and deterioration of sophisticated and expensive items is minimized, training costs drop, and unit readiness is significantly enhanced. No other factor is more essential in determining Reserve readiness.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) continues to be the Army's principal source of trained military personnel to serve as replacements or fillers for both Active and Reserve component units. Supporting the Total Army, the IRR constitutes the Nation's largest pool of deployable and trained individual manpower. Its strength has grown from 213,000 in fiscal year 1981 to a fiscal year 1991 end strength of over 372,000. However, as the result of downsizing the Active Army and the effects of the 8-year military obligation, the IRR is expected to grow to 458,000 by the end of fiscal year 1993. Over 17,000 IRR soldiers were activated to support Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm and did a superb job of demonstrating how well the IRR can perform its mission. They also demonstrated how quickly they can re-hone their skills.

INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTATION

The mission of the Army Reserve is to provide both trained units and individuals upon mobilization or for national emergencies. One of the Army Reserve's most important elements in performing that mission is the Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) program. IMA soldiers are members of Selected Reserve and, as such, are by law subject to immediate mobilization. During Desert Storm nearly 1,600 IMA soldiers were activated. Our IMA force consists of qualified Reserve soldiers who are preassigned to Active component billets that must be filled upon mobilization. By regulation they must train with their assigned command or agency for a minimum of 2 weeks per year to ensure their proficiency in their mobilization duties.

TRAINING

During the last fiscal year, Army Reserve units and soldiers participated in a wide variety of training exercises that not only improved readiness, but also demonstrated our ability to perform augmentation and contingency operations. Several years of outstanding training have been a key to this success. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm validated many Army Reserve training programs and provided valuable data for refining others. The unquestionably successful role of the Army Reserve in the Persian Gulf proves that, when high quality, mobilization-oriented training is given to top notch citizen-soldiers, the result is an unbeatable combination.

OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

One very important program that was validated by our success in the Persian Gulf is overseas deployment training (ODT), which offers Reserve soldiers the opportunity to mobilize, deploy to an overseas theater of operations, train with their Active component counterparts, and perform their wartime missions. Over the past 6 years, an annual average of over 19,000 Army Reserve soldiers from about 1,400 units participated in the successful ODT program. This training takes place in over 50 different countries and includes over 20 major overseas exercises a year.

As the strategic posture of the U.S. military shifts from a large number of theater-based, forward-deployed units to rapid-deployment, contingency forces, greater emphasis will need to be placed on development training. With fewer units stationed in the theaters of operations, the deployment and employment processes are critical. An upscale ODT type program is the natural vehicle to exercise these processes. The USAR, already active in Europe and Latin America, is working with the Pacific Command to increase our participation there.

In addition to ODT, the USAR participates in a variety of overseas training programs. These included military intelligence (MI) readiness training (REDTRAIN), exchange programs with other countries, individual mobilization augmentation (IMA) assignments, the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program, the Assistant Army Attache (AARMA) Program, exercise augmentation, specialized counterpart training for key unit leaders and staff (LINKUP), Inter-allied Confederation of Reserve Officers (ČIOR), and training for units stationed overseas.

During the past 5 years, the Army Reserve has also expanded its mobilization exercise program. This greatly contributed to the smooth call-up of USAR units for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Along with ODT, the mobilization exercise program paid big dividends in Desert Storm. These exercises were largely responsible for

achieving two important wartime goals: accomplishing the military mission and preserving the lives of our soldiers.

While initial entry basic and advanced training for new Army Reserve soldiers has always been done full-time, almost all subsequent institutional training is in Reserve component training institutions. This year we are beginning to refine and improve the already superb training provided by these institutions by working with the Training and Doctrine Command to create a quality assurance/accreditation program. Additionally, realignments and improvements in the noncommissioned officer and officer education systems will ensure that our leaders receive appropriate training to prepare them for their future responsibilities.

In Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, following the Presidential call-up in August 1990, nearly 650 units, nearly 1,600 Individual Mobilization Augmentees, 1,400 retirees, and 17,000 members of the IRR plus over 5,500 IRR volunteers were activated. Nearly 85,000 Army Reservists were called to active duty in support of Operation Desert Storm. More than 36,000 of these soldiers were assigned to over 400 Army Reserve units in Saudi Arabia. Twenty-seven units performed important duties in Europe freeing Active component units for deployment to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, over 200 units expanded the training, support, and medical base in the United States.

