dangerment of the Nation's security. I caution the committee not to let this happen again. This is why the National Guard Caucus continues to support the fiscal year 1993 strength levels contained in the 1992 Defense Authorization Act. Uncertainties exist in both the projected threat and the defense requirements needed to meet an unidentified threat. While reductions in the Guard and Reserve are inevitable, cuts should only be made when these uncertainties are resolved. The caucus does not believe we have reached that point. By the end of this week, Senator Bond and I, my colleague here at the table, will send to the committee a letter signed by over half of the members of the Senate asking that the Guard and Reserve numbers authorized for fiscal year 1993 be retained. I hope this committee will honor our request. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I ask that a letter to you from our colleague, Senator Dodd, be included in the hearing record. Senator GLENN. Without objection, it will be included. [The information follows:] U.S. SENATE, Washington, DC, April 3, 1992. Hon. JOHN GLENN, Chairman, Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR JOHN: As the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel begins hearings on the proposed cuts in the National Guard and Reserve, we are writing to bring to your attention a couple matters of concern. As you know, the National Guard has a long and colorful tradition within New England. Indeed, many of the units presently stationed there date back over 300 years, predating even the Revolutionary War era. These units are a source of sustenance and strength for the entire surrounding community, while their rich lineage represents a precious link with a treasured and fabled past. It was therefore a great disappointment to us that the Northeast was singled out by the Defense Department last week for a significant portion of the cuts in the Army National Guard. In Massachusetts, the cuts would eliminate almost 60 percent of the authorized Guard personnel. New Hampshire would lose about 40 percent of its personnel. In our state, Connecticut, about 45 percent of the personnel would be eliminated. The average cut across the nation, on the other hand, would be only 17 percent. Even worse, these cuts would come do n particularly hard on many historical units. Within Connecticut, three unit hat date back to the year 1672-the 192nd Field Artillery, the 169th Infantry, and the First Battalion, 102nd Infantry-are scheduled for elimination by the end of 1993. These un have participated in nearly every conflict the United States has been in during her history. We certainly do not mean to imply that prudent cuts in the National Guard and Reserve forces should not be considered at this time. Indeed, manpower cuts are a necessary part of any well-structured force reduction and cutbacks in the Guard and Reserve components must remain an option. However, it is our hope that the committee will consider a few important issues as these cuts are considered. First, we note that the National Defense Authorization Act for 1992 and 1993 recommended a 1993 end strength for the Army National Guard of 425,450. Last week, however, the Pentagon proposed a 1993 end strength of 383,100. We continue to support the authorized level of 425,450 and we hope it will receive your continued support. We would also draw your attention to section 402 of the same Act, which required an independent study by the end of this year of the many issues surrounding the Active/Reserve force mix. Until that report is complete, we believe it would be premature to authorize large reductions in the Guard and Reserve Component. Second, we urge the Committee to inquire as to the Army's intention to preserve the lineage of historic units. Even if individual units are eliminated in function, it is our understanding that it is possible to preserve these units in name, so that the long history and tradition associated with these units be allowed to continue. While it is our preference that these units not be eliminated at all, it is our hope the Army will take whatever steps necessary to ensure that lineage is preserved in a satisfactory way. Finally, we urge you to closely monitor the Army's progress to ensure that the impact of these cuts is evenly spread across the nation. It is our understanding that the Army, as the initial round of Guard cuts is being completed, will begin to move individual units from state to state in order to eventually balance out the impact of the cuts. The Army refers to this process as "backfill." It is our hope, of course, that at the end of this process, the Connecticut Army National Guard will retain the same percentage of the overall force structure as it did in 1991. However, to this point only one unit of less than 200 personnel has been identified to replace the structure Connecticut is expected to lose. Connecticut will require a backfill of approximately 820 additional personnel in order to retain the same proportional strength. As we have noted above, we certainly believe that measured cuts in the Army National Guard can and should be considered for the coming years. But we find it hard to understand why the Northeast should be singled out for the brunt of these cuts. And we don't see the logic in starting with some of the oldest and most treasured units in the nation. We look for your assistance in finding an equitable solution to this dilemma. We appreciate your attention to these important issues and we look forward to working with you. Sincerely, JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. Senator. