encryption in the case of the second missile test, but also that we know enough about it to know its stages and to have a judgment as to its compatibility with the SS-13.

Senator GARN. That is not the point whether we are able to decipher enough. The proscriptions are clear in SALT II about encryption of telemetry.

Mr. GARTHOFF. This was a matter argued at considerable length and where we did not get Soviet agreement to ban encryption; encryption is allowed.

Senator GARN. Under limited circumstances.

Mr. GARTHOFF. The other way around. The limitation on encryption is a limitation on matters that would impede verification of the treaty. Anything else is allowed. I think that is a difficult proscription to apply. I don't think it is a good one for that reason. Senator GARN. I agree. There are a lot of things that are different. That is why we need better verification, including on-site inspection.

Mr. GARTHOFF. On-site inspection would in some cases no doubt be of great assistance. In some others it might not. I don't think it is necessarily the answer in all cases.

If we are talking about encryption, for example, you would have to actually have a full sharing on both sides of our research and development programs if you were going to deal with the problem completely, something I think we are not prepared to do.

Senator GARN. You are never going to deal with it completely, but certainly in the testing phase after we lost our monitoring site in Iran, it made it a great deal more difficult in determining their launches.

I am sure you are aware how important the first few seconds of those launches are and the necessity in that testing phase to have the first minute or so of those.

The hour is late. I sincerely wish we could pursue this further. But time is gone.

We will reconvene at 3 o'clock with Kenneth Adelman and the other scheduled witnesses who will come back to the subcommittee for further testimony.

Mr. Garthoff, we thank you very much for your willingness to come and testify today.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

The subcommittee will recess until 3 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., Tuesday, May 10, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 3 p.m., the same day.]

(AFTERNOON SESSION, 3:30 P.M., TUESDAY, MAY 10, 1983)

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

INTRODUCTION OF AMBASSADOR ADELMAN

Senator PROXMIRE [presiding]. Senator Stevens is late and has asked me to go ahead.

Our leadoff witness is Ambassador Kenneth L. Adelman. Prior to his appointment he served as Deputy Representative of the United States to the United Nations. As such he was head of the Presidential delegation to the Second United Nations Special Sesssion on Disarmament and head of the delegation of the United Nations' First Committee.

He has written widely on national security and foreign policy and published in the Washington Quarterly.

Mr. Ambassador, go ahead. I want to thank you so much for making your statement available to us in advance. You are one of the few witnesses who did and the first one we got. If you want to abbreviate it in any way, we will be all set to go ahead with questions.

Ambassador ADELMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I do want to abbreviate. Let me say I am very pleased to be here before the Senate Appropriations Committee and, in baseball terms, back under the lights on the Senate side that I have gotten familiar with since mid-January.

Mr. Chairman, I wanted to summarize my statement very quickly and say that obviously the potential to limit and reduce nuclear weapons is one of the great challenges of our era which is why I am so honored to be before you as Director of ACDA at this time. We have to move ahead on arms control agreements. They can help reduce the risk of war. They can help limit the spread of nuclear weapons, help reduce misunderstanding of particular events or accidents, can help channel modernization into stabilizing rather than destabilizing paths.

At times they can help save some defense dollars. But, as we will talk about later on, this may not be a primary goal, is not a primary goal of arms control.

The primary goal is to make a safer world, keep the peace, reduce the risk of nuclear war and reduce the risk of any war. This may cost less money or may cost more money. The point is to have deterrence and to have international stability. That is the most important concern.

DETERRENCE

A word about deterrence. It cannot be a bluff. It has to be credible to the Soviets and would have to deter what they are interested in to prevent any kind of conflict. The modernization of our forces is necessary, both for deterrent capability and for arms control capability.

They are two parts of the same pattern to increase international stability. Our START proposals are quickly summarized under the key elements. Limit of 5,000 deployed ballistic missile warheads, a sublimit of 2,500 on ICBM warheads, other constraints designed to reduce the existing 3-to-1 Soviet advantage in ballistic missile throw-weight.