TRAINING DIVISIONS

The Army Reserve training divisions were also a part of the continental United States' support of Operation Desert Storm. For the first time they performed their mission of expanding the training base. Approximately 25 training battalions, with required command and control headquarters and support units, provided refresher and military occupational specialty training to IRR soldiers called-up for Desert Storm service.

EDUCATION INCENTIVES

The fiscal year 1993 request also includes $53.0 million for incentives and $15.3 million for education benefits. These incentives and educational entitlements serve as an extraordinary measure to assist the Army Reserve in meeting and sustaining manpower requirements in a post Desert Storm environment. The incentive program pays a variable bonus to Army Reserve enlistees who will acquire critically needed skills or who will fill vacancies in high priority units. The education benefit program helps build a stronger and better educated Army Reserve. These education and incentive programs are complementary and both are essential to meeting our strength goals. Of particular value is the Montgomery GI bill and its "2 X 4" option, which provides a $300 per month benefit to soldiers serving on 2 years of active duty followed by 4 years of service in the Selected Reserve. It attracts both soldiers leaving the Active component and civilians, and the education it provides serves both the Army and the national economy well.

The Army Reserve would like to spend incentive dollars more wisely and be better able to channel payments to high priority units with specialty qualification problems.

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY RESERVE

The Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve budget request for fiscal year 1993 is $990 million. These figures do not include Special Operations Forces operation and maintenance funds that have been in the Defense operation and maintenance account for fiscal year 1992 and out. In accord with Army Reserve strength and force structure decreases, we are also reducing our civilian end strength: from 11,900 in fiscal year 1992 to 9,800 in fiscal year 1993. Included within the civilian end strength number are the civilian military technicians, who provide full-time support that is so critical to the readiness of the Army Reserve. The fiscal year 1992 strength level for technicians of 8,100 will decrease to less than 6,200 in fiscal year 1993.

Despite a downsizing of the Army Reserve force, a tremendous amount of modernization will flow into our force during fiscal years 1992-1998. The Army Reserve is the last of the three Army components to receive modernization because of the decision that combat arms forces should enjoy the fruits of the initial effort. The effects of modernization and the increased levels of equipment on hand will present a tremendous requirement for technicians during a period when these technicians are mandated to decrease in numbers.

This budget request should be adequate to meet the requirements of the Army Reserve; however, this belief is predicated upon two unknowns: first, the amount

and timing of equipment transfers from the Active Army, and second, whether all of the Army Reserve equipment used during Operation Desert Storm can be repaired before the supplemental funding runs out.

The level of Army Reserve equipment on hand continues to improve. Since fiscal year 1981, the Army Reserve has received roughly $3 billion from a combination of the Dedicated Procurement Program and normal Army procurement. We are very appreciative for the congressional funding that supported these programs. They have improved both training and the ability of the Army Reserve to perform its vital mission. This ability paid big dividends in the Persian Gulf.

CONCLUSION

In summary, while the future presents many challenges, I am completely confident that the men and women of the Reserve components, when they are properly resourced and trained, can and will continue to do jobs and accomplish the missions assigned to them. In these times of tight budgets, our citizen-soldiers, by virtue of their being part-time, are the best bargain in DOD.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, General. Admiral Taylor. STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAMES E. TAYLOR, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVY RESERVE

Admiral TAYLOR. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here to testify before your committee today and on behalf on our 144,000 Naval Reservists. I would like to express our appreciation to you and your committee for the generous support you have provided in the past.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Admiral TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Naval Reserve's performance during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm is clear evidence that the Naval Reserve has met the challenge of being a fully integrated, technically competent and operationally effective force, both in peace and war. In the 1990s, we are prepared to assume new and challenging assignments to maintain a balanced Naval force structure. Overall the global threats may have lessened, but the role of the Naval Reserve isand will continue to be firmly linked to our Nation's Total Force Policy.

