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of a very extensive and really quite exhaustive witness list this morning who can bring an enormous amount of information to this committee so that we can make an informed and balanced judgment.

The National Guard and Reserve forces have played an important role in our security since the first militia units were formed in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1636. A new chapter in this outstanding history was written last year when 250,000 of these citizen soldiers were called to active duty during Operation Desert Storm. In that conflict, as in all previous ones, the Guard and Reserve performed with distinction. We should not do anything to undermine this bedrock tradition of the American citizen soldier. I am, therefore, troubled by the Pentagon's proposal on the National Guard and the Reserve.

The end of the cold war allows us to reduce our Armed Forces, particularly those assigned to defend Europe from an attack by the now defunct Warsaw Pact, but these force reductions must be fair and responsible. The Pentagon proposal fails this test. It offers hazardous cuts that devastate the Guard in some States, while leaving others virtually untouched. The average nationwide reduction proposed for the Army National Guard in the next 2 years is less than 20 percent. Yet, the reduction in Massachusetts is almost twothirds of our total force, 66 percent. And a handful of other States have cuts for that period of about 50 percent.

This lopsided proposal flies in the face of congressional intent. In the report for the fiscal year 1992 defense authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee specifically directed the Department of Defense to avoid disproportionate reductions in any State or region in implementing the cuts in the Guard and the Reserve forces. This maldistribution of cuts must be corrected. Not all States have major military bases with active military units, but all States do have National Guard units and Reserve units. And it is through these units that we ensure broad participation from our citizenry in defending our national security. We should not abandon this important principle by forcing a few States to accept disproportionate cuts in their Guard and Reserve units.

I thank the Chair.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much. Carl, did you have a statement?

Senator LEVIN. I do, just a brief statement, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this hearing. It is of critical importance to the Nation.

The breakup of the Soviet Union should allow us to have fewer regular forces than previously planned and to rely more on the Guard and Reserve. But instead, the administration makes no change in the number and structure of forces from the base force plan that it constructed about 2 years ago. The cold war is over, but the administration base force plan is frozen. The world has changed dramatically and the Soviet Union has disintegrated, but the administration unwisely and illogically insists on no changes in the size and composition of the military base force.

Greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve is indicated by the reduced threat from the Soviet Union, by the need to rely on a citizen army to assure that public support exists before we engage in

major military efforts. Greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve is indicated by the fiscal situation in which we find ourselves.

We know that there must be reductions in military personnel in the coming years, both active duty and Reserves, but reductions must be rational and orderly, producing the most efficient force possible. I am not convinced that the reductions that the President is proposing meet that standard.

Last year this committee under Senator Glenn's leadership ordered an independent study of the appropriate mix of active and Reserve forces for our military precisely because the Department of Defense had not provided a credible rationale.

Nor has the administration's proposed reductions in Guard and Reserve met the equity test. These proposed reductions in the Guard and Reserve hit the Midwest, for instance, much harder than other regions. The administration proposes numerically greater cuts in the Guard and Reserve for fiscal year 1992 and 1993 in the seven midwestern States than in the 15 southern States. The figures are that in the seven States of the Midwest with Guard and Reserve forces of 80,000, the administration proposes reductions of almost 20,000; whereas in the 15 southern States, with Guard and Reserve forces of twice the size, twice the number of States, the actual proposed reduction is less, under 19,000.

My own State of Michigan would be one of the hardest hit, although an independent survey cites Michigan as one of seven States that should be considered for increased National Guard authorizations between now and the year 2000, and although on performance history, Michigan units continue to have the highest assigned strength, the highest successful recruitment rate of any State.

So, whatever the cuts are in the Guard and Reserve, they must be equitably distributed.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding these hearings.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator Nunn, do you have any comments? Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman this is a very important hearing, and I believe that we are going to learn a great deal this morning. This is one of the most important and one of the most difficult issues we are going to face.

I would commend to all of our colleagues an article written by Colonel Harry Summers that recently appeared in the Washington Times. As Colonel Summers pointed out, the history of this goes back a long way. "By incorporating the reserve combat brigades into active Army division," writes Colonel Summers, "General Abrams sought to eliminate the disastrous Vietnam war fallacy that wars can be fought in cold blood without paying the political price of national mobilization." Colonel Summers goes ahead and points out that the Persian Gulf war proved that General Abrams was correct. One of the reasons American people supported the Persian Gulf war so strongly was that the mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve touched towns and communities all across America and gave every one of them a direct and personal stake in the war's outcome.

