AEGIS SHIPS ARE COSTLY Mr. MAHON. They cost about $1.2 billion? Admiral RICKOVER. That is the estimated cost of the first nuclear strike cruiser which is planned to carry Aegis. That cost includes the design and the development cost of the very first ship and also the startup costs of Aegis production. The strike cruiser, of course, will have other weapons besides Aegis. If it is a conventional ship, what is the corresponding figure? Mr. LEIGHTON. The comparable present estimate is $835 million, but the conventional ship doesn't have as much armament. Admiral RICKOVER. The nuclear ship will be a larger ship and will have considerably more armament and weapon carrying capacity as well as nuclear cores providing propulsion energy for 15 years of operation. Compared to the non-nuclear Aegis ships being considered, the nuclear ship is expected to have twice as many canister launchers of surface-to-surface Harpoon missiles; 45 percent more magazine capacity for anti-air and antisubmarine missiles; 4 versus 3 Aegis fire control system missile illuminators. It will have greater weight, space, and electrical power reserve capacity for future weapon system modifications. It will also be designed to carry the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) long range missile systein that is not planned to be carried by the non-nuclear ship. NUCLEAR POWER IN AEGIS SHIPS I have strongly advocated that the Aegis ships be nuclear powered. By so doing, I have been accused for capriciously increasing the cost of our ships in order to provide unnecessary and expensive nuclear propulsion plants. I have also been accused of making the ships we build so expensive that we cannot biuld the numbers of ships that we need. I am sure you have heard all the arguments. It is said that because nuclear Aegis ships in peacetime will cost about one and one-half times the cost of non-nuclear ships, we should build oil-fired, not nuclear, Aegis ships. I simply do not believe that conclusion logically follows. I believe we should design our warships to operate in a future wartime environment. That is why we have Aegis ships in the first place. I don't believe that in a wartime environment sufficient propulsion fuel for high tempo operation of our striking forces can be assured. That is the crux of the issue. All the studies comparing peacetime costs of oil-fired ships versus nuclear-powered ships miss the issue that warships must be able to operate in a war environment. If they aren't, we should save our money and not build them at all. ROLE OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SHIPS I have been accused of urging that all ships be nuclear powered. This is not so; I do not believe such a course would be practical. But what I do believe, which is also what title VIII of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1975, states is the policy of the United States, is that our major combatant ships should be nuclear powered. There is a place in the Navy for oil-fired ships to perform a variety of missions for which nuclear power is not of benefit commensurate with the cost. NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE SHIPS But our naval striking forces are a different matter. These forces must be able to survive and operate against a determined attack by nuclear submarines, aircraft and sophisticated missiles. That is the threat that necessitates, if the Fleet is to survive the attack, a system as sophisticated as Aegis. But since the non-nuclear Aegis ship will cost $835 million for the lead and about $425 million for a follow ship, we will never have very many Aegis ships, either nuclear or nonnuclear. What then will we use to protect our large, slow tankers that an oil-fired strike force will need? The missiles shot at tankers sent to refuel strike force ships in the high threat areas won't be any different from those shot at our carrier task forces. I fail to see how the analysts can so blithly assume that an enemy will not attack our tankers and that the oil will somehow get there where it is needed for the ships in the high threat strike areas. What good does an $835 million ship do if it runs out of fuel while enemy nuclear submaries knock off every approaching oiler and its helpless escorts which can't shoot down the submarine-launched cruise missiles or have the endurance needed to attack the nuclear submarine? A major advantage of nuclear power, one that is not adequately treated in any cost studies I am aware of, is that nuclear power reduces the necessity for replenishment ships and their escorting combatant ships to operate in high threat areas. The nuclear ships are designed to carry more combat consumables so as to reduce the need for replenishment. Further, when replenishment of combat consumables is required, the nuclear ships can retire at high speed to areas of lower threat to replenish. With modern detection methods and with the range, stealth and speed of enemy nuclear submarines, a so-called high threat area can occur anywhere