruiser will cost?

Mr. EDWARDS. When you talk about putting an Aegis system on the Long Beach, how much are you talking about?

Mr. LEIGHTON. Right now the Navy is studying various alternatives but it will be about $500 million for the weapons modernization. Mr. EDWARDS. Does that include Aegis or just the conversion? Mr. LEIGHTON. It includes both. It includes buying an Aegis system and installing it in the ship. The Navy is studying various modifications to the existing combat system so the number varies from somewhat more to somewhat less than $500 million. The Navy, I understand, would require about $300 million in fiscal year 1977 to buy the Aegis system. The ship would then be taken out of service for 2 years starting in fiscal year 1979 for conversion. That is when the balance of the funds would be required.

Admiral RICKOVER. Converting the Long Beach to Aegis would give the Navy the fastest experience with it.

Mr. EDWARDS. What do you figure the Aegis system costs?

Mr. LEIGHTON. About $200 million for the first production unit with one missile launcher, sir.

Admiral RICKOVER. The first of any system is always more expensive because you have to go through the throes of designing it for a particular ship.

Mr. LEIGHTON. The first production Aegis has not been bought. One of the problems is: What ship will be the first one to pay for it? If the Long Beach becomes the first ship with Aegis and gets the first production unit it is going to pay the price of that first unit. That would make the first strike cruiser cost perhaps $40 million less. It is hard to answer the questions until the program has been agreed to.

Mr. EDWARDS. You are not asking us to buy a pig in a poke, are you? Mr. LEIGHTON. No, sir. The questions concerning the Long Beach will not come up until fiscal 1977. The House Armed Services Committee considers it would be wise to convert the Long Beach to include Aegis. The first place to fund that is in the fiscal 1977 budget.

Mr. EDWARDS. Is there a standard AEGIS or can it have different numbers of missiles and different numbers of launchers and other componentry?

Mr. LEIGHTON. Aegis can be used with varying numbers of missiles and launchers, sir.

Mr. EDWARDS. We have to know how many missiles and which components are involved before we can talk about costs then.

Mr. LEIGHTON. Yes, sir. That is why I said the cost was about $500 million. Variations of about $50 million could result from the final choice of such items as the size of the missile magazines. I can state specifically that for the nuclear strike cruiser the plan is to have an Aegis system with two Mark 26 launchers. Each launcher missiles. The launchers are the same as on the Virginia class, but have been modified to hold more missiles.

will hold

Mr. FLOOD. On that point, you say you have to have a platform. Here is an Aegis system. Now you are running around looking for a platform. What are you going to do to the battle cruiser, the silhouette of the cruiser when you put this on?

Mr. LEIGHTON. This is a silhouette of the Texas. If you are interested, the big difference is we have rotating radars on the present ships. The Aegis has a fixed radar which looks like four flat plates on the sides of the superstructure. It is rotated electronically. You have a fixed system rather than rotating antennas, physically.

Mr. FLOOD. You are not bothering with the fighting deck?
Mr. LEIGHTON. No. You have to build the structure up high.

Mr. EDWARDS. Do you have a picture or an artist's conception of this system?

Mr. LEIGHTON. Not with me, but I can get one.

Admiral RICKOVER. I would estimate that when the Navy gets through, the amount of money the Navy will spend will be greater than these estimates because that has been true of everything ever estimated by any military organization in history.

Mr. EDWARDS. Since the memory of man.

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LEIGHTON. But with the Mark 26 launching system there is a Mod-0, which has 24 missiles, a Mod-1, which has 44 missiles, and a Mod-2, which has missiles. That is one of the differences between the nuclear strike cruiser and the conventional ship. There will be more missiles on the nuclear strike cruiser; two Mod total

missiles.

which

Mr. EDWARDS. I think you need to place in the record some kind of breakdown showing mods, missiles, pods and the like as well as unit costs. I am looking at the total justification we have for the $60 million that the President has asked for. It consists of one paragraph and a half dozen figures.

Admiral RICKOVER. That is for lead items for the propulsion plant. Mr. EDWARDS. But we are getting ready to embark on a $1.2 billion program at a minimum.

Admiral RICKOVER. The missiles are not my area of specialty, sir. We are giving you this information but we can of course ask the Navy to furnish in the record the additional information you are asking for, which has the details that are not under my cognizance, sir.

Mr. LEIGHTON. I realize you do have to face an appropriation issue. We would like to point out that the components that you will be buying in fiscal 1976 for this ship are like the nuclear components we use in our nuclear frigates. Should you appropriate the money and later somebody decides not to build the ship, the components can be used for the ships we have. So it is not a question of wasting money, sir.

