BIOLOGICAL TREATY IMPROPRIETIES BY SOVIETS

Senator PROXMIRE. Why do you think the Soviets have deliberately cheated on the biological treaty? Is it a flaw in the treaty or overriding Soviet need?

Mr. COLBY. That is one of the treaties that does not have verification provisions in it. It does not have procedure for followup. It just has the flat statement that we won't do it. That is not the kind we should have. We should have one like the SALT Treaty which has a consultative commission which has various aspects to help you with the verification.

That is what I mean by a verifiable freeze agreement, that it would have that kind of provision which I don't think it would be hard to negotiate.

With respect to their experiments and their obvious attempts to use this kind of weapon and testing, I think there is a certain monentum in the Soviets society, if they think, "We can get away with it secretly", they will.

I don't trust the Russians. I think you have to watch them. The fact is that the biological one shows that we have caught them, we have caught them at this violation. If we were totally unable to verify that treaty, we would not have caught them by definition. Senator PROXMIRE. We need compliance features in the treaty to require their abiding by the treaty and we failed to put that in. Mr. COLBY. In that case it is just a flat statement that we will not have that kind of weapon.

VERIFICATION PROBLEMS IN MOBILE SYSTEMS

Senator PROXMIRE. What verification problems would be created if the Soviet Union went to a system of a high number of road or rail mobile single warhead ICB's?

Mr. COLBY. It would be a problem for us to follow these around, get an adequate count of them, and so forth, but it is not an impossible one. Our intelligence capability would give us a perfectly adequate general estimate of the numbers of there for verification process.

If there is a limit on the total number, I think we would have accurate within a reasonable degree and certainly within a degree which would be strategically significant.

Senator PROXMIRE. Do you think the Soviets Union will stick with their preponderant land-based nuclear or do you think they will move to sea-based weapon systems?

Mr. COLBY. I think they will maintain their land-based unless we negotiate some reductions in them. They have been reluctant to go to sea. The Soviets Union is not a maritime nation. They are well aware that their submarine capabilities are light years behind

ours.

There is a reluctance to put all their eggs in that particular basket. I do think, however, that the real danger is that by the end of this decade we may be facing a Soviets cruise missile armada and we will be engaged in a discussion in this country as to whether we should set up a massive air defense system. If we had a freeze today, that would not develop.

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S. INTENTIONS

Senator PROXMIRE. Do you believe the Soviet leadership has a good handle on U.S. intentions that we do not seek a first strike, we don't seek military dominance over the Soviet Union, or are they confused, in your judgment, about U.S. policy?

Mr. COLBY. I think they know what our declared policies are, but they are not going to risk their security on a belief that a succeeding administration will have the same declared policy that this one has. They have seen variations in our different administrations. They know the Americans are quite variable in their positions on a lot of things.

The failure of SALT II, I think, raises considerable doubts in the Soviet Union as to the reliability of the United States as a negotiating partner.

Senator PROXMIRE. To what degree are Soviet negotiating positions taken with the United States because of their fear of Chinese nuclear weapon capability?

Mr. COLBY. I don't think a major degree. They do consider that as part of their problem. I don't think they or we consider the Chinese as a major nuclear threat today.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you again, Mr. Colby, for superb testimony. I appreciate it.

Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Senator.

ONSITE INSPECTIONS

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Colby, I take it in terms of a mutually verifiable freeze you are not talking about on site inspection?

Mr. COLBY. I would ask for that capability. If we got it, find. But if we didn't get it, it would not be the be-all and end-all. The Russians invented the Potemkin village, Mr. Chairman. I think they could pull the wool over an inspection team's eyes without too much difficulty. I don't think that is the only thing we should rest

on.

Senator STEVENS. In terms of our society versus theirs, however, if you did not have a verifiable treaty-I take it you are really talking about technological verification, is that right?

Mr. COLBY. Largely, yes. I am talking really, Mr. Chairman, about the concept of central intelligence which brings all the relevant information into one place, the technological, the overt information, the reports of our Embassies, attaché, and such espionage as we are able to conduct. That is not something that should be totally dismissed.

A Soviet officer a number of years ago was so repelled by what he considered the irresponsibility and the danger of Mr. Krushchev and the people around him that he made contact with us to give us some very important secrets about the Soviet nuclear policies.

If we were in a freeze with the Soviet Union, highly touted by the Soviet Union and ourselves as a great new step in stability between our two nations and then the Soviets developed the size of cheating program that would be necessary to have any kind of substantial strategic effect, then I think you could count on a few Soviet citizens having a crisis of conscience in that group. At least the Soviet leaders would have to count on that possibility.

SOVIET ARMS TREATY VIOLATIONS

Senator STEVENS. We had one of our Senators catalog a whole series of potential arms treaty violations that are going on right now by the Soviets, including development of two new types of ICBM's, testing new mobile air defense systems as part of a nationwide antiballistic missile defense system that is forbidden by the 1972 treaty, concealed deployment of land mobile SS-16 missiles, underground nuclear tests of up to 250 kilotons of explosive power in excess of the 150-kiloton limitation imposed by two treaties, rapid reload and refire exercises of the SS-18's and stockpiling of other missiles circumventing the limit of the missile launchers, deployment of long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles, the Bear intercontinental bomber and Backfire increasing their intercontinental attack capability, although it is classified as a medium-range bomber, a total encryption of telemetry data associated with testing of all significant missiles. The problem is that no one believes it.

