Consultative Commission and in other channels in attempting to resolve compliance issues. But commonsense dictates that if the Soviet Union violates a treaty and the violation bears on U.S. security, then the defense of the United States should not be constrained by unilateral observance to that treaty. And that, in fact, is a re-statement of accepted international law, as well. The jury is still out on this question. In fact, it has barely begun to deliberate. The administration and the Congress need to evaluate the full range of Soviet-American agreements and negotiations in light of Soviet violations of arms control agreements and evaluate the strategic impact of those agreements. We should pay particular attention to studying Soviet advances in ballistic missile defense and the wisdom of maintaining the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 as an element of U.S. security. In fact, Mr. Chairman, we would do well to rid the arms control issue of all emotion, tense expectation and apocalyptic rhetoric, and to view arms control as one of several available instruments of U.S. security policy. It can be an effective counterpart to deterrence and diplomacy, and it is highly desirable, but if arms control doesn't work as expected and is not the centerpiece of defense policy, we needn't be alarmed. Above all, in the interest of arms control, we should stop basing our judgment of the entire United States-Soviet relationship on the state of arms talks; in a world of global superpower competition, this is too large a burden for the arms control process to bear. Mr. Chairman, and other members of the panel, I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you. At any given time I would be very happy to come back and answer questions from you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of the panel. It is an issue I have a particular interest in, and indeed, we all must. Chairman FASCELL. Thank you very much. We will stand in informal recess to answer the quorum call and come right back. [Recess.] Chairman FASCELL. Our next witness is the Honorable Norman Dicks, a Representative in Congress from the State of Washington. STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN D. DICKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment you and your committee for giving Members of Congress an opportunity to discuss our thoughts and concerns about the arms control question. The critical issue, in my judgment, is how we can best avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war by controlling and reducing these weapons of ultimate destruction. My colleague and good friend, Les Aspin, has labeled 1984 "the year of arms control." The situation we face today represents a paradox. In one sense, 1984 certainly is the year of arms control when we view the increased attention given the issue by the Congress. This committee has taken a leadership role in focusing on the arms control issues before the Nation. The Foreign Affairs Committee has given special attention to the question of arms control in space and I want to commend you for this work and the very important and positive recommendations you have made for avoiding an arms race in space. Both the House and Senate have begun to focus on the implications of new weapons systems on existing arms control agreements and the prospects for further treaties. We have tied arms control considerations to such programs as the MX, antisatellite weapons, and nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. We have required reports on long term plans to determine the implications of strategic modernization on the question of a first strike capability. We have asked for clarification of plans to reduce our dependence on battlefield nuclear systems in Europe. This increased congressional attention to arms control implications of weapons programs is important, and in my view overdue. But 1984 is also the worst of times for arms control. For the first time in over 2 decades, negotiations on controlling nuclear weapons have been suspended. United States-Soviet relations have declined to a state of public name calling and finger pointing. The unjustified Soviet walkout from the START and INF talks does not excuse the arms control failures of this administration. In my view, much of the failure of the last decade to achieve arms control progress rests with the breakdown of the bipartisan consensus on arms control policy and the rise of extremists on both sides. One group, including many officials in key positions of the Reagan administration, view arms control as inherently bad, as something to be avoided. They argue that arms control only provides for institutionalized Soviet cheating while the American people are lulled into a sense of false security. The other side ignores the difficulties in reaching an agreement with a stubborn and hard nosed adversary like the Soviets. They argue that if we simply quit building military forces, especially nuclear weapons, then the Soviets will naturally follow suit. Over the last decade these two extreme views have vied to achieve political victories over the other. The result has been the failure to ratify any arms control treaty for 10 years and continued uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets about U.S. force modernization plans. The net result is that we have all been losers. What we need is to bury the hatchet; to recognize that while there are legitimate points made by both extremes, neither is correct in its overall assessment. Leslie Gelb of the New York Times put it well when he wrote last year: Arms control is neither sin nor salvation. It is a way-along with diplomatic and military decisions-of managing Soviet-American competition. Without such negotiated mutual restraint, the competition would be far less controllable and both sides could acquire capabilities that just might make nuclear war more thinkable. It is a way of preserving the Soviet-American "peace" that, with good luck, has survived the last 40 years of tension and waste. To ask more of a bargaining process between two powerful countries so mistrustful of each other is to condemn it to failure. President Reagan will be the first American President in 20 years who has failed to produce tangible achievements in the arms control field. The administration's record is one characterized by delays, inaction, and lost opportunities. It entered office decrying SALT II and 37-561 0-84--13 the process by which it was developed. It took over 2 years to develop its own proposals for strategic arms reduction, and when it did they were blatantly onesided and nonnegotiable. Its top officials have rhetorically questioned whether we should-and this is Mr. Perle "Now feel liberated from our obligations" under existing agreements, and instead "consider resorting to classical defense. With nuclear weapons there is no "classical defense." While I believe that the President sincerely wants to achieve nuclear arms agreements, he has not mastered the complex issues involved nor forced the pace of negotiations. For arms control to be successful, the President himself must be directly engaged. We would never have achieved a test ban agreement if President Kennedy had adopted a laid back attitude and left it to his aides to handle. We would never have gotten a SALT I Agreement if President Nixon had not personally forced the pace of negtiations. We couldn't have had the SALT II Agreement signed if President Carter had not spent countless hours familiarizing himself with the issues and directing his lieutenants to reach an agreement. There has been some limited progress over the last year as the administration revised its START and INF positions to a more balanced approach. And I might add that that was done with intense congressional pressure and intense oversight by leading Members of Congress. The recent reversal on the question of negotiating on space weapons is a positive sign. But progress on arms control demands a long term commitment, not just