| Mark Granovetter - 1995 - عدد الصفحات: 263
...or other terms of trade. As Albert Hirschman has noted, such idealized markets, involving as they do "large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and...perfect competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstration or mutual adjustment and the various operators that contract together need... | |
| Stuart Corbridge - 2000 - عدد الصفحات: 642
...allocative efficiency and all-round welfare maximisation are strictly valid only for this market. Involving large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and sellers supplied with perfect information. such markets function without any prolonged human or social contact among and between the parties.... | |
| Ruth F. Chadwick, Doris Schroeder - 2002 - عدد الصفحات: 384
...allocative efficiency and all-round welfare maximization are strictly valid only for this market. Involving large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and sellers supplied with perfect information, such markets function without any prolonged human or social contact among or between the parties. Under... | |
| Masao Miyoshi, Harry Harootunian - 2002 - عدد الصفحات: 428
...here is the self-regarding individual. As Hirschman has put it, [because idealized markets involve] large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and sellers supplied with perfect information . . . [they) function without any prolonged human or social contact between the parties. Under perfect... | |
| Alan M. Rugman - 2002 - عدد الصفحات: 384
...or other terms of trade. As Albert Hirschman has noted, such idealized markets, involving as they do "large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and...perfect competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstration or mutual adjustment and the various operators that contract together need... | |
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