Colonel Summers concludes and I quote from his article "Cutting the size of the Reserves to reflect post-cold war realities is one thing. Cutting their role in providing for the common defense so as to avoid the perils and problems of mobilization is quite another. If we fail to remember the major lessons of the Vietnam war, we will surely once again reap the disastrous consequences."

Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that the full text of Colonel Summers' article be included in the record. Senator GLENN. Without objection.

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Those who cannot rc. member the past," wrote the Spanish philosopher George Santayana 1906. "are condemned to repeat it." It is an adage often quoted, and even more often ignored. With last week's announcement by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney of an initial 1992-93 cut of some 830 units and almost 140.000 men and women from America's military reserves the Army and Air Force National Guard and the reserves of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines — we may be on the verge of doing it yet again.

"The National Guard and Reserves are invaluabie national assets," he said, "but we are cutting the size of the entire military force. botn active duty and reserve." By 1997. another 100.000 will be cut from the reserves, reducing their overall size by some 25 percent, almost the same percentage as the reductions under way in the active forces.

-The National Guard and Reserves will play ar. zosuiutely vital part" in future strategy. Mr. Cheney emphasized, noting that the propor tion of active duty forces (64 per cent) to reserves (36 percent) will remain the same." But these statistics mask an important shift in the philosophy undergirding the Total Force concept that grew out of the Vietnam War.

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Chairman Gen. Colin Powe!! said.
"For that kind of proficiency.
need active units 2: are able to
train at this day in and day out all
year long."

While Gen. Powell's premise is ar
guably true when comes to Army
maneuver units (a: :s. front-line
infantry armor and cavalry units) it
is cangerously similar to the argu
ments used at the neight of the Cuid
War to justify neglecting the reserve
forces in favor of a large active
force. "If they can': ae: there in 9C
days." ran the argument. "we con:
need them.”

"But what happens on the 91st
day" asked Gen. John Vessey who
was passed over for promotion to his
second star for asking such an em
barrassing question. A former Min

nesota National Guard first ser-
geant, who won a battlefield
commission at the Anzio beachhead
in World War II. Gen. Vessey
wouldn't shut up. When his question
was finally addressed. the reserve
was found to be in such disarray that
the only options open after 90 days
were surrender or nuclear war.

Gen. Vessey (who rose to four
stars and appointment as chairman
of the Joint Chiefs) helped set in mo-
tion the mobilization machinery that
paid off so handsomely in the Per-
sian Gulf war when the reserve
forces (as they had in every Amer
ican war save Vietnam) literally
made victory possible.

Reserve forces represented some 20 percent of U.S. military forces deployed to the Gulf, and Mr. Cheney acknowledged that they had performed "magnificently" in that war. But there is more to the reserves than their purely military capability. as then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Creighton Abrams recognized when he established the "Total Army" concept in 1972, melding active and reserve components into a cohesive whole.

By incorporating reserve combat brigades into active-Army divisions. Gen. Abrams sought to eliminate the disastrous Vietnam War fallacy that wars could be fought "in cold blood" without paying the political price of national mobilization. It was precisely what many saw as the reserves' greatest weakness — their political sensitivity that Gen. Abrams recognized as their greatest strength. Unlike the draft, which had degenerated into a nationa¡ cisgrace, the reserve forces, he believed. represented the true bridge between the active force and the American people.

The Persian Gulf war proved him exactly correct. As Gen. Crosbie £ Sain: commented. "The carly decision to call up the reserves turned out to be a major catalyst in consolidating American public opinion firmly behind our strategy in the Gulf. The size of the call-up mean: that everyone had players from the:: state. The moral ascendancy tha U.S. troops had when they knew their country was behind them can. not be discounted." "In war,” Napoleon said, "the moral is to the ma terial as three to one."

Cutting the size of the reserves to reflect post-Cold War realities is one thing. Cutting their role in providing for the common defense so as to avoid the penis and problems of mobilization is quite another. If we fa:! to remember that major lesson of the Vietnam War, we will surely once again reap the disastrous conse quences.

Ham: G. Summers Jr. a retired U.S. Army colonel, is a distinguishec jellow of the Army War College and c nationally syndicated columnist.

Senator NUNN. I would suggest that he hits the nail on the head. We have to sort out here, the cuts that affect the realities of the overall drawdown as distinguished from the cuts that represent a shifting of functions from the Reserve and Guard that I believe have performed very, very well to the active duty forces so they can avoid some of the problems inherent in mobilization. But those very problems that may be inherent in mobilization are also tremendous national assets for our country in mobilizing the Nation. You have to mobilize the Nation to fight a war, and I hope we have found that out.

