Historically, Catholic moral teaching has sought to prevent war, and if war comes, to limit its destructiveness through restraint imposed by moral principles.

The technological revolution embodied in the development of nuclear weapons poses the most profound challenge to a conception of moral limits on war.

Our pastoral letter asserts the absolute need to establish in the policy debate and in the personal conviction of citizens, a recognition of moral limits which should not be transgressed in warfare, even in the pursuit of legitimate and valuable objectives, and precisely because of our conviction that moral principles can guide policy if they are used and known in policy debate and personal conscience formation.

We have given substantial attention in the pastoral letter to an explanation of the moral criteria used to limit warfare. These criteria embodied in the just war teaching are often misunderstood.

Their primary purpose is not, and never really has been to legitimate the use of force, but to prevent it until it is a last resort and then to limit any use of force even in pursuit of justifiable purposes.

Offering a clear statement of basic religious and moral principles was one objective of the pastoral letter. A second was to illustrate how these principles relate to major questions raised by the nature of modern warfare.

Although our concern is not confined to nuclear war, it is the nuclear reality which poses the most pressing, the most immediate challenge to the traditional moral categories of restraint.

Accordingly, we examined in our letter three cases of possible use of nuclear weapons. Then we analyzed the policy of deterrence. I will comment very briefly on these questions.

The three cases of use were, first, countercity attacks; second, limited nuclear war; and third, initiation of nuclear war.

Countercity attacks: The pastoral letter of the bishops affirms the teaching of the Second Vatican Council. This is now cannonized church teaching, and I quote, "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation."

I might depart from the text for a moment to point out that we are always concerned about any direct, deliberate, intentional attack upon innocent human beings. That is basically the principle underlying our concern with abortion.

The reaffirmation of this principle is significant because there have been proposals at various times in the nuclear age to employ a deterrence policy consciously targeted on cities.

The pastoral letter opposes this idea and opposes countercity strikes, even in retaliation if our cities are hit first. We will see the reason for this in a moment.

The second issue, limited nuclear war: Over the course of the nuclear age, there has been much talk of waging a limited nuclear war, while acknowledging that in theory, a given nuclear weapon might have limited effects.

The weight of expert testimony provided to the Bernardin Committee and our own moral reflection led us to conclude in the letter

that the primary moral imperative is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons and to hope that our leaders will resist the notion that nuclear conflict can be limited, contained or won in any traditional

sense.

Our written testimony expresses our appreciation that this policy has been articulated by the administration, and we trust is now in effect. That there can be no winnable nuclear war.

The initiation of nuclear war: We examined at some length of the moral question of the first use of nuclear weapons, with the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe by the United States, along with the Soviet SS-20's, any escalation from the use of tactical weapons, and we are looking at this morally, certainly risks escalation to the strategic level.

Hence, we have urged the NATO allies to improve conventional forces to raise the nuclear threshold and to rely upon such forces, along with the U.S. strategic arsenal, for the deterrence of the Warsaw Pact.

That section we worked out very, very carefully and in conjunction with our brother bishops in Europe.

Now, about the nuclear deterrence, the judgment of the U.S. Bishops on deterrence policy builds upon the statement of Pope John Paul II at the United Nations in 1982.

In current conditions, deterrence based on balance certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament may still be judged morally acceptable.

Nonetheless, in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum, which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion.

I conclude the quote.

Now, the U.S. bishops reflect both dimensions of the papal message in the pastoral letter. The judgment of the letter is one of "strictly conditioned moral acceptance of nuclear deterrence."

In spite of the pervasive skepticism of the pastoral letter concerning the possibility of a limited use of nuclear weapons, the letter does not condemn deterrence, yet the acceptance of deterrence is strictly conditioned.

The pastoral letter sets forth a series of criteria that is prudential judgments by which the U.S. bishops seek to make clear the meaning of strictly conditions acceptance.

We feel a responsibility for continued evaluation of the meaning, morality and direction of defense policy that brings us here today. A strictly conditioned acceptance of deterrence requires, we believe, continued participation in the public debate.

The strategy of deterrence is judged in the pastoral letter as not adequate as a long-term basis for peace. It is rather a transitional imperative, providing time and space during which steps should be taken to halt the arms race, reverse its course, and move toward not only arms control, but nuclear disarmament, and of course, we always speak in the letter of multilateral or bilateral disarmament. From this perspective on deterrence, His Eminence Cardinal Bernardin will address policy choices.

Chairman FASCELL. Thank you.

Cardinal.

STATEMENT OF HIS EMINENCE JOSEPH CARDINAL BERNARDIN, ARCHBISHOP OF CHICAGO

Cardinal BERNARDIN. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I reiterate Archbishop O'Connor's expression of our appreciation for the opportunity to present the views of the U.S. Catholic Conference on the arms race, and on U.S. arms control policy to this committee.

I will focus my remarks on how the moral principles used in the bishops' pastoral letter relate to policy choices which shape the direction of U.S. strategic policy and arms control policy.

