Our fiscal year 1993 budget request addresses the challenge of force reductions and simultaneously identifies our requirements for a combat-ready, expeditionary and versatile Marine Corps.

As we downsize, we are cognizant of the fact that we are separating winners, winners of not only the war in Southwest Asia, but winners of the Cold War. With this in mind, our actions balance, as best they can, the needs of the Marine Corps and our Nation with the needs, desires and welfare of the individual Marines and their families.

Our current manpower force is a product of long-term planning and constant refinement. In this time of force reductions, we will continue to develop and prepare the quality Marine Corps needed in the years ahead.

Your continued understanding and support is absolutely essential. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before this committee. I am prepared for your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Cooper:]

PREPARED Statement by LT. GEN. MATTHEW T. COOPER, USMC, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR Manpower and Reserve AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee: It is an honor for me to appear before you today to present the status of Marine Corps manpower and address our fiscal year 1993 requirements as contained in the President's budget. Additionally, I will review 1991 manpower actions and present our views on the future of the Marine Corps.

TOTAL FORCE

It is important to view the Marine Corps in its totality-the Active component or Regular Marine Corps, the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, our retired marines, and our civilian workforce. Together these five elements comprise the U.S. Marine Corps Total Force. Each has its own roles, needs, and challenges; but most importantly, each brings special values and strengths. The combined capabilities of these elements enable us to provide the Nation a premier force-in-readiness.

At the heart of the Total Force policy has been our unwavering commitment to the highest standards of excellence. Experience tells us that _by_maintaining this steadfast commitment to high standards, we ensure a quality Corps of Marines. These quality marines and civilians, in turn, provide the readiness, responsiveness, versatility and capability to respond to the needs of the Nation in time of peace, crisis or national emergency.

The war in Southwest Asia (SWA) validated our Total Force policy and the importance of building the force with quality people. Regular, reserve and retired Marines, supported by our civilian personnel, joined together and performed just as the Nation had a right to expect. Concurrent with the great success in SWA, Marines, in other joint and combined operations throughout the world, vividly demonstrated the flexibility, diversity, and aggregate usefulness of the Marine Corps as well as its ability to respond to multiple crises around the world. Operation Sharp Edge maintained an extended U.S. presence in Liberia evacuating thousands of people and reinforcing a beleaguered U.S. Embassy. Operation Eastern Exit evacuated American citizens and foreign nationals from war-torn Somalia, again demonstrating the reach and responsiveness of amphibious forces which were concurrently committed to SWA. Operation Provide Comfort, an extensive multi-national effort in Turkey and northern Iraq, has been on-going for 10 months and has brought aid and protection to the Kurds, enabling them to return safely to their homes. A severe typhoon in Bangladesh led to Operation Sea Angel-a major humanitarian assistance effort that required the assistance of a Marine task force which was assembled, in part, from Marines returning from SWA. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines led to Operation Fiery Vigil, yet another disaster relief mission that required the assistance of a Marine task force. Most recently, the coup in Haiti continues to involve a contingent of Marines in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in the handling and security of Haitian refugees. As these operations occurred, Marines continued their forward presence missions in the Western Pacific and the Mediterranean. Addition

ally, they conducted counternarcotic operations in Latin America, along the southwest border of the United States, and in the Caribbean. Few periods of Marine Corps history have more clearly reflected the aggregate utility of the Marine Corps than the past 18 months.

While we are justifiably pleased with the performance of the Marine Corps during this period, we now face another challenge: downsizing the Marine Corps. Reducing the required numbers of people to meet mandated end strengths may sound relatively easy. However, doing it in a way that maintains our combat capability, while still allowing dignity and fairness for those who must leave, is more difficult. Our fiscal year 1993 budget request addresses the challenge of force reductions and simultaneously identifies our requirements for a combat ready, expeditionary, and versatile Marine Corps. We realize in the budget years ahead there will be fewer defense dollars. This dictates that the Marine Corps of the future will be smaller. Our ability to be the flexible and responsive force you and the Nation have come to expect will be challenged by further reductions.