I look forward to working with your and your committee, sir, as we work this budget request and I am ready to answer your ques

tions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Taylor follows:]

PREPARED 1992 POSTURE STATEMENT BY REAR ADM. JAMES E. TAYLOR, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL RESERVE

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am delighted to appear before you today and represent the Navy's over 142,000 Reservists. As you know, these are truly momentous times for those of us in the military. A half century after our Nation quickly mobilized for World War II, we have finally reached a period in which global tensions have begun to abate.

As a professional military officer for the past 35 years, I have served in uniform through most of the Cold War. I know first hand the costs that our policies have required, both in terms of national sacrifice and of the personal sacrifices that thousands of sailors and other military professionals have made. You cannot have worn the uniform of our great country without being truly excited about the prospects that lie ahead.

One of the things that keeps Naval service interesting is that it—like the sea-is always changing. The changes that lie ahead for the Navy in a world with fewer global threats are especially welcome. That does not, however, mean that all the changes we must make will be easy ones.

It is merely stating the obvious to note that the overall size of the Total Force Navy and its peacetime priorities must adapt to these new realities. This we are attempting to do by concentrating our resources to maintain high levels of quality and readiness in our force.

Even in peacetime our missions have never been easy. Since the Navy has provided a large measure of our Nation's forward presence worldwide, often operating in remote and dangerous areas of the globe, going in harm's way has always been part of our job description. This will remain so and has been explicitly recognized both by the President's National Security Strategy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's National Military Strategy, even as we contemplate this opportunity to reduce the size of our force.

The forthcoming changes in our Navy will have major implications for our Reserve force. Since the end of World War II-well before the idea of Total Force was conceived-we built our Naval Reserve force around an underlying assumption that it would be mobilized in the event of global war. We assumed the most likely scenario to be a Soviet invasion of Europe followed by protracted land war. Since this threat has largely disappeared, the need for some Reserve components has diminished as well.

In all quarters there is general agreement that a new world order dictates a smaller, highly professional and effective Navy. It should be a Navy that includes, and is supported by, a Reserve force that is just as professional and effective as the Regular component, and one that can quickly blend with and support the active force. I think we have achieved that level of professionalism and competence in the Naval Reserve today and the key to maintaining it, I would argue, is to insist that our Reserve force continues to complement the needs and missions of the Navy.

Does this mean a smaller Reserve force? I believe the answer to that is yes, though I would quickly add that this does not mean a less important Naval Reserve. A key lesson of the Gulf war was that a properly structured and trained Reserve force is critical, even as a participant in a regional conflict. Indeed, the planned reductions in the active force will, of necessity, make any future military operation more dependent than ever on a strong Reserve program. Despite the planned drawdown in Reserve end-strength, we must continue to support initiatives to retain people in critically needed occupational specialties.

The Gulf conflict answered one of the biggest uncertainties regarding the Reserve program: Would our national command authority be willing to use Reservists in something less than a global war scenario? Today, our force planners in the Pentagon know for certain that Reservists will be involved in most major future military operations. And they also know that they can count on Reservists to carry their weight. That fact alone makes it imperative that we have good, solid missions which make sense in the new world order.

But let me return to a key issue. It is not the size of the reserve force that is important. It is the capability of our force. We in the Navy mobilized only a small portion-roughly about one-sixth-of our Selected Reserve force for Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. And, if you had asked me back in 1989 when I assumed command what elements would be most likely to be activated, I could not have predicted the mix that we ultimately recalled to active service.

In many cases, we needed individuals, not entire units. We recalled individuals because the unified CINCS specifically requested particular skills to meet specific needs. We did not recall individuals who would have been superfluous to the planned operations. Thus, Reservists who were not needed did not have their lives thrown into the disarray that inevitably accompanies a rapid mobilization. Unit training was important, but more critical was the training and skills of the individual. For the Navy, combat support and combat service support Reserve units proved to be the units of choice during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Medical, logistics, harbor defense units were the types of personnel needed most, and they were the ones called upon to serve.

As I mentioned earlier, many of our current Naval Reserve units were structured on the now unlikely premise of mobilization for a sustained global war centered in Europe. With the decrease in that threat, it would seem imprudent to continue to support Reserve missions that are no longer needed. If a Reserve unit is structured to support a mission or an active command which is no longer required, then it makes no sense to continue to maintain that Reserve component. Such units should be realigned, reduced or decommissioned altogether.

