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lysts. Army Reserve support of domestic marijuana eradication also increased markedly in fiscal year 1991.

Naval Reserve counterdrug efforts also increased. In fiscal year 1991, the Naval Reserve flew more than 4,100 hours of detection monitoring missions, an increase of 1,700 hours over fiscal year 1990 and 3,100 hours over fiscal year 1989. Naval Reserve frigates spent 433 steaming days patrolling ocean drug routes and searching suspected drug vessels. Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare units continued yearround surveillance operations in Puerto Rico supporting the Coast Guard Greater Antilles Region, and assisted the Border Patrol in southwest border operations. Naval Reserve Intelligence specialists provided important personnel augmentation for JTF-4 and USCINCLANT J3D.

The Marine Corps Reserve was also very active in the counterdrug program during fiscal year 1991. Marine Reservists trained drug law enforcement personnel in a variety of skills including scouting and patrolling, camouflage and concealment, land navigation/map reading, and the selection and manning of observation posts. Before each Listening Post/Observation Post operation, the Marines and DLEAS participate in 3 days of cross training.

The Air Force Reserve provided counterdrug support in a variety of ways during fiscal year 1991. In response to requests from the DLEAS, Air Force Reserve helicopters carried drug law enforcement teams to and from locations of suspected drug activity and to transport prisoners from remote areas. The unique airborne sensor capabilities of Reserve aircraft were also used in support of detection and monitoring. Air Force Reservists also provided technical training to DLEA agencies as well as storage spaces for certain law enforcement material.

THE FISCAL YEAR 1993 BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS Table VI summarizes the budget request which has been submitted for the Reserve components for fiscal year 1993.

TABLE VI.-Reserve Component Budget Request, February 1992 Submission

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TABLE VI. Reserve Component Budget Request, February 1992 Submission-Continued

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Mr. Chairman, at my confirmation hearing in October 1987, I informed the Senate that the primary focus of my administration of the Office of Reserve Affairs would be on the combat readiness of the National Guard and Reserve. I noted that in the final analysis, the single question to which the President, the Congress, and the American people must have an unequivocally affirmative answer, is: "Are they ready?"

I am honored to report that time and again the Reserve components have demonstrated by their magnificent performance that they are ready whether it is for a major armed conflict like Desert Storm, a smaller armed conflict like Just Cause, the fight against drug traffickers, or more routine, peacetime operations. I look forward to our mutual efforts to ensure that our National Guardsmen and Reservists are equally ready for the challenging, if less predictable days ahead.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. Mr. Jehn.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. JEHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As is true of Mr. Duncan, I have a prepared statement. I am very pleased that you have entered it into the record. In the interest of time, I will simply make a very short statement here. I want to emphasize three points that I think are absolutely key and essential to the issue we face in shaping the Reserve components consistent with the reduction and restructuring that we propose for the Active components. These comments will simply echo Mr. Duncan's, but I think they merit repetition.

The first point I would like to make concerns balance. As we have discussed personnel reductions, civilian and active duty, you have heard me before talk about the importance of balance, balance in terms of pay grade, balance in terms of mix of occupational skills and so on. There is another dimension of balance that we need to emphasize in the context of today's discussion, and that is

the balance between the Active components on the one hand and the Reserve components on the other hand.

As you and I know, the members of this subcommittee appreciate very well, we are in the midst of an enormous reduction and restructuring of the Defense Department. By the end of this year almost 300,000 fewer women and men will be on active duty in our military services than was true at the end of 1989. The Department of Defense will have almost 100,000 fewer civilians than it did at the end of 1989. It is time, Mr. Chairman, that we begin to restructure the Reserves in a commensurate way.