The meaning of a "conditional acceptance" of deterrence is that there must be a continuing assessment of proposed additions to our deterrence posture or proposed changes in strategic doctrine.

As we said in our pastoral letter, "we cannot approve of every weapon system strategic doctrine or policy initiative advanced in the name of strengthening deterrence.

Conditional acceptance of deterrence requires ongoing evaluation of policy choices. At Hiroshima Pope John Paul II said: "From now on, it is only through a conscious choice and through a deliberate policy that humanity can survive."

We recognize that it is not the province of religious leaders to make the final policy choices in these matters, but we do have an obligation, as Archbishop O'Connor mentioned earlier, to set forth moral criteria to guide policy decisions.

Specifically, we propose two criteria for making the conscious choices which the Congress has the ability and the responsibility to make. First, the impact of each new strategy system on the dynamic of the arms race should be evaluated: Technological advance should be scrupulously measured by political and moral criteria. Second, the cost of specific systems should be assessed along with the impact of the weapons system.

If a particular system is found to be of dubious strategic value; that is, not absolutely necessary to preserve our deterrence posture, and yet is certain to cost large sums of money, then these two criteria lead us to recommend against the system in question.

The relevance of these two criteria to existing policy proposals can be illustrated by examples. Perhaps the single most controversial decision in nuclear policy before the Congress is the MX missile.

While the House has acted on it for fiscal year 1985, the future of the MX missile is still unresolved. In the pastoral letter of a year ago, the bishops called attention to the MX as the kind of technological decision which requires intense political and moral assessment.

We believe the same kind of assessment is still needed. If anything, the number of knowledgeable analysts who have expressed reservations or outright opposition to the MX has increased since publication of our pastoral letter.

They argue that the MX is vulnerable to attack, yet powerful enough to appear threatening to the Soviets as a potential firststrike weapon.

Even a citizen's review of the technical debate leads many to conclude that the impact of the MX on the arms race contains very

severe risks of moving both superpowers toward an even more unstable relationship than presently prevails.

At the same time, the MX will cost several billion dollars. The continued questioning of its strategic value, as well as its assured cost, should be sufficient to require a prayerful reconsideration of MX deployment.

A different but analogous case is provided by proposals to move toward some form of space-based defense for the United States. The history of strategic debate about defensive as opposed to offensive systems is older than the MX debate.

The objectives of defense systems have always been desirable, to target weapons, not people, and to reduce the incentive to use nuclear weapons at all.

The problem has always been the impact of defensive systems on the arms race as a whole. The fear of many experts is that rather than displacing offensive strategies, we will produce both an offensive and a defensive race.

The impact of space-based defense, like the MX, on the stability of the arms race, is precisely why it is under severe questioning as it has been in the past.

Yet, the expenditure for moving in a major way toward such a defensive system will be enormous.

The Congress does not face an immediate choice on space defense comparable to the MX. But now is the time, in our judgment, to apply the criteria we are proposing in order to assess the Space Defense Initiative in terms of its strategic impact and its cost, before major commitments are made.

The essential method for controlling and reversing the dynamic of the arms race is bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Pope John Paul II has been unequivocal about this, affirming his faith in the process of negotiations and appealing directly to the United States and to the Soviet Union to renew negotiations.

We use this Congress testimony to call for a new effort of political will and create a diplomacy on behalf of a new round of superpower negotiations to reverse the arms race.

Negotiated restraint in the arms race has never been easy to achieve. Small political steps are often outdistanced by major technological advances. It was with this history in mind that the American bishops in "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response," called for negotiations to halt the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear systems.

This objective-to cap the arms race now-should be rigorously pursued. At the same time, we need to recognize and protect the more modest accomplishments which negotiations have thus far achieved.

These include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963); the Outer Space Treaty (1967); the Nonproliferation Treaty (1970); the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty (1972); and the SALT I agreement (1972). These measures are the legacy of a bipartisan effort of two decades; they provide a limited but firm foundation for future steps in the 1980's. They deserve to be sustained and supported.

A conscious U.S. policy of independent initiatives to restrain the arms race and a convincingly articulated U.S. policy aimed at reconstituting negotiations with the Soviet Union would be a source

of hope and inspiration to people in our own Nation and in other nations of the world.

It would say that we are determined to build and secure the peace, not only for our generation and our country, but for the children who represent the future of this planet.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish simply to reaffirm a major point made in the pastoral letter which often does not emerge as prominently as it should in a presentation like this: namely, that we attach great importance to the power of prayer, both in our personal lives and in the life of the world community.

It is as men of faith, who are totally committed to God and to our church, that Archbishop O'Connor and I have appeared before you today to articulate some moral principles and criteria which we are convinced are critically important in assessing the questions facing us in the nuclear age.

Thank you for giving us this opportunity to make this presentation.

[The prepared statement of Cardinal Bernardin and Archbishop O'Connor follows:]