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Senator FORD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Dodd is deeply concerned about Guard and Reserve cuts in his State of Connecticut. One point I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, in that Senator Bond and I have both been head of the National Guard in our States. We understand, as former Governors, what the National Guard means, what it can do not only in peacetime, but in a time of war. So, we come to this committee with a feeling of closeness to the National Guard and a first-hand knowledge of its abilities. So, Mr. Chairman, I urge that the committee acknowledge our request and that we retain the authorized strength in fiscal year 1993. I thank the committee for hearing me out. Senator GLENN. Thank you, Senator Ford. Senator Bond. STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Nunn, members of the subcommittee. We do appreciate your inviting us to appear today. It has been said that the witness list is exhaustive. I hope it is not exhausting because the issue we are considering today, whether or not to approve the administration's plan to slash National Guard forces, is one that deserves close study because it will have a long-term impact on our national security. Today's hearing provides an important opportunity to examine that proposal. The plan laid out by Secretary Cheney and General Powell last month would result, as has been said, in the elimination of approximately one-third of all Army Guard units by 1997. If enacted, such cuts would drastically alter the historic role of the National Guard in our Nation's defense and would damage our ability to respond to crises such as the ones we handled so well in the Gulf. The Base Force Plan, which serves as the basis for these recommended cuts, ignores several key points. First, you and I know that defense spending is likely to drop further than the administration or many of us would now plan or want. That means that if we want to retain a sufficient force capable to defend our interests around the world, we must make every defense dollar count. We simply are not going to be able to afford the kind of force that the Pentagon wants to retain. I am not saying that cutting the force further is particularly a good idea, and I will work to try to stop some of those cuts. But simply it's a reality, and we must recognize that. We can maintain an Army Guard combat division for approximately one-quarter of the annual recurring costs of an active combat division. We simply cannot afford to ignore the fact that the Guard is the most cost effective component of our military force. However, it is not just that the Guard is a good value, it is also a well-trained and highly capable force. Today's Guard is the most professional and capable we have seen in years. And as we saw in Desert Shield and in Desert Storm, there is no question that the Guard can serve alongside our Active forces. That was illustrated very well by the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade from the Arkansas National Guard, West Virginia's 196th Field Artillery Brigade, both of which fought alongside their active counterparts in Iraq. I would note, Mr. Chairman, that those who argue that the Guard cannot deploy quickly enough to be useful in the conflicts we will face are ignoring some very important facts. We are just not going to have the sealift and airlift needed to deploy forces more quickly than the Guard can prepare. We saw in Desert Storm that it took months to deploy our troops, months that could and were used to provide training for troops, both Reserve and active. Now, a second fact that I believe is ignored by the Pentagon's Base Force Plan is one mentioned by my colleague from Kentucky, one which my colleague from Oklahoma knows full well, and that is the important role the Guard plays in the States. The National Guard provides absolutely essential assistance in States in times of natural disaster and civil strife. I know that is not a top priority of the Secretary of Defense, but I can tell you as a former Governor, it is vital. When we look at all of the things that we used to do for the States, the assistance that we used to provide, we have had second thoughts about how we have cut back on some of that assistance. Maintaining a strong, viable State militia that is able to respond in times of tornado, flood, civil disturbance, and any other threat to order is vitally important. I would only reference you to the Governors of your States now to ask them what position they would be in if they did not have the Guard to call upon in times of State emergency. Frankly, they will tell you it is vital, and I can tell you that the role the Guard plays in the fight against illegal drugs, particularly in my State, is significant as well. The third factor that is ignored by the Pentagon's Base Force Plan is one that has already been referenced by the Chairman of the full committee, and that is that the Guard is the vital link between the people and the military. The reason our troops had overwhelming support of the public during the Gulf conflict was because everyone in the country knew someone who was over there. Thousands of communities sent men and women to fight, and each of these communities had a personal stake in the conflict. That's a big difference from what we experienced in Vietnam. If we sever the relationship by dissolving Guard units and closing armories in thousands of communities across the country, we are not going to be able to reestablish that contact overnight. The loss of public support that would come with that dissolution would have long-term negative implications for public support of the military at all levels, a point I do not believe the Pentagon appreciates. In closing, please permit me to answer briefly some of the points made by those who do support the massive cuts. I have listened to the arguments of those who disagree with us about cutting Guard forces. There have been, for example, several newspaper editorials arguing that Congress is simply responding to the proposed cuts with its typical knee jerk, "don't cut anything in my State" reaction. Now, that might be a legitimate criticism if it were true, but it is not. We have already agreed upon responsible cuts, and I expect that we will continue to see cuts as the forces down-size, but as the Chairman has pointed out, there has been no justification for the Department of Defense cuts; whereas common sense, that we have already outlined, indicates there are good reasons for maintaining it. The Secretary of Defense has said that we can and must make cuts because of the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. They provide us with an historic opportunity