the enemy may choose to attack. We just can't afford to build our replenishment ships so costly that they will be capable of surviving in high threat areas. Therefore, we must minimize the logistic support needed for our strike forces. Nuclear propulsion gives us the capability to do this. Aegis ships are a logical choice for nuclear propulsion. These are high valued ships designed to operate with our carrier striking forces. In time of war, the enemy will no doubt seek out and attempt to destroy these powerful attack forces wherever they may go. If they do not have nuclear propulsion, he could do this by cutting off lightly defended and highly vulnerable supply lines before closing in on the task force severely low on fuel and hampered in its ability to fight. Nuclear power would be of significant military benefit in such a case. PEACETIME COST AND WARTIME ADVANTAGE The disturbing thing about this whole argument over whether our strike forces should be nuclear powered or not is the relatively small increase in total cost, the 3 percent to 8 percent greater peacetime cost of nuclear powered strike forces, that has been cited by Navy and Department of Defense cost analyses. It has been said that because this relative cost includes in its base the cost of aircraft and manpower as well as ship costs, this relative cost is not a valid comparison. I believe the comparison is fully valid. You have to look at the effectiveness and cost of the task force as a whole. What you are buying for your money by putting nuclear power in your task force ships is the composite military effectiveness of that task force. If a carrier can't go where it is needed, there is no sense in having bought the expensive aircraft. If you have to slow a carrier force for frequent refuelings you thereby increase its vulnerability and jeopardize not only the ships but the aircraft and the lives of the embarked personnel as well. That is briefly why I advocate that Aegis ships be nuclear powered. Ships that are as large and important to our first line forces as the Aegis ships are should not be dependent on slow, vulnerable tankers. SIZE OF STRIKE CRUISER Mr. FLOOD. What is the tonnage? Admiral RICKOVER. The tonnage has not been definitely decided. The tonnage of the conventional ship has been described as about 8 to 9 thousand tons but there is no firm design. The tonnage of the nuclear ship, because it will carry more weapons, has a nuclear power plant, and will have greater reserve for future growth, might be in the 14 to 18 thousand ton range. The size will depend on the final weapons suit and other ship characteristics now being determined. Mr. FLOOD. It is still a light cruiser? Admiral RICKOVER. It is a cruiser. It is difficult to call it a light cruiser. Mr. MAHON. And it is not a very light cruiser at that. Mr. MAHON. Let me ask you now, while we are on the subject of the cruiser, and the Aegis system, a few questions for the record here. Mr. FLOOD. What is Aegis? Where did that spelling come from? Admiral RICKOVER. It is from the Greek word "Aigis" which in Greek mythology referred to a shield borne by Zeus. Mr. FLOOD. I know that. But I have seen two spellings of it now. Mr. MAHON. [Spelling]. A-e-g-i-s. Admiral RICKOVER. Called properly from my little knowledge, it would be "eye-gis," but it isn't called that. The English spelling has been changed from the Greek and it is called é-gis. Mr. FLOOD. That is what I heard. Mr. MAHON. Give us some idea of the breadth and length of the ship. Mr. LEIGHTON. Mr. Chairman, perhaps the easiest way to bring this into focus is to compare it to the U.S.S. Texas, which is one of the present frigates, recently redesignated cruisers, that is under construction. I have a picture of a model of the Texas here. In the strike cruiser, we will use the same basic propulsion plant as the Texas. The CSGN will be a little wider, and a little longer. The final dimensions will be determined during the initial design. The Navy is studying a length from 580 to 680 feet, but final determination has not been made. The Navy is trying to get an optimal ship, which involves tradeoff studies now being done. The beam will be on the order of 66 to 79 feet on this ship. Again, the dimension isn't finally settled. The so-called base-line characteris tics call for a ship which is 580 feet long, 66 feet wide, and displaces 12,700 tons. But the Navy is studying a range of ships with the same basic propulsion plant and looking at different characteristics. For comparison, the Texas is 560 feet long, 63 feet wide, and displaces 11,000 tons. STRIKE CRUISER SCHEDULE One of the things that is asked for in the President's 1976 budget is design money for the nuclear strike cruiser. That was in the President's original budget, and the purpose of that money is to determine the contract design of the ship in fiscal 1976 so that the ship itself can be ordered in fiscal 1977. Mr. MAHON.. You would budget the ship then in fiscal 1977? Mr. LEIGHTON. Yes, sir. That is the present plan. But