The new technological areas are handled in the section about the growth of the Soviet military budget which has been going at a level of effort twice that in terms of percentage of GNP that we invest. This investment has led to an unprecedented buildup in their strategic and theater unclear forces over the last decade.

Although arms control may not be able to halt all the aspects of the Soviet buildup, I believe it has the potential to reduce parts of it and channel it is not areas that are more stabilizing. This is one of the interesting point of the Scowcroft Commission report.

It has been accomplished in the past and can be accomplished in the future. Past accomplishments include the Limited Test Ban Treaty, ABM, Space Treaty. We are hoping in START and INF to really add to this list.

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

On the question of the defense expenditures, to be very frank, it is not likely that arms control agreements can substantially reduce nuclear arsenal savings. In other words, arms control agreements would not result in enormous savings on our overall budget.

For one thing the relative cost of the nuclear arsenal in the total defense budget is small, about 15 percent. It is about 8 percent in terms of procurement.

On the item of cost, the Scowcroft Commission, as you know, Senator Proxmire, recommends a Midgetman, a new small ICBM, to be developed. It must be flexible enough for a survivable basing mode in a variety of ways.

The cost of doing that would be higher per warhead than would be the cost per warhead of the MX, but the cost of survivable warheads would be lower because of the increased survivability that would come from the additional basing mode possibility and the dispersal, of course, of a smaller missile.

We believe that the development of force in that direction over time helps improve stability and reduces the threat of a first strike and encourages the Soviets to do likewise and would be well worth any additional cost in terms of overall strategic stability.

The last point on knowledge of the Soviet activities. Obviously monitoring Soviet forces and force operations is essential to saving our defense dollars. The more we know about the Soviet forces the more precision we have in tailoring our own defenses to meet the threat and know more.

It helps insure that an agreement once adopted will remain effective. It is good for compliance in both START and INF.

VERIFICATION

We are developing verification regimes to be sure we can verify Soviet activities. We can talk about that in great depth. Prohibition against activities would impede verification.

In addition to provisions which would insure effective verification, we have proposed confidence-building measures in both negotiations which would insure that both sides could be notified in advance of all ballistic missile launches. We have also proposed that notifications be required for majority military exercises and that strategic forces data be exchanged.

I believe that all of these provisions have the potential to markedly improve our knowledge of Soviet military activities, reduce uncertainties, and ensure that any agreement can be effectively verified. These are important if we are to create conditions in the world wherein peace can endure and freedom and diversity can everywhere be cherished.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Adelman is as follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. ADELMAN

DIRECTOR

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. Chairman:

I am most pleased to be here today to discuss the important issues raised in Senator Proxmire's letter of April 20 relating arms control to military strategy and exploring what military and budgetary benefits would flow from limiting and ultimately reducing the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet

Union.

To me the potential to limit and reduce nuclear weapons offers one of the great challenges of our era, which is why I am so honored to be before you as Director of ACDA at this time. Soundly based and carefully considered arms control agreements can help reduce the risk of war; can help limit the spread of nuclear weapons; can help reduce the risk of misunderstanding particular events or accidents; can help channel modernization into stabilizing rather than destabilizing paths; and can help save some defense dollars by allowing us greater precision in estimating Soviet weapon developments thereby reducing the need for us to over-insure against worst-case projections of their force posture.

Mr. Chairman, the cost-saving aspects of arms control should not be neglected, but neither should they be over-emphasized. Our primary goal in arms control is to make for a safer world to reduce the risk of nuclear war, and to reduce the risk of any war. This may cost less money or it may cost more money. Regardless, it is worth doing just as fully as we can, for mankind's sake.

In our overall approach, we presume the Soviets have interests similar to ours. In specific aspects, however, the Soviets will pursue their own agenda, attempting where they can