Please be assured, however, that the Navy is not advocating that all Reserve missions be cut across the board. To the contrary, there are numerous missions presently assigned to the active force which, in the new environment, could safely and effectively be placed in the Naval Reserve. Equally important, there are other reserve

missions which should be expanded in light of Desert Shield/Desert Storm's success

es.

We know that our logistics forces and our harbor defense forces are excellent examples of wartime missions that Reservists could-and did-perform in an outstanding manner during the Gulf crisis. As the likelihood of full mobilization decreases, the Naval Reserve is being reoriented and equipped for crisis response.

As you recall, both the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations have recently testified that there are numerous missions which the Naval Reserve can assume or expand. Medical treatment, repair of the shore establishment, tactical air adversary squadrons, and electronic warfare squadrons are areas under consideration as cost-effective and innovative concepts for the Naval Reserve.

In addition, Naval Reservists will make a greater contribution to peacetime operations through contributory support; that is, the use of military or civilian skills resident in the Reserves to meet national security requirements beyond the capability of the regular component. Some units those envisioned for use only in the event of full mobilization-will be maintained in states of flexible readiness, building proficiency through mutual and fleet support to the active force. We plan to do this and still maintain the same high personnel quality standards that contributed to our success in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

As both Secretary of the Navy Garrett and Admiral Kelso have testified, the Navy has begun decommissioning its FF-1052 Knox-class frigates with the exception of eight which have been redesignated as Naval Reserve Force frigate training ships or FFTs. These ships will be placed under the operational command of the Naval Reserve and homeported in the Navy's newest strategic homeports where we hope to draw and retain Reservists with the required skills to meet future requirements. We also plan to bring Reservists from inland areas to the ships at least once a quarter to provide them with needed shipboard training. This is one way Reservists can help maintain Navy capabilities at a lower cost. Such programs hold special promise because they allow Reservists to remain an integral part of the Total Force.

The lifeblood of the Reserve program has, of course, been sailors leaving active duty. In the not too distant past, the high retention rates in the fleet caused our Reserve recruiters to work long and hard to bring aboard the many professionals that comprise the Naval Reserve Force today.

As many of our fine sailors leave active duty as a result of downsizing, we are eager to welcome those with critical occupational ratings who are eligible into our program. This added reservoir of Navy talent will be a boon to the Reserve program for years to come and is another reason why I think we will be able to adapt to changes that lie ahead with minimum difficulty.

We are continuing to receive new equipment and improve the training of our Reservists. We look forward to the C-130 and C-20 aircraft you provided to enhance our Navy logistics effort, the new MH-53E airborne mine countermeasures helicopters for aerial minesweeping, and the introduction of Coastal Mine Hunters as a Naval Reserve Force ship.

I also want to assure you that we will continue to move toward more joint operations. Naval Reserve participation in joint programs and exercises remains a high priority. We want to ensure that our Naval Reservists are ready and capable of working in the joint service environment that will be part of any future operation. Likewise, we will continue to stress the same high professional standards that we have in the past. We will maintain a drug-free environment and are in the process of expanding our drug demand reduction program, Campaign Drug Free, to reach more school children in the coming year. We will also apply all available resources in new and creative ways to support DOD drug interdiction efforts.

The support we have given active commands through contributory support is impressive and will continue to grow. For example, in fiscal year 1991, our Reserve intelligence program provided 108,758 mandays of intelligence and investigative work. Our supply personnel contributed 54,087 mandays of logistics support; and our Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (or SIMA) program offered 63,333 mandays of ship repair and maintenance work. Seebees provided 28,710 mandays of construction work. Reserve helicopter squadrons flew 2,119 flight hours, including 802 hours of combat support; and, our tactical support squadrons provided 11,754 flight hours. Our Reserve logistics aircraft flew 40,448 flight hours in fleet support, including 8,632 hours of combat support. This in addition to over 21,000 Naval Reservists recalled for ODS/S. All in all, a real "bang for the buck!"

In all, that is proof positive, Mr. Chairman, that the Naval Reserve, which your committee has so generously supported, has met the challenge of being a fully integrated, technically competent and operationally effective force both for war and peace. In the 1990s, we are prepared to assume new and challenging assignments to