War, Strategy and IntelligenceRoutledge, 12/11/2012 - 500 من الصفحات Investigating the logic, conduct and nature of war on the highest political and strategic levels, these essays put less emphasis on operational and tactical aspects. They look at the impact of technology on warfare, the political nature of war and the limits of rational analysis in studying war. |
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الصفحة 13
... enemy's intentions and capabilities. As Chapter 4 emphasizes, this ideal is seldom even approximated in real life ... enemy in order to promote their own procurement plans. To justify their own existence they may exaggerate the ...
... enemy's intentions and capabilities. As Chapter 4 emphasizes, this ideal is seldom even approximated in real life ... enemy in order to promote their own procurement plans. To justify their own existence they may exaggerate the ...
الصفحة 15
... enemy's threat. Strategic planning is thus influenced as much by domestic and organizational considerations as by 'external' factors. Strategic plans and military doctrines that at first sight seem to be based on military logic alone ...
... enemy's threat. Strategic planning is thus influenced as much by domestic and organizational considerations as by 'external' factors. Strategic plans and military doctrines that at first sight seem to be based on military logic alone ...
الصفحة 16
... enemy's strength too high than too low. such is human nature As a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good, and rather tend to exaggerate the bad.'17 His vivid description of a soldier's reaction to the perils of fire and ...
... enemy's strength too high than too low. such is human nature As a rule most men would rather believe bad news than good, and rather tend to exaggerate the bad.'17 His vivid description of a soldier's reaction to the perils of fire and ...
الصفحة 18
... enemy's existing perceptions also explains why the use of strategem cannot really be exposed even in those instances where it fails. Differences in perception between opponents in war also explain why their readiness to terminate a war ...
... enemy's existing perceptions also explains why the use of strategem cannot really be exposed even in those instances where it fails. Differences in perception between opponents in war also explain why their readiness to terminate a war ...
الصفحة 34
... enemy's mobilization and the time necessary to mobilize one's own troops. In addition, it can throw light on the planning of strategic surprise from the attacker's point of view. The chart implies that it might be wiser for the attacker ...
... enemy's mobilization and the time necessary to mobilize one's own troops. In addition, it can throw light on the planning of strategic surprise from the attacker's point of view. The chart implies that it might be wiser for the attacker ...
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Abwehr achieve adversary aircraft American analysis Army battle battlefield benefits bomber British intelligence capabilities Churchill Clausewitz Command conflict cost counter-measures deceiver deception operations deception plan decision defense difficult diplomacy diplomatic surprise Double Cross System Dudley Clarke effective enemy enemy’s estimates example fact failure fighting first Foreign Policy German German intelligence Handel Hitler Ibid impact important influence initial intelligence community intelligence organizations intelligence process intentions interests invasion Israel Israeli Japanese leaders London major Michael Howard missiles mobilization modern negotiations nuclear offensive officers one’s Operation Mincemeat Pas de Calais peace perceptions political possible problems R.V. Jones radar Second World Second World War secrecy Soviet Union strategic surprise success Sun Tzu superior surprise attack tactical tanks technological surprise tennination termination theory tion troops Ultra United University Press USSR victory Vietnam warfare warning wars weapons systems Yom Kippur War York