One of the ways you mobilize the Nation, one of the most important ways, is through the Guard and Reserve and having the courage to call them and having the courage to explain to the American people why calling them is necessary to our national security. I hope we don't get back into another situation that we have been in in the past where a war is not important enough to mobilize the Nation, but important enough to send people over to die. I think that is a distinction that we should all keep in mind. [The prepared statement of Senator Nunn follows:]

PREPARED Statement by Senator Sam NUNN

Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you and Senator McCain for calling this important hearing.

The Reserve component personnel levels are going to be one of the most difficult issues we have to deal with this year. Secretary Cheney and General Powell have again proposed deep reductions in National Guard and Reserve personnel strength for fiscal year 1993 and for the next 5 years. These proposals deserve careful consideration, and I know the subcommittee and the full committee will spend a great deal of time on this matter.

I think there are two important points to keep in mind as we examine the National Guard and Reserve issues this year.

I have heard suggestions that some of the military services are reassigning missions from the Reserve components back to the Active forces. I hope the subcommittee will look at whether the National Guard and Reserve reductions are part of an overall drawdown of our defense establishment, or whether they are being cut so that their missions can be assigned to Active forces. Long experience shows that it is a lot less expensive to assign a mission to the National Guard and Reserves than it is to have the Active forces perform the mission. If we are interested in reducing the defense establishment and the defense budget, I don't think we should be taking missions and functions currently being performed by the National Guard and Reserves and putting them back in the Active forces.

We should also remember that the Reserve components play an important role in our Volunteer Force in keeping the American people in close touch with the military services. Last week retired Army Colonel Harry Summers wrote an excellent column on this subject that recalled the history behind Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams' decision in the early 1970s to rely more heavily on the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Colonel Summers points out that General Abrams realized in the aftermath of the Vietnam war-a war in which we did not mobilize the Reserves that there is more to the Reserves than their purely military capability. In fact, the Reserve components represent the true bridge between the Active force and the American people.

"By incorporating the reserve combat brigades into active-Army divisions"writes Colonel Summers "General Abrams sought to eliminate the disastrous Vietnam war fallacy that wars could be fought 'in cold blood' without paying the political price of national mobilization."

As Colonel Summers points out, the Persian Gulf proved that General Abrams was correct. One of the reasons that the American people supported the Persian Gulf war so strongly was that the mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve touched towns and communities all across the America, and gave every one of them a direct and personal stake in the war's outcome. Colonel Summers concludes:

"Cutting the size of the reserves to reflect post-Cold War realities is one thing. Cutting their role in providing for the common defense so as to avoid the perils and problems of mobilization is quite another. If we fail to remember that major lesson of the Vietnam war, we will surely once again reap the disastrous consequences." Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of Colonel Summers' article be included in the record.

I look forward to the testimony this morning, and I will have questions for the witnesses after they have given their opening statements.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

Senator Ford and Senator Bond, who are co-chairmen of the Senate National Guard Caucus, and Senator Boren, who has not yet arrived, have all requested the opportunity to join this hearing and give testimony. We will be happy to accommodate these Senators before we turn to our three panelists. Senator Ford.

STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL H. FORD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Nunn, Senator Kennedy, Senator Levin. I appreciate the opportunity to say a few words this morning to the Manpower Subcommittee. Since you have a great many distinguished witnesses to hear from, Mr. Chairman, I will be brief.

Two weeks ago, the Department of Defense announced its plans for reductions in the National Guard and Reserve forces and sent to the Congress a long list of cuts in every State of the Union. As co-chairman of the Senate National Guard Caucus, it is my opinion that the list was dead on arrival.

I do not dispute the need to reduce the size of our defense establishment as we reorder priorities and missions in the new world created by the demise of the Soviet Union, and given the size of the Federal deficit and poor economic health of the Nation, we must save every defense dollar we can. However, I reject the premise that slashing the end strength and force structure of the Guard and Reserve is the correct way to go.

In fact, it should be just the reverse. The citizen soldier has served this Nation for over 300 years, and it is upon him that we should now place more reliance. I submit that we should return to the days of a small standing army and a larger reserve force for two main reasons. First, in terms of cost, we can field four reservists for every active duty soldier, and second, the Reserves proved in Desert Storm that they can do the job.

There is no question about the performance of the Guard and Reserve units mobilized in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. As noted by Secretary of Defense Cheney, Chairman Powell, General Schwarzkopf, and other senior military leaders, the Reserves served with great distinction and made a contribution that was integral to the success of the operation. Ironically, these same leaders have publicly stated how vital Reserve personnel are to the Total Force concept, and now they want to regulate them to a force in deep re

serve.

History has shown that after every major conflict, we have drawn down too far, too fast, and have had to build up all over again, resulting in a waste of resources and money and in the en

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