year have a more comprehensive statement, but I will be brief here this morning. I do want to commend you and Congressman Winn and the rest of the committee for holding these hearings.

Certainly, Mr. Chairman, the records of some of my more liberal colleagues who will testify later demonstrate their strong commitment to military restraint on the part of the United States. But if their positions were to prevail in the Congress, I am afraid we would have precious little with which to negotiate, and I think that is the whole issue, on which other people that have testified here before and will testify later.

Many defense critics have only one suggestion, and that is to terminate very important new weapons systems being developed by the United States. Many defense critics believe that the United States should unilaterally stop the planned modernization of our ICBM forces; they believe that we should unilaterally halt the development of the strategic defense initiative, and unilaterally cancel the modernization of our manned bomber fleet, which certainly needs to be modernized.

They believe we should unilaterally terminate the U.S. ASAT program. Unilaterally stop the modernization of our submarine ballistic missile force. Unilaterally break our NATO commitment of 1979. And the list goes on and on. Many Members of Congress have voted against all of these vital national security programs. And if we went on and followed their advice, we would have no defense in this country.

I can understand reasonable concerns about certain defense programs. I have some myself. But I cannot justify blanket opposition to each and every new important weapons system that comes along. These same critics are also telling us it is the President's fault that the Soviets have walked out of the Geneva arms control talks. You know, Mr. Chairman, I just want to show you a picture that was taken when you and I and our great, great chairman, Clem Zablocki, Congresswoman Sala Burton, were in Geneva last year. There is a picture of her-I won't mention the name of the Russian general-but after we had had our cross table talks, you and I, and I think you, Mr. Chairman, or maybe Sally Burton, brought this Russian general over to me, and we got into a rather heated but friendly argument over arms control and over the Russians possibly walking out at that time if we went ahead and deployed the missiles in Europe.

There was no press there. And this brings me to the comment that the Russian general made to me, because he said, Mr. Solomon, how could we ever agree to let you, since you have none deployed now-how could we ever let you deploy 10 intermediaterange missiles or 5, 4, 3, 2, or even 1? He said, we could not let you deploy anything. If we ever agreed to let you deploy even one, we would have our heads cut off.

So he said, what he was saying to me, and to every other Member there was that you have to go ahead and deploy those intermediate range missiles throughout Europe, and that is what we are talking about here today. That is what the Russian general said to me.

Now, the next thing, Mr. Chairman, I think that the critics will be telling us, that it is the President's fault that the Soviets mur

dered 269 innocent people in the KAL massacre, and it is the President's fault that the Soviets have 120,000 troops in Afghanistan.

Well, I would like to remind some of my colleagues that the Soviets walked out of the talks because the NATO alliance refused to cave in to Soviet demands that NATO halt the deployment of intemediate-range missiles in Europe. And we told them, way back in 1982, that if they didn't sit down and negotiate, if we didn't have some effective results, that we were going to go ahead-we, the NATO forces. And that is exactly what we did. So they had no choice. Sure, they got up and walked out, and eventually they will come back.

Since Congress is on record in support of the NATO decision, I guess we should also blame Congress for the Soviet's decision to walk out on those talks, or maybe we should blame the Washington Post for the Soviet's actions since they editorialized in support of the 1979 NATO decision.

But clearly, only the Soviets are to blame for the KAL massacre, for their invasion of Afghanistan and for their refusal to negotiate seriously on arms control.

I, for one, will continue to support the commitment America has made as a NATO ally. Deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe extends the protection of strategic power to the defense of Western Europe. This NATO decision represents an effective response to the massive buildup of Soviet SS-20's targeted on Western Europe. I believe this agreement should provide a guideline for similar efforts worldwide. The security of all our allies must never be separated from that of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment briefly on the issue of Soviet arms control violations. That, Mr. Courter, I understand dwelt on earlier, and I commend him for his report to the committee.

Last year, I drafted and circulated for signature a letter to the President calling on him to make public information regarding Soviet treaty violations in the field of arms control. In January of this year the President responded by announcing that the Soviets have violated treaty obligations in the arms control field.

I think one of President Eisenhower's remarks on arms control is pertinent to the record of Soviet treaty violations. President Eisenhower said, "Disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can properly claim to possess a perfect formula but the formula matters less than the good faith without which no formula can work." Mr. Chairman, the record of Soviet treaty violations raises some serious questions concerning the good faith of the Soviet Government in the field of arms control. I believe that we must see a genuine reversal of Soviet attitudes toward compliance if they are serious about continuing the arms control process in good faith.