Mr. EDWARDS. It is not so much that, as it is taking to the floor of the House in effect a brand new item with no information to stand up on the floor with to defend the project. We are going into a time when everything this committee comes up with in the way of a new, costly project is going to be subject to scrutiny. I think we are going to need a lot more information. Granted you don't have responsibility for the whole proposal.

Admiral RICKOVER. I suggest, Mr. Edwards, that we arrange with the chairman to get the people whose responsibility it is to tell you about that. We are out of our water in one sense in discussing the military aspects of this fire control system.

Mr. EDWARDS. I simply say for whatever it is worth for this Member that I am not likely to take something like this to the floor unless I know a lot more about it.

Admiral RICKOVER. I can understand that, sir.
Mr. EDWARDS. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. MAHON. Mr. Sikes.

RETENTION OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

Mr. SIKES. Admiral, I would like to attest to the things that have been said about the importance of your contribution to this committee and the value of your testimony and the fact that you have been very helpful to us through the years. We look forward to hearing you year after year. You have previously discussed the problems that have been experienced in retaining qualified nuclear personnel in the Navy. As I recall it, the legislation providing a bonus designed to aid and retain the nuclear officers was allowed to lapse. Is that true?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, it lapsed June 30 of this year.

Mr. SIKES. Has the situation changed such that you no longer need this bonus?

Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir, the situation has not changed. In fact, we lost in fiscal year 1974 about 220 nuclear trained officers. This was more than double the 1973 fiscal year total. The recently ended fiscal year statistics show that we again lost over 200 of these officers. You may recall that the bonus legislation was initially designed as a stopgap measure to stem the exodus of junior nuclear trained officers from the Navy. It was never intended to be a permanent solution. The Navy recently sent to the Congress a legislative proposal which is designed to replace the officer bonus legislation. It is called nuclear career incentive pay and has been introduced as H.R. 8088. I understand there were some delays in obtaining the necessary concurrence, which resulted in the bonus legislation expiring before the Congress had a chance to act upon the new proposal.

Mr. SIKES. Does that mean that this bill has the support of the Department of Defense?

Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, and the support of the administration. I hope that this committee will support the bill. I am aware of the provisions of the bill and strongly support it.

Something must be done to improve the retention of these highly trained officers. The proposed legislation has the best chance of succeeding.

Mr. SIKES. Admiral, would you give the committee a brief outline of the bill and tell us why it has your support?

Admiral RICKOVER. Certainly, sir. H.R. 8088 is entitled Nuclear Career Incentive Pay because it is designed to provide a viable incentive to outstanding officers to seek a career in the Navy's nuclear power program. It provides a level of monetary compensation for officers who are qualifying or are qualified for the supervision, operation and maintenance of Naval nuclear propulsion plants. This proposal has a provision incorporated in it which assures that only those nuclear trained officers who are involved in the program will receive the compensation. Additionally no officer above the rank of Captain or with more than 25 years of service will receive this pay.

The bill is designed not only to retain nuclear trained personnel in the critical career-decision years as did the previous bonus legislation, but to provide incentive to encourage the best qualified people to apply for the program. As you know the Navy has never been able to attain the desired yearly input of new officers to the program. This coupled with the unacceptable resignation rates has made it virtually impossible to maintain any selectivity in the assignment of officers to command the Nation's nuclear warships. The new legislation is designed to provide some measure of economic incentive so that our experienced middle grade officers will not be enticed out of the Navy by the civilian nuclear power industry solely by economic factors.

We can ill afford to continue to lose these people. The continuation bonus has become ineffective in retaining sufficient nuclear trained officers. A permanent solution to the retention problem is required. I hope that the Nuclear Career Incentive Pay will provide this solution. I believe H.R. 8088 merits your careful consideration and approval. This legislation should be approved if we are to retain the necessary numbers of trained officers to man our nuclear surface ships and submarines.

Mr. SIKES. That addresses the officers, Admiral, but how are we doing with the enlisted personnel? Has the recent bonus legislation been of help in retaining sufficient enlisted nuclear operators?

Admiral RICKOVER. That is a somewhat difficult question to answer at this point. Our retention rates are showing some improvement; however, the economic conditions that have prevailed over the past year may have influenced some people to reenlist rather than leave the service.

I do, however, have indications that the new selective reenlistment bonus system is working in the nuclear area. One of my main concerns in the program, as I have said on numerous occasions, is to retain the best of those experienced operators in sufficient numbers to maintain a viable supervisory structure. To do this the Navy needs programs such as the selective reenlistment bonus and the proficiency pay system.