Now, I would like to reemphasize-and this is my second pointa point that Mr. Duncan made. The Base Force does not recommend drastic and draconian cuts to the Reserve components. Indeed, as Mr. Duncan has emphasized, the Reserve components will continue to be an essential and integral part of our Total Force. We are not walking away from the Total Force Policy here. Indeed, by the end of fiscal year 1995, the Reserve components, as Mr. Duncan pointed out, will be 6 percent larger than they were at the end of fiscal year 1980 despite the fact that we have already cut the Active component to its lowest level since before the Korean war.

My final point is simply a point, I know you all appreciate that while Reserve forces may be somewhat less expensive to maintain than Active forces, they are not free, and the money that may be spent on Reserve forces that have no mission would be much better spent maintaining the capability and readiness of Reserve forces that do have a mission and the Active component.

So, we enlist your support and we understand the important issue we are all facing here and appreciate the opportunity for all of us to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jehn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. CHRISTOPHER JEHN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR FORCE MANAGEMENT AND PERSONNEL

TOTAL FORCE OVERVIEW

Mister Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department's plans for reshaping the Total Force over the course of the next 4 years.

As Secretary Cheney has said on numerous occasions, our overarching objective while we are reshaping the force is to maintain a balance between mission and readiness requirements and personnel considerations, while remaining sensitive to fiscal constraints and the impact of the decisions we make today on our future force. The central impetus to American's defense transformation is a change in the underlying assumptions that have driven our strategy and force planning for the last 40 years. Our primary focus is no longer the threat of a Soviet-led European-wide conflict leading to global war. Our focus now is on regional contingencies, such as the one we just dealt with in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the continuing political and economic changes in Eastern Europe certainly compel us to follow developments there carefully.

The Total Force Policy is a creative response to this Nation's responsibilities as a global power tempered by fiscal and demographic realities. The Active and Reserve components together with the civilian workforce, including host nation support and contract support, each provide unique, yet complementary, capabilities needed to maintain the security of this Nation. The composition of the new Total Force reflects the national defense strategy articulated by President Bush when he said the United States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess at present. . . . what we need are not merely reductions but restructuring.'

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So the challenge ahead is to restructure forces to fit the new defense strategy and to conform to dramatically lower budgets. Defense spending as a percentage of the U.S. gross national product is heading to its lowest levels since before World War II. By 1995 our forces will be about 21 percent smaller than in 1989.

For America's new defense strategy to be effective, however, the restructuring of our Armed Forces must be guided by the requirements of that strategy. The Department of Defense is doing exactly that in its plans for reshaping the Total Force. Even though the new strategic requirements affect active and reserve forces differently, the manpower of both will decline roughly in the same proportion in our restructuring.

Based on the National Military Strategy, Total Force precepts, and fiscal constraints, we plan to reshape and reduce the active military force by 486,000, or 22.8 percent, between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1995.

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At the same time we need to reshape and reduce the Reserve components by about 249,000, or 21.3 percent.

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This is more than a reduction, it is a fundamental restructuring of our military force. From the end of fiscal year 1989 through fiscal year 1995 the Army will deactivate one active corps, six active divisions, and four reserve divisions. At the same time two divisions will be converted to cadre status. The restructured Army will have a forward presence of four divisions (two in Europe and two in the Pacific), a CONUS-based crisis response force of five active divisions, a contingency force of three active and six reserve reinforcing divisions, and a reconstitution capability of two cadre divisions. This restructuring will result in a reduction of 234,000 active and 209,000 reserve end strength between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1995. By the end of fiscal year 1995, Army military strength will be 536,000 active (48.6 percent) and 567,000 reserves (51.4 percent).

The difference in the magnitude and rate of drawdown between the active and reserve naval forces is caused primarily by the difference in decommissioning requirements. The Active component is decommissioning battleships and carriers, while the Naval Reserve is decommissioning frigates and support ships. At the same time, the active force is commissioning replacement ships (cruisers and mine sweepers) and the reserve force will man 24 frigates under the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept. Between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1995, the Navy will decommission 94 Battle Force Ships, going from 545 to 451 ships, and inactivate two Active compo

nent carrier air wings. By the end of fiscal year 1995, Navy military strength will be 509,000 active (81.2 percent) and 118,000 reserves (18.8 percent).