In addition, I believe future arms control treaties should contain built-in sanctions against a nation found in violation of arms control agreements. Violations of treaty agreements by the Soviets will not be deterred simply by the risk that their action will be discovered.

Selective sanctions must be an integral part of future arms control treaties. The United States and our allies must be willing to

apply sanctions such as the automatic increase in military expenditures to compensate for serious treaty violation. Inaction on the part of the United States and our allies will make the arms control process meaningless and force higher military expenditures by both the United States and the Soviet Union, something that none of us want.

Inaction will also jeopardize the strategic balance of power and world stability. I would simply like to conclude by quoting another President on the issue of arms control. President Kennedy said that "Negotiations are not a substitute for strength, they are an instrument for the translations of strength into survival and peace." Thank you very much for allowing me to testify, Mr. Chairman. Chairman FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Solomon.

Our final witness is Congressman Ed Markey from the State of Massachusetts.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for my tardy arrival but I have another bill which is being heard right now over in the Commerce Committee.

Mr. Chairman, the nuclear arms race is a danger to the safety of America because it increases the danger of nuclear war. The trend in the arms race is toward destabilizing, war fighting weapons and every shorter warning times. New counterforce weapons with hard target kill capabilities decrease each nation's confidence in its retaliatory deterrent. These weapons undermine crisis stability, increasing the danger of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. At the same time, the development of antisatellite weapons and antiballistic missiles threatens to undermine important existing arms control agreements such as the ABM Treaty.

The way to stop the arms race and to ensure U.S. security is to negotiate a mutual, verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons. Last year the House passed the nuclear freeze resolution by a vote of 278 to 149. Unfortunately, this mandate for the President to negotiate a nuclear freeze has become another wasted opportunity for arms control.

If we are to make progress in halting the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons, the initiative must come from Congress. For this reason, over 120 of our colleagues have joined Jim Leach and me in sponsoring the Arms Race Moratorium Act of 1984. The Arms Race Moratorium Act, or "Quick Freeze," carries forward this body's commitment to halting the nuclear arms race.

This legislation calls on the President to propose to the Soviets a moratorium on the testing and deployment of new nuclear ballistic missiles, the testing against objects in space or deployment of antisatellite weapons and the testing of nuclear warheads. If the President fails to make this proposal, but the Soviets convey to the United States their willingness to adhere to a bilateral moratorium, then the act would suspend funding for the testing and deployment of new ballistic missiles and ASAT's and the testing of nuclear warheads. This moratorium would continue so long as the Soviets comply with its provisions.

This testing and deployment moratorium is highly verifiable by national technical means. At the same time, it will stop three of the most dangerous aspects of the arms race.

Congress has already demonstrated its commitment to controlling these weapons programs. And there is overwhelming public support for halting these aspects of the arms race. The grassroots nuclear weapons freeze campaign has made the enactment of a congressional quick freeze the focus of its legislative strategy. As a bilateral, verifiable first step toward a comprehensive freeze, the congressional quick freeze responds to the overwhelming national consensus for an end to the nuclear arms race.

The quick freeze would be a historic and feasible first step toward a comprehensive nuclear freeze and reductions.

It would get arms control moving again. It would be a tremendous confidence building measure, and could start rapid movement toward the conclusion of a treaty enacting a comprehensive nuclear weapons freeze and reductions. Perhaps most important, a quick freeze would halt some of the most dangerous elements of the arms race. It would make America more secure, by taking us a few giant steps away from the brink of nuclear annihilation.

We have the ability to stop the nuclear arms race if we have the will to do it.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity of testifying here today. I also thank you for your indulgence in allowing me to take a quick leave. I regret that I cannot stay, but will be happy to respond to any questions for the record.

[Mr. Markey's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEment of HoN. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

I'd like to thank the chairman for this opportunity to testify before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The subject of arms control and its role in foreign policy is one of the most critical topics before Congress and the nation today. We are now facing a new and newly dangerous round in the nuclear arms race. Relations between America and the Soviet Union are at their worst in a generation, perhaps since World War II. The nuclear arms race continues apace. Both sides are preparing to deploy new, destabilizing silo-buster missiles. And promising opportunities for arms control have been wasted.

Congress, meanwhile, has begun taking an increasingly active and creative role in working to curb the arms race. Following the passage of the Nuclear Freeze Resolution in the last session, supporters of the freeze have introduced the Arms Race Moratorium Act, also known as the Quick Freeze.

