Defense Industrial Base

The acquisition strategy described above will provide a continuous reduced-rate flow of modern systems into the field. In this plan, therefore, the defense industrial base will not go into suspended animation, but will continue to function on most if not all cylinders, at a much reduced rate of production. transition will be painful. It is important that adjustments be made on the government side to allow a viable downsized industrial base to survive.

The

It will be necessary that the terms and conditions and profit rates on R&D work be established that will allow a financially healthy defense industry.

The Final Report of the Packard Commission emphasized the need for the procurement process to promote trust and cooperation between Service customers and system contractors. Current reviews of contract law (now being undertaken by the DoD Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition Law) should be used as a vehicle for further relaxation of expensive confrontational obligations.

It is also important that prototype and technology demos be funded without consideration of whether or not EMD and production funds are programmed in the SYDP. None of the five prototypes of the 70's and 80's (Have Blue, YF-16, YF-17, YC-14, YC-15) were programmed for out year funding at the time of prototyping. Stumbling blocks to the sale of weapons systems to friendly foreign nations should be removed and replaced by pro-active support in the government Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce, and in the Congress. Government and industry must cooperate to avoid cases in which friendly foreign governments are forced to go to our foreign competitors because our government policies forbid the sale of weapons to them.

Summary

The American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics is pleased to have this opportunity to present our thoughts to this committee. We strongly support the notion that a strategy for downsizing and maintaining an effective defense force supported by a healthy industrial base is necessary. There are many things about the prototyping strategy that are good. Deterrence of future threats depends on maintaining a perceived and real superiority. We have suggested a framework for what we believe is a workable and potentially successful strategy and plan. We have suggested some specific measures for maintaining a viable defense industrial base, albeit smaller. Let us not forget what brought us to this very favorable position which now allows our government to place more attention and national resources on the important quality-of-life issues of our society, culture, and citizens.

The AIAA thanks you for this opportunity to appear.

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 1992.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS

WITNESS

VICTOR RIVERA, BSN, CRNA, PAST-PRESIDENT, MARYLAND ASSOCIATION OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS

INTRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. Our next witness is Mr. Victor Rivera with the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists. Mr. Rivera.

STATEMENT OF MR. RIVERA

Mr. RIVERA. I am glad to be here. My name is Victor Rivera. I am a certified registered nurse anesthetist and the past President of the Maryland Association of Nurse Anesthetists. Currently, I am a staff CRNA with the Anesthesia Care Team, P.C., at Providence Hospital in Washington, D.C. I am also a retired Army nurse anesthetist, having held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

Mr. Chairman, as the professional association that represents over 24,000 CRNAs, the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists, AANA, appreciates the help that you and the Committee have given us, DOD, and each of the military services in recruiting and retaining CRNAs. Our written testimony addresses in detail the issues of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, manpower, pay, promotion, practice and education. My brief remarks today will highlight our specific recommendations for changes in these

areas.

SPECIAL PAYS

First, Operation Desert Storm. The AANA appreciates the Committee's help in remedying the inequity regarding special pay for reserve, recalled, and retained CRNAs involved in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Due to the Committee's direct intervention, the special pay for all CRNAs is now retroactive to August 1, 1990.

Second, manpower and pay. Although there is a clear intent to downsize the number of military personnel generally, this does not create a need to decrease the number of anesthesia providers. The military health care mission has not been downsized in any way; the health care needs of military personnel and their families must still be met.

Unfortunately, there is a severe CRNA shortage in the military. One reason is that the current $6,000 Incentive Special Pay retention bonus for CRNAs still does not make military CRNA pay competitive with that of the civilian sector. AANA membership survey data on CRNA mean gross annual income by type of employment for calendar year 1989 provided the following approximate figures: Civilian self-employed: $88,000; civilian employed: $60,000; Army, $45,000; Navy, $47,000; Air Force, $44,000.

Therefore, we recommend that, one, the $6,000 annual ISP for CRNA retention be increased to $15,000 in order to be competitive