Changes to the Marine Corps force structure involve all three elements of the force. The Command element activated new Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Groups to provide better command and control. In the Ground Combat element, one tank battalion, an artillery battalion, and an armored assault battalion will be deactivated. In the Aviation Combat element, two F/A-18 squadrons, an AV-8B squadron, and two OV-10 squadrons will be deactivated. In addition, reductions in the combat service support element will parallel those in the command and combat elements. This restructuring will result in a reduction of 27,000 active and 9,000 reserve end strength between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1995. By the end of fiscal year 1995, Marine Corps military strength will be 170,000 active (82.9 percent) and 35,000 reserves (17.1 percent).

By fiscal year 1995 the Air Force will reduce 10 active and 1 reserve tactical fighter wings and eliminate 97 strategic bombers. The Air Force will also transfer 138 air refueling (KC-135) aircraft from the Active to the Reserve components and eliminate 41 other aircraft. In addition, it will transfer 46 airlift aircraft to the Reserve components and eliminate 107 other aircraft. This restructuring will result in a reduction of 142,000 active and an increase of 2,000 reserve end strength between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1995. By the end of fiscal year 1995 Air Force military strength will be 429,000 active (68.1 percent) and 201,000 reserves (31.9 per

cent).

Civilian reductions between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 1995 will be about 204,000 (from 1,116,800 at the end of fiscal year 1989 to 912,400 at the end of fiscal year 1995), or 18.3 percent, and reflect the reduced requirement for supporting infrastructure and the implementation of management improvements. At the end of fiscal year 1995 civilians will comprise 26.2 percent of the Total Force.

This force restructuring and related end strength reductions are consistent with the President's new strategy and reflect Total Force Policy by taking advantage of the strengths of each component. Active component forces have a critical role to play in supplying combat and support forces for the initial response to contingencies that arise on short notice. Reserve component forces will, among other roles, contribute mobility assets in short notice crises, support and sustain active combat forces and provide combat forces in especially large or protracted contingencies. In addition, mobilizing Reserve component combat forces can provide the force expansion needed to enhance the U.S. capability to respond to another contingency. Last, all components of the Total Force, active, reserve, and civilian, will contribute to the four critical capabilities-logistics, space, research and development, and reconstitution-necessary for the combat forces to accomplish their intended purpose. The DOD's 1992 requested reduction of 106,358 in active end strength was approved by Congress; however, the Congress reduced Selective Reserves by only 37,580, instead of the 105,076 requested by the Department. If reserve forces are not reduced as we reduce the active force structure, we will be left with many reserve units without a mission as the Active component units they support are deactivated. The funds to support those unnecessary reserve units would be much better spent supporting required reserve units those with a mission-and Active component units.

The Department has proposed a carefully balanced force structure. The reduction in Reserve component force structure and end strength is inextricably linked to changes in Active component force structure. With less Active component structure, the need for combat support and combat service support forces, found largely in the Reserve components, is also reduced. Reversing or redistributing these programmed reductions will require the Department to reallocate funds from other critical areas such as OPTEMPO, training, maintenance, or procurement solely for the purpose of funding unneeded force structure. This will result in the creation of "hollow" forces in the Active and Reserve components and unnecessary units in the Reserve components.

Our proposed force structure continues to rely heavily on the essential contributions of reserve units. Indeed, we are proposing a reserve end strength that is still over 6 percent larger than before the defense buildup of the 1980s (922,000 in fiscal year 1995 compared to 869,000 in fiscal year 1980), even as we reduce the Active component to its lowest level since before the Korean war. But we cannot afford a reserve force structure larger than required.

I hope my comments will prove helpful for the important decisions you will be making in the coming weeks. Your support is vital for allocating our scarce defense dollars to forge a streamlined, ready, top-quality force for this new security era.

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