ACTIVE FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND MANNING

The Marine Corps is requesting an active duty end strength of 181,900 for fiscal year 1993. While this strength is achievable through in-place manpower practices, this reduction will again cut into the muscle of the Marine Corps our operating forces. Since our lean supporting and training establishments cannot sustain significant cuts, reductions necessary to reach 181,900 in fiscal year 1993 must come from our infantry, artillery, armor, aviation, and combat service support forces-forces which have already felt the effects of reduction actions in fiscal years 1987 through 1992.

Anticipating DOD-wide force reductions, our Commandant convened two Marine Corps Force Structure Planning Groups (FSPG) beginning in August 1991 to address force structure requirements for both the regular and reserve elements of our total force. Using a bottom-up approach with emphasis on balancing capabilities with requirements, a force structure was developed which is focused on the missions and tasks delineated by DOD in the national military strategy while sensitive to anticipated force reductions.

Even with the forecasted troop reductions, our forces are still capable of performing any mission assigned by higher authority, including humanitarian efforts such as those performed during 1991. However, if the reductions continue as planned, a smaller Marine Corps will mean a certain degree of flexibility will be lost. Simply stated, we will lose some of our flexibility that recently enabled us to project forces to resolve a crisis in one area of the world while saving the lives of endangered noncombatants somewhere else. Given the planned end strength reductions, if we were to try to sustain our current level of forward deployment forces with a smaller Marine Corps, morale and readiness would suffer. While further reductions in the DOD budget may result in additional manpower cuts, decisions on the size of the Marine Corps in the future must be sensitive to these vital considerations if we are to maintain a quality Marine Corps.

Our strength reductions during fiscal year 1993 will be accomplished primarily through normal attrition, retention controls, and reduced accessions. We will maintain the experience of our skilled Marines as much as possible and our officer-toenlisted ratio will remain at the current level of 1:8.8.

Fiscal year 1993 changes to the Marine Corps force structure preserve the readiness of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) while accommodating an end strength reduction of approximately 6,000. Our Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units will be manned at the 90 percent level. We will continue to assign approximately 69 percent of all Marines to our operating forces, maintaining our traditionally high "tooth-to-tail" ratio between the operating forces and the supporting establishment.

MARINE OFFICERS

An effective officer corps is critical to Marine Corps readiness. Accordingly, officer reductions are carefully managed with an eye on three objectives. First, we focus on preserving the readiness and mission accomplishment capability of our officer corps. Next, we design our officer plans to create a sensible balance between the retention of experienced, proven leaders and the accession of the young officers who will be the leaders of tomorrow. Finally, we are sensitive to ensuring that all officers are treated with the respect and dignity they have earned and that our drawdown plan contributes to continued high morale within our officer corps.

Officer end strength will be reduced by approximately 600 officers during fiscal year 1993. We will achieve this reduction by employing a two-pronged officer reduc

ratio of civilian employees to active duty military is approximately 1 civilian for every 10 Marines. This compares to an approximate ratio of 1:2 throughout the rest of DOD.

A large portion of our base and station support is provided by civilians who fill a variety of professional, technical, trade, and administrative positions. They are the continuity in the supporting establishment and are an integral part of our Total Force. They are strategically placed in our supporting establishment filling key positions of trust and responsibility thereby enabling us to keep Marines in the operating forces. As outyear budget reductions dictate further military structure cuts, we see the civilian work force playing an increasingly important role in the Total Force.

At the end of fiscal year 1993 our civilian end strength will be 17,097. This new end strength will represent a reduction of 4.7 percent of our civilian work force. These reductions are the result of either DOD directed consolidations or civilian reductions comparable to the military force structure drawdown. The real impact of these reductions will begin to be realized in fiscal year 1993 as our military force structure declines. Commanders have already begun to reprioritize many on-going functions. They have cut operating support assets, increased lead time between work load requests, and asked the remaining work force to do more with fewer re

sources.

Reductions in an already austere civilian work force will present our commanders with an ever-increasing challenge. Our remaining civilians will be responsible for supporting essentially the same critical missions aboard our installations as before. As commanders continue to seek the most efficient use of their constrained civilian assets, the military end strength reductions will precipitate reduced support from our Fleet Assistance Program (FAP). Under this program a limited number of active duty Marines, from our Fleet Marine Forces, are assigned temporary duty to base and station commanders to assist them in accomplishing FMF support missions. Reduced support from this program will further exacerbate the problem of how the base commanders employ their dwindling civilian force.