to cut our security commitments and redirect some of our spending toward getting our economic house in order. The Secretary of Defense has said that most of the units being cut are tied to the mission in Europe which is being significantly reduced. I can't speak for all of the States, but in my State, Mr. Chairman, 85 percent of the troops proposed to be cut by 1997 have missions that are not related to Europe. Now, when you look at who is taking the cuts, I come from one of the States that relies very heavily on defense spending for jobs. Yet, I have supported recent cuts in spending. I have proposed cuts in excess of those set forth by the President for weapon systems as others, and I know many of my colleagues in the Guard Caucus have as well. Slashing the Guard, however, would I believe be penny wise and pound foolish. Maintaining our reserve forces is not protecting pork; it's ensuring the survival of the backbone of our Nation's military. So, I am pleased to join with the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Oklahoma in urging the committee to reject the proposed cuts and to continue the efforts to assure that any reductions are fully justified to maintain our Guard forces at a reasonable level. As the Senator from Kentucky has said, we will be providing a letter by the end of this week signed by a majority of our colleagues. We hope that will be the will of this committee. I thank the Chair. [Prepared statement of Senator Bond follows:] PREPARED Statement by SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I thank you for inviting me to appear before you this morning. The issue that you are considering today-whether or not to approve the administration's plan to slash National Guard forces is one that deserves close study because it will have a long-term impact on our national security. Today's hearing will provide an opportunity to examine that proposal. The plan laid out by Secretary Cheney and General Powell last month would result in the elimination of approximately one third of all Army Guard units by 1997. If enacted, such cuts would drastically alter the historic role of the National Guard in our Nation's defense and would damage our ability to respond to crises such as the one we handled so effectively in the Gulf. The base force plan which serves as the basis for the cuts ignores several key points. First, defense spending is likely to drop further than the administration is now planning. That means that if we want to retain a large force capable of defending our interests around the world, we must make every defense dollar count. We simply aren't going to be able to afford the kind of force that the Pentagon wants to retain. I am not saying that cutting the force further is a particularly good idea-it is simply reality and we must recognize that. We can maintain an Army Guard combat division for approximately one quarter of the annual recurring costs of an active division. We simply cannot afford to ignore the fact that the Guard is the most cost-effective component of our military force. However, it is not just that the Guard is a good value-it is also a well-trained and highly capable force. Today's Guard is the most professional and capable we have seen in years and—as we saw in Desert Shield and Desert Storm-there is no question that the Guard can serve alongside our active forces. That was illustrated very well by the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade from the Arkansas National Guard and West Virginia's 196th Field Artillery Brigade, both of which fought alongside their active counterparts in Iraq. I would note, Mr. Chairman, that those who argue that the Guard cannot deploy quickly enough to be useful in the conflicts we will face are ignoring facts. We are just not going to have the sealift and airlift needed to deploy forces more quickly than the Guard can prepare. We saw in Desert Storm that it took months to deploy our troops—months that could be used to provide training for troops both reserve and active. A second factor that I believe is ignored by the Pentagon's base force plan is the important role the Guard plays in the States. The National Guard provides assistance in the States in times of natural disaster and civil strife and, although I know that is not a top priority of the Secretary of Defense, it is a role that cannot be ignored. As a former Governor, I can tell you that not a year went by when I didn't mobilize the Guard to respond to floods, tornadoes or civil disturbances. And the role played by the Guard in the fight against illegal drugs is significant as well. The third factor that is ignored by the base force plan is that the National Guard is the link between the people and the military. The reason our troops had the overwhelming support of the public behind them in the Gulf was because everyone in this country knew someone who was over there. Thousands of communities sent men and women to fight and each one of those communities had a personal stake in the conflict. That is a big difference from what we experienced during Vietnam. If we sever that relationship by dissolving Guard units and closing armories in thousands of communities across the country, we may never be able to reestablish them. The loss of public support that would come with that would have long-term negative implications for public support of our military at all levels. In closing, I would like to make just one additional point. I have been listening to the arguments of those who disagree with me about cutting Guard forces. There have been, for example, several newspaper editorials arguing that Congress is simply responding to the proposed cuts with its typical knee-jerk, don't cut anything in my State reaction. That would be a legitimate criticism if it were true; but it is not. Mr. Chairman, I believe we can and should make further defense cuts. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact provide us with an historic opportunity to cut our security commitments and redirect some of our spending toward getting our economic house in order. I come from one of the States that relies most heavily on defense spending for jobs. Yet I have supported |