begrudging changes when weapons programs are threatened or elections loom. There remains much justifiable skepticism as to whether the positive steps of the last 2 years really signal such a commitment. As we enter the second half of the 1980's what should be our arms control policy? I believe a cornerstone must be an unambiguous commitment to uphold those nuclear arms agreements already in place. That is why I introduced House Joint Resolution 601, calling upon the President to affirm and maintain his commitment not to undercut existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint. Prospects for future arms control agreements are directly tied to the continued health of previous treaties. Arms control is a longterm process, with negotiations building on the progress of earlier agreements. When the foundation these agreements provide is undermined, the entire structure comes tumbling down like a house of cards. A critical element of maintaining this foundation is the integrity of the ABM Treaty, and that is why I am proud to be a cosponsor of House Joint Resolution 531 introduced by Congressman Brown of California, which calls for a continued commitment to maintain that treaty. We must also complete the unfinished work of earlier Presidents by submitting for ratification the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These agreements can help promote stability, aid verification of overall agreements, and play a constructive role in nonproliferation efforts. These steps to maintain the important progress to date must recognize that just as a house with no foundation is unsound, so is a foundation with no house. Arms control is an ongoing process. The agreements of the past were based on the assumption of a continued process that would build on the limitations and prohibitions already agreed upon. Thus, in a very important way, delay of and by itself, serves to undercut existing agreements. Because of the delays we have encountered in even actively working on a successor agreement to SALT II, near-term adjustments and clarifications of that agreement should be considered in tandem with serious efforts to secure a successor agreement. The question of verification of compliance with earlier treaties is also an important issue for the no undercut effort. Arms control opponents will use verification concerns to scuttle any proposed agreement by insisting on 100 percent certainty of compliance. This is nothing more than a "red herring." Every American President from John F. Kennedy to Jimmy Carter recognized that asking for unrealistic verification provisions could effectively foreclose agreements that are very much in our interest. And so for 20 years American Presidents have advocated a standard of adequate verification. We must be able to detect Soviet actions before they can affect our security and in time to take countermeasures. Obviously we have significant means of detection with our satellites and other national means of detection. Producing a verifiable agreement isn't sufficient, however. We know from past experience that the Kremlin will press at the margins of any nuclear arms agreement that is signed. If the Kremlin's military bureaucracy sees some advantage in pressing at the margins, and if this activity isn't expressly forbidden, it is likely that the Soviets will not hesitate to test the waters. That is why we need a vigorous and effective approach to compliance issues, one that will maintain the viability of agreements reached. The most effective approach to compliance issues is a private one, through the channels established by the Standing Consultative Commission, or SCC. The SCC worked effectively during its first decade of existence. Every compliance issue raised by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter was resolved to their satisfaction at the SCC. Either the Soviet practice in question ceased, or it was explained in a way to alleviate our concerns. The Reagan administration has also experienced problems with Soviet compliance, but unlike its predecessors it has had less success in ironing out various questions at the SCC. This is no doubt related to the deplorable state of United States-Soviet relations and occasional public blasts by high administration officials. The SCC can work effectively when United States-Soviet relations are returned to a reasonable condition and when quiet professionalism is used in place of harsh rhetoric. A two-track approach is needed when compliance questions arise. Within treaty constraints, the United States should take effective countermeasures to negate any advantage the Soviets may have gained by exploiting gray areas in arms control agreements. At the same time, the United States should work through the SCC to reach new common understandings that maintain the viability of previous agreements. That is, assuming that you want to maintain the viability of previous agreements, Mr. Chairman. For the future, we should strive to negotiate agreements that more clearly state what is allowable, and what is not. A little better draftsmanship might be part of the answer if we can get better draftsmanship between the two countries. A second area where real progress can be made is in the field of crisis management and control. The recently completed agreement to upgrade the hotline is a modest, but positive step in this area. We need to aggressively pursue the establishment of a more comprehensive joint crisis center that will reduce the chance that a nuclear war begins by accident or misunderstanding. The late Senator Jackson was a pioneer of this proposal, and in the House, Congressman Stark has sought congressional support through H.R. 408. A joint crisis control center, while beneficial, can be made even more effective by regular interchange between United States and Soviet leaders, including regular annual summit meetings. I presented to the committee a detailed discussion of my thoughts on arms control in space on April 10. But let me express my strong support and commendation for the recommendations put forward by Chairman Fascell on this matter. Hopefully, negotiations on arms in space can begin quickly and the administration will demonstrate flexibility in seeking an agreement. Our objective ought to be to curtail as closely as possible the introduction of weapons in space and not to structure an agreement that will somehow give us an advantage, and as such, be doomed from the start. Finally, hopefully the Soviets will see the wisdom of returning to negotiations on strategic and intermediate range arms following the election. As a means to foster a return to the table, merger of these talks makes both political and practical sense. In addition, the administration should be prepared to present what explicit tradeoffs it is willing to make in areas of U.S. advantage, such as bombers and cruise missiles in order to induce the Soviets to make reductions in their land based missile forces. In conclusion, arms control must play a central role in our national security policy. Billions invested in new weapons will not make us more secure in an unconstrained arms race. At the same time, we must recognize that we cannot effectively negotiate from a position of weakness. Promoting a more stable nuclear balance and reducing armaments will be a long, hard process. It will encounter setbacks. But it is a goal well worth the effort. We must show the leadership and dedication necessary to succeed. Working together, Republican and Democrat, I believe it can be done. Fighting amongst ourselves will doom us to failure. I know this committee will continue to take a leadership role in this crusade, and again I thank you for the opportunity to share my views. Chairman FASCELL. Thank you very much, for your statement Mr. Dicks. Our next witness is our distinguished colleague on the committee, the Honorable Gerald Solomon, who is a Representative from the State of New York. STATEMENT OF HON. GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, A REPRESENTA- |