We presently have underway a process known as the Manpower Requirements Assessment Survey (MRAS). MRAS is a structured program that is designed to bring into balance workload and available work force. This action, along with management to payroll efforts, represent continuing efforts to improve on our existent manpower efficiencies. We recognize that reductions to active military forces will cause commensurate cuts in our civilian work force. While we have anticipated these reductions and planned for them accordingly, adequate funding is essential to enable our remaining civilian work force to support the Fleet Marine Force properly. I consider future civilian manpower reductions, below those currently planned, a threat to our readiness and our ability to sustain our operating forces.

RETIREES

Retired Marines have long been recognized for the important contribution they make to the Total Force policy. Our war plans rely on them. When required, the Marine Corps is able to draw from a population of approximately 36,000 retired Marines who are under the age of 60. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 586 retired Marines were mobilized to support our war effort. Retired Marines were assigned to critical wartime billets at non-FMF bases and stations, thereby freeing active duty Marines for assignment to SWA. Their spirit, energy, and knowledge were decisively beneficial.

The traits which made our retirees good Marines are welcomed in the civilian communities of this Nation and serve as a positive testimony to the value of a Marine Corps experience. We ask for your continued attention to programs which support our retirees.

TRAINING

An essential element of maintaining our Total Force is ensuring Marines arrive at their first operational unit trained for combat and fully deployable. This approach is unique to the Marine Corps and was of enormous value during the hostilities in SWA. During this fiscal year, we will continue our emphasis on Marine Battle Skills Training (MBST) for every Marine. The program has been extraordinarily successful in providing Marines a common denominator of basic warfighting skills which are routinely followed by unit-based, sustainment level combat proficiency training.

Enlisted End Strength.

Reduction From Prior Fiscal Year.....

Percent Reduction From Prior Fiscal Year

163,474 5,461

3.2

Our enlisted force reduction plan emphasizes balance and prudence. Owing to our earlier investment in high quality, well trained career Marines, the majority of the reduction in the enlisted force will be achieved by reducing the number of new recruits. Still, we must keep recruiting activity high enough to sustain a balanced enlisted force. New recruits become the trained noncommissioned officers of our career force in 4 to 6 years. This means that part of the reduction must be accomplished by requiring some career-oriented Marines to leave. This effort focuses first on retirement eligible Marines in overmanned skills. Next, senior Marines who have reached high year of tenure and have no further promotion or career potential are identified for separation.

We plan judicious use of the Voluntary Separation Initiative and Special Separation Benefit (VSI/SSB) as additional force shaping tools. VSI/SSB will assist us in managing our enlisted force by targeting particular skill/grade/year of service groups that need adjustment.

Reducing the size of the enlisted force during the drawdown will be a significant challenge. Our enlisted management approach has taken care to ensure that no element of our enlisted force bears an unequal share of the reduction and that our actions balance, as best they can, the needs of the Marine Corps against the needs, desires, and welfare of the individual Marine.

MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The Total Force policy, adopted in 1973, had not been fully tested until the war in SWA. Charged with the responsibility for rapidly expanding the size of our Marine Corps during a national emergency, the Marine Corps Reserve enhances our sustainability upon mobilization. Once the President made the decision to reinforce the Persian Gulf force, our highly trained reserve units responded quickly and decisively to the regional crisis in SWA. Reserve units added an invaluable dimension to our Total Force policy and significantly contributed to the combat capability of the Marine Corps forces assembled in the region.

The Marine Corps Reserve is a versatile and responsive organization that complements our Regular force structure. The smooth integration of reserve units with Regular component gaining commands during Operation Desert Storm was a direct result of integrated training at all levels. Active duty Inspector-Instructors ensure that our reserves are well trained in current doctrine and standards. Our emphasis on thorough, detailed evaluations of the readiness of our Reserve units, and realistic training along side our Regular forces also provide Marine reservists with valuable experience; thereby, enhancing interoperability between the two components.

On October 1, 1991, the Reserve Affairs Division was formed within my department. A staff agency centrally organized and adequately manned, it handles reserve issues and acts as our reserve advocate. Led by the Director, Reserve Affairs, this staff division enhances the working relationship between the Reserve and Regular components.

