War, Strategy and IntelligenceRoutledge, 12/11/2012 - 500 من الصفحات Investigating the logic, conduct and nature of war on the highest political and strategic levels, these essays put less emphasis on operational and tactical aspects. They look at the impact of technology on warfare, the political nature of war and the limits of rational analysis in studying war. |
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الصفحة 13
... reports , for the production of such estimates involves a ' political ' bargaining process in which the relative strength and influence of each organization play a major role . Finally , individuals – whether leaders or analysts ...
... reports , for the production of such estimates involves a ' political ' bargaining process in which the relative strength and influence of each organization play a major role . Finally , individuals – whether leaders or analysts ...
الصفحة 30
... reports ought to reflect the truth , in reality this is rarely true . Some experts therefore concluded that since intelligence in practice could never achieve the ideals of neutrality and objectivity , the intelligence community should ...
... reports ought to reflect the truth , in reality this is rarely true . Some experts therefore concluded that since intelligence in practice could never achieve the ideals of neutrality and objectivity , the intelligence community should ...
الصفحة 33
... reports and conclusions are questioned ; therefore , the greater the risk in the long run of over - reliance on its findings . Paradox No. 5 : Self - negating prophecy . Information predicting an imminent enemy attack leads to ...
... reports and conclusions are questioned ; therefore , the greater the risk in the long run of over - reliance on its findings . Paradox No. 5 : Self - negating prophecy . Information predicting an imminent enemy attack leads to ...
الصفحة 38
... report on an important issue first appeared to be correct but turned out wrong and yet seemed to have a ' good explanation ' . • Since deception cannot be avoided , it is important to be able to respond quickly to unexpected ...
... report on an important issue first appeared to be correct but turned out wrong and yet seemed to have a ' good explanation ' . • Since deception cannot be avoided , it is important to be able to respond quickly to unexpected ...
الصفحة 69
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Abwehr achieve adversary aircraft American analysis Army battle battlefield bomber British intelligence capabilities Churchill Clausewitz Command cost counter-measures deceiver deception operations deception plan decision defense diplomacy diplomatic surprise Double Cross System Dudley Clarke economic effective enemy enemy's estimates example fact failure fighter Foreign Policy German German intelligence Handel Hitler Ibid impact important influence initial intelligence community intelligence organizations intelligence process intentions interests invasion Israel Israeli J.F.C. Fuller Japanese leaders London major Michael Howard military doctrine missiles mobilization modern negotiations nuclear offensive Operation Mincemeat peace perceptions political possible problems R.V. Jones radar reports Second World Second World War secrecy Soviet Union strategic surprise success Sun Tzu superior surprise attack tactical tanks technological surprise termination theory threat tion troops Ultra United University Press USSR victory Vietnam warfare warning wars weapons systems World War II Yom Kippur War York