ARMS CONTROL AND FOREIGN POLICY

Role of arms control in foreign policy

Arms control has long been at the center of U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. The reason for this is clear. U.S.-Soviet relations, and world politics generally, are dominated by the military standoff between the superpowers. Between us, we have the power to end human civilization. As Carlos Fuentes said, we are going to "live together or die together."

Arms control represents an effort to assert human control over technology. It also represents an effort to deal with the superpower competition in a reasonable and peaceful way. Arms control addresses the most fundamental issue that we can address-that of the survival of our nation, and indeed of civilization itself.

Our commitment to arms control is a concrete reflection of our commitment to solving international problems by negotiation rather than confrontation. It upholds the American principle of turning first to law, not force, in international affairs.

Reagan administration opposition to arms control

Unfortunately, the long-standing bipartisan commitment to arms control has not been shared by the Reagan Administration. Ronald Reagan came to the White House with a record of opposing every major arms control agreement reached by Presidents of both parties. Since then, he has been the first President since Hoover not to meet with the leader of the Soviet Union. He is the first President since Eisenhower not to achieve an arms control accord with the Soviets.

President Reagan's chief arms control negotiator, General Rowny, recently said that "We've tried in the Reagan Administration to get away, to distance ourselves, from making arms control the centerpiece of our foreign policy. To some extent, we've succeeded." They have succeeded indeed.

The Administration did not even begin talking with the Soviets about arms control until overwhelming pressure from the American people, crystallized in the grass-roots nuclear freeze campaign, forced them to the bargaining table.

When there, the Administration put forward proposals that were, in the words of Alexander Haig, "not negotiable," and "absurd." The talks quickly deteriorated, and both sides began playing to the galleries, presenting proposals that were designed for public consumption rather than serious negotiation.

The Administration's arms control policy is best known by its results. Not only has there been no arms control agreeement, there are now no arms control negotiations.

U.S.-Soviet relations are now in a deep freeze. Administration officials who speak of Soviet hibernation show a tragic misunderstanding of the situation. The nuclear arms race has not stopped; the Soviets have merely given up on the prospect of controlling it in the near future.

The nuclear arms race is a danger to the safety of America because it increases the danger of nuclear war. The trend in the arms race is toward destabilizing, warfighting weapons and ever shorter warning times. New counterforce weapons with hard-target kill capabilities decrease each nation's confidence in its retaliatory deterrent. These weapons undermine crisis stability, increasing the danger of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. At the same time, the development of antisatellite weapons and antiballistic missiles threatens to undermine important existing arms control agreements such as the ABM Treaty.

ARMS RACE MORATORIUM ACT

The way to stop the arms race and to ensure U.S. security is to negotiate a mutual, verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of all nuclear weapons. Last year, the House passed the nuclear freeze resolution by a vote of 278 to 149. Unfortunately, this mandate for the President to negotiate a nuclear freeze has become another wasted opportunity for arms control.

If we are to make progress in halting the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons, the initiative must come from Congress. For this reason, over 120 of our colleagues have joined Jim Leach and me in sponsoring the Arms Race Moratorium Act of 1984. The Arms Race Moratorium Act, or "Quick Freeze," carries forward this body's commitment to halting the nuclear arms race.

This legislation calls on the President to propose to the Soviets a moratorium on the testing and deployment of new nuclear ballistic missiles, the testing against objects in space or deployment of antisatellite weapons, and the testing of nuclear warheads. If the President fails to make this proposal, but the Soviets convey to the United States their willingness to adhere to a bilateral moratorium, then the Act would suspend funding for the testing and deployment of new ballistic missiles and ASATs and the testing of nuclear warheads. This moratorium would continue so long as the Soviets comply with its provisions.

This testing and deployment moratorium is highly verifiable by national technical means. At the same time, it will stop three of the most dangerous aspects of the

arms race.

The Quick Freeze would mandate a bilateral halt to the flight-testing and deployment of ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 600 kilometers which were not flight tested before August 1, 1982. This includes modifications of existing missile types which increase throw-weight or the number of re-entry vehicles.

Preventing the deployment of a new generation of accurate, MIRVed silobusters would greatly enhance stability in the nuclear balance of terror. The Quick Freeze would stop the MX, along with the Trident D5 missile, and it would also shut down production of dangerous, unnecessary Soviet missiles such as the SS-24, the SS-25 and the SSN-23 missiles.