Mr. COLBY. No one believes the Soviets.

Senator STEVENS. No one believes our Senators. The real problem is that the intelligence community knows it. Those who get secret briefings know it, but the country does not know it because we rely exclusively on intelligence activities to tell us whether or not the Soviets are violating the treaties.

Unless you can have onsite inspection by people who are not experts in the intelligence field, how are we ever going to get the American public to come onboard and believe it?

Mr. COLBY. I think there are ways for committees of this Congress to receive classified information from the intelligence community, find out what the intelligence community's true assessment of that is, and then be able to release the overall results, not the details, not the sources, but the results.

The two missile tests, I gather, I have not had access to classified material in recent years, Mr. Chairman, but I gather from the press that there is a legitimate question as to whether there are two new missiles or one new one and a modification of an existing

one.

I don't know the details of how that comes out. The intelligence community presumably could brief you as to which they think it is and you would be able to say either that they had tested two or that they had tested one and a modification or that you weren't quite sure yet and you are going to look into it very sharply. Senator Stevens. I don't want to prolong this.

I join Senator Proxmire in congratulating you on an excellent statement. I remember well Ed Brooke's attack on the multiple warhead and was associated with him at that time in that regard.

I also believe that the problem is that no one really understands the capability of their system to secret the information as compared to ours. We just don't seem to have the ability to secret information.

Mr. COLBY'S. We are not in the same ball park, Mr. Chairman. Senator STEVENS. I am sure I like that too much in the long run. The real problem with the verification of any freeze on production is that it has to be believable. Then even if it is believed, I remem

ber my history of the limitation after World War I on the size of the battleships and the armaments and the fact that there were open violations by both Japan and Germany and the world knew it. Mr. COLBY. And nobody did anything about it. I think you are onto a valid point, Mr. Chairman. I think the present treaties largely say either that they are totally followed or they are violated. There is no sanction and no interim sanction put in.

I think there is ground for negotiating some interim sanctions such as a determination by a neutral group or a third party such as a demand for inspection upon suspicion, that sort of thing, such as a reciprocal violation by our side of violation on the other side, but not the destruction of the entire treaty.

Just a conscious set of sanctions for incremental violations of the treaty. I think that kind of thing could be worked out to a degree. Senator STEVENS. I for one would like to see a movement publicly from their community in Russia supporting a similar kind of freeze and demand for inspection on our shores. I think we would grant it rapidly. I don't see any mutuality in the freeze demand.

I notice you used the words "mutual" and "verifiable." I commend you for the way you have said it, but there does not seem to be mutually on the freeze proposition as far as the world is concerned. They impose a freeze on us without regard to whether the Russians do or not.

Mr. COLBY. I would not accept that. I would consider a freeze on both sides. The argument is whether it would freeze them into a position of superiority. I respectfully differ with the President on this. I do not see any usable superiority at this time.

They might have a few more of this and we might have a few more of that, but neither side is able to break through the stalemate. Why not stop.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Colby.

Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM H. KINCADE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

Senator PROXMIRE. If I might, I would like to introduce the last witness. He has served in the Senate. Let me welcome you back to the Senate, Bill, at this time in a slightly different capacity.

Mr. Kincade for several years was staff director of the Joint Committee on Defense Production. He has arranged committee hearings such as this one. He is executive director of the Arms Control Association.

We welcome him warmly. Now he is on the side of the questioning, he undoubtedly will find answering more difficult then drafting.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL GOODPASTER

Mr. KINCADE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PROXMIRE. General Goodpaster wanted to have his statement submitted for the record. He could not stay. Senator STEVENS. That will be granted.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. A. J. GOODPASTER

(U.S. ARMY-Ret.)

on

one I

I welcome the opportunity to speak to this committee arms control as a military strategy (or more broadly, as a security strategy in its military aspects). My interest goes back many years. During the 1950's, it was shared with President Eisenhower, when I was a staff assistant to him with interests in this field. His interests were manifested repeatedly, for example in his Atoms-forPeace proposal, his Open Skies proposal, his constant efforts to lower the military components of US/USSR relations, his appointment of Governor Stassen as his Special Assistant for Disarmament, and mant other actions. During the 1960's, while serving as assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then as Director at the Joint Staff and later as Commandant of the National War College, I was again concerned with these issues. Following my retirement as SACEUR, while serving at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and subsequently as Professor of Government and International Studies at the Citadel in Charleston, S.C., I included a treatment of these issues in my book, "For the Common Defense," published in 1977. Since my retirement on leaving West Point in 1981, I have participated in several major studies conducted, among others, by the Atlantic Council of the United States, and the Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control.

I will address the very cogent questions set out in the letter to me from your committee:

"What specific military and/or budgeting benefits would flow from capping and ultimately reducing the nuclear arsenals on both sides?"

"How can arms control maintain and improve the credi

bility of the U.S. strategic deterrent?"

"How can arms control prevent U.S./Soviet military competition from spilling over to new technological arenas?"

"How can arms control maintain U.S. defense expenditures within limits of economic and political acceptability?" "How can arms control improve the ability of the United States to monitor Soviet military activities?"

First, to lay the groundwork for my responses, I suggest (as I did in my book) that we should see arms control as one of the three major lines of policy to provide for the basic security of our people, our territory and our free institutions, the other two policies being defense and deterrence. In formalising security policy and establishing military programs, I have long favored an approach that begins with consideration of our national values that are exposed to outside international threat, identifies from these our specific major interests that require se