we do need long-lead nuclear components in fiscal 1976. Mr. MAHON. And you are asking for $60 million? Mr. LEIGHTON. Yes, sir, and that is for long-lead nuclear propulsion components. Mr. MAHON. When will the ship be delivered to the fleet. Admiral RICKOVER. She could be delivered in early 1983. Mr. LEIGHTON. March 1983 is the present schedule. That schedule is based on the $60 million long lead being authorized in fiscal year 1976 and the ship construction being authorized in fiscal year 1977. Mr. FLOOD. What is the beam? Mr. LEIGHTON. Sixty-six feet on the present "base line" characteristics. It may be wider when the conceptual design is finished. Mr. FLOOD. Aircraft in the fantail? Mr. LEIGHTON. Helicopters. Mr. FLOOD. Two? Mr. LEIGHTON. Two helicopters are in the present design. INSTALLATION OF AEGIS IN U.S.S. LONG BEACH Mr. MAHON. Maybe I should ask at this point, are you in favor of the conversion of the nuclear powered cruiser Long Beach to incorporate the AEGIS system? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir, that would be the quickest way of getting it in the fleet, and furthermore it would be on a nuclear ship which could be deployed with our nuclear carrier strike forces, which is where we should have Aegis ships. I do not have cognizance over the development of the Aegis system, but the Navy has said that Aegis could be ready in time to put it on the Long Beach beginning in mid-1980. Thus, Aegis could be in the fleet on a nuclear ship in 1981. Mr. MAHON. Then you should tell us what the cost would be. Mr. LEIGHTON. It is approximately $500 million in fiscal year 1977 dollars. The cost depends on the degree to which the combat system is modernized. The Navy is presently studying this. This cost is for modernization of the weapons systems and does not include costs for overhaul of the ship which would be done concurrently. The House Armed Services Committee has indicated they favor this, and the concept here is to put money in the fiscal year 1977 authorization to procure the Aegis system itself, and then to do the conversion in the fiscal year 1979 authorization, with the ship being out of service for about 2 years from 1979 to 1981 and the Long Beach returning to service in 1981 with the Aegis system on it. Mr. MAHON. The estimate, then, is half a billion dollars? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir. None of that money is for the nuclear propulsion plant. It is just money for the combat system and its installation. The nuclear propulsion plant will not have to be modified, but it will have to be overhauled. Mr. MAHON. That seems ..ke a staggering sum of money. FUTURE PRICES Mr. LEIGHTON. One of the problems you have in any numbers is that all numbers have to include an allowance for the future prices that may prevail when the ship is being constructed or modified. When we price a procurement or ship conversion we have to assume that it will cost more in the future. Current Department of Defense guidance is that we must allow for price increases of between 6.4 percent and about 10 percent per year. This makes the cost of anything we plan to do in the future much more expensive than if we could buy it today "off the shelf." For a rule of thumb, any ship we priced in the fiscal year 1973 program is automatically twice as expensive in the fiscal year 1978 program. These are staggering numbers and in many ways are misleading because we can only think of them in terms of things today. But if inflation occurs as assumed in the estimates, the high dollar costs will occur. Mr. MAHON. Wouldn't it be better just to not convert the Long Beach to the Aegis system? CONVERSION OF U.S.S. LONG BEACH Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir. Conversion of Long Beach gives us an Aegis ship faster, and at less money than if you built a new one. Besides, by 1980 the Long Beach combat system should be modernized anyway. Mr. MAHON. Would it be fully adequate? Admiral RICKOVER. Yes, sir; the ship has many years of life left to it. There is no sense in not making use of an existing nuclear platform. There is much discussion about the need to get Aegis in the fleet as soon as possible. I don't see why you should say it is better to have a new ship when you have one that is adequate, has nuclear power, and can be delivered sooner and cheaper than a new conventionally powered ship. Besides, you would gain experience with Aegis in the fleet on a fully operational combatant ship before new classes of Aegis ships reached the fleet. LEADTIME OF STRIKE CRUISER Mr. MAHON. Navy witnesses testified this year that the Aegis development schedule-we are talking about this system now-would not provide a system to install on a ship until 1980. In view of this development schedule, are you budgeting the strike cruiser too soon? Admiral RICKOVER. No, sir. The problem is that it takes many years to build a modern ship. Long leadtime propulsion plant components must be fabricated and delivered to the shipbuilder over 3 years before |