Our fiscal year 1993 Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps (RPMC) request will support an end strength in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve of 38,900, a decrease of 3,500 from fiscal year 1992. Our Full-Time Support (FTS) fiscal year 1993 end strength is 2,130 Marines, the appropriate level required for administration and training support of the requested reserve end strength.

This budget request is based on newly proposed reserve force structure changes. These changes are the result of a bottom-up approach conducted during October 1991 by the Reserve Force Structure Planning Group. In developing reserve force structure changes, this group balanced the new structure changes against newly emerging requirements for augmentation and reinforcement of the active force.

In the face of changing security requirements and anticipated budget reductions, the Marine Corps Reserve will play an ever increasingly important role. The Marine Corps Reserve will continue to contribute to Total Force readiness by filling a vital reinforcing and sustaining role in times of crisis, as well as enhancing our flexibility to respond simultaneously to numerous missions as we draw down the active force.

CIVILIAN MANPOWER

The Marine Corps Total Force is enhanced by a thoroughly professional civilian work force. Like the uniformed elements of the Marine Corps, the civilian work force presents an austere picture when compared to the remainder of DOD. Our

ratio of civilian employees to active duty military is approximately 1 civilian for every 10 Marines. This compares to an approximate ratio of 1:2 throughout the rest of DOD.

A large portion of our base and station support is provided by civilians who fill a variety of professional, technical, trade, and administrative positions. They are the continuity in the supporting establishment and are an integral part of our Total Force. They are strategically placed in our supporting establishment filling key positions of trust and responsibility thereby enabling us to keep Marines in the operating forces. As outyear budget reductions dictate further military structure cuts, we see the civilian work force playing an increasingly important role in the Total Force.

At the end of fiscal year 1993 our civilian end strength will be 17,097. This new end strength will represent a reduction of 4.7 percent of our civilian work force. These reductions are the result of either DOD directed consolidations or civilian reductions comparable to the military force structure drawdown. The real impact of these reductions will begin to be realized in fiscal year 1993 as our military force structure declines. Commanders have already begun to reprioritize many on-going functions. They have cut operating support assets, increased lead time between work load requests, and asked the remaining work force to do more with fewer re

sources.

Reductions in an already austere civilian work force will present our commanders with an ever-increasing challenge. Our remaining civilians will be responsible for supporting essentially the same critical missions aboard our installations as before. As commanders continue to seek the most efficient use of their constrained civilian assets, the military end strength reductions will precipitate reduced support from our Fleet Assistance Program (FAP). Under this program a limited number of active duty Marines, from our Fleet Marine Forces, are assigned temporary duty to base and station commanders to assist them in accomplishing FMF support missions. Reduced support from this program will further exacerbate the problem of how the base commanders employ their dwindling civilian force.

We presently have underway a process known as the Manpower Requirements Assessment Survey (MRAS). MRAS is a structured program that is designed to bring into balance workload and available work force. This action, along with management to payroll efforts, represent continuing efforts to improve on our existent manpower efficiencies. We recognize that reductions to active military forces will cause commensurate cuts in our civilian work force. While we have anticipated these reductions and planned for them accordingly, adequate funding is essential to enable our remaining civilian work force to support the Fleet Marine Force properly. I consider future civilian manpower reductions, below those currently planned, a threat to our readiness and our ability to sustain our operating forces.

RETIREES

Retired Marines have long been recognized for the important contribution they make to the Total Force policy. Our war plans rely on them. When required, the Marine Corps is able to draw from a population of approximately 36,000 retired Marines who are under the age of 60. During Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 586 retired Marines were mobilized to support our war effort. Retired Marines were assigned to critical wartime billets at non-FMF bases and stations, thereby freeing active duty Marines for assignment to SWA. Their spirit, energy, and knowledge were decisively beneficial.

The traits which made our retirees good Marines are welcomed in the civilian communities of this Nation and serve as a positive testimony to the value of a Marine Corps experience. We ask for your continued attention to programs which support our retirees.

TRAINING

An essential element of maintaining our Total Force is ensuring Marines arrive at their first operational unit trained for combat and fully deployable. This approach is unique to the Marine Corps and was of enormous value during the hostilities in SWA. During this fiscal year, we will continue our emphasis on Marine Battle Skills Training (MBST) for every Marine. The program has been extraordinarily successful in providing Marines a common denominator of basic warfighting skills which are routinely followed by unit-based, sustainment level combat proficiency training.