(ASAT) weapons, mobile land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) strategic sea-launched cruise missiles and "stealth" bombers not easily detectible by radar.

Arms control rests fundamentally on two premises: a political willingness to negotiate agreements and technical ability to verify them. If their development is not aborted, verification of these new technology weapons will be difficut or impossible. Their advent could effectively remove the essential technical foundation for negotiated security, whatever might develop regarding political willingness.

For example, proponents of small, mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles like them because an enemy could not see where they were at any one time, so could not target them. But missiles that can't be seen can't be counted precisely either. An arms control agreement based on numerical limits would be difficult to imagine in a world of mobile "midgetman" missiles.

What about the argument that there are now so many nuclear weapons on both sides that we can stop trying to count or control them? Even the Reagan administration rejects that view. Indeed, its spokesmen are now saying that agreements to reduce offensive armaments are essential if their proposed strategic defensive system is ever to be effective. Without limits on offensive rockets, even the Star Wars system-if it worked, which it won't-could be overwhelmed.

Unfortunately, the prospects for unraveling the existing arms control regime now seem excellent. The electoral process offers little hope for arresting this erosion. The foundation for future arms control may be removed before the November election. Election campaigns are too consumed by domestic problems and political posturing to permit arms control to be more than a distant second-priority issue. The positions of the candidates will be tailored to address specific issues and serve specific constituencies, so that the broader question of the termination of arms control will be obscured. Candidates will attack policies but not their overall thrust, adding to the obfuscation of central issues.

The proliferation of proposals for rescuing arms control has not been helpful; deep cuts of various kinds, "build-down," the freeze, nuclear-weapons-free zones, etc. These initiatives have cluttered the public agenda with "quick fix" formulas while obscuring recognition of past arms control accomplishments and realistic future negotiating possibilities. The result has been petty bickering among the backers of various "instant gratification" proposals.

While a large segment of the public has been won over to arms limitations, it does not know what that means concretely. The confusion over the proper approach to constrain nuclear weapons has led to condemnation of "classical" negotiated arms control, especially by the freeze movement. This allows the administration to pursue its strategy unchallenged.

The Congress offers little hope for saving the existing nuclear arms limitation structure and the prospect for future accomplishment. It is divided, consumed with concern for formulaic approaches to arms control, intimadated by the popularity of the executive branch and prone to dilatory and personally self-serving measures. What make this a particularly critical time for the future of arms limitation is that both of the superpowers are on the threshold of a new era in strategic technology.

Far from being "asleep" in the development of strategic weapons during the past decade, the United States has been ahead in making the transition to the new technical era. It will probably continue to dominate, at least for some time, development of weapons which are intrinsically hard to detect and are made even more deceptive by the addition of "stealth" technology. History suggests, however, that this lead will be short-lived.

Gradually, both superpower arsenals will be dominated by these new weapons. A part from arms control considerations, the advent of these systems will dramatically reduce the ability of U.S. intelligence to monitor Soviet Weapon deployments. Ending the SALT regime will further prejudice U.S. intelligence capabilities, as the Soviets will again be free to conceal their strategic deployments and interfere with our intelligence operations (both are forbidden by the SALT agreements).

This transition will lead to higher levels of uncertainty for strategic planning and budgeting. Such uncertainty will create pressures for military spending even beyond projected levels.

Ironically, though, this time of political and technological challenges to arms control is also the moment when serious arms control efforts could do more to counter the threats of vulnerability and uncertainty then any other component of our national security policy. Fragile though it is, the existing framework of nuclear arms limitation-including the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty, the ABM Treaty and the SALT I and SALT II agreements on offensive forces-provides a foundation for a comprehensive containment of nuclear weapons. The Reagan administration often argues that result of the last 15 years of arms control talks have been "disappointing." This author, having spent over three decades working in arms control, is well aware of the frustrations and disappointments that have often resulted from negotiating with an adversary. Progress has been modest, but the SALT process has produced significant achievements, and much more is possible.

Realizing this potential requires a serious commitment to the task. During the past several years, the administration has based its arms control proposals on the false premise that the United States is in a position of strategic inferiority to the Soviet Union. Arms control cannot and should not be used as a method for catching up with the Soviet Union. As long as the U.S. continues to hold such an assumption, we will never achieve an arms agreement.

The draft agreement that the United States offered at the START talks last fall, while revised from earlier proposals, would still require the Soviets to dramatically restructure their strategic nuclear forces while permitting the United States to proceed fully with its planned nuclear buildup. The Soviets cannot be expected to accept deep cuts in their ICBMs if the United States remains unwilling to put on the table weapons that the Soviets find threatening.

For example, banning MX makes good strategic sense if it can be traded (along with other inducements) for a ban on new Soviet ICBMs and reductions in their existing ICBM force. It is also unlikely that the Soviets will agree to significant cuts in ballistic missile warheads without some meaningful restrictions on American heavy bombers and cruise missiles. The administration has failed to make such as offer. We must begin negotiations in other areas of arms control that have recently been neglected. A destabilizing arms race in space could be avoided through an agreement to ban antisatellite weapons. A comprehensive and verifiable ASAT agreement is possible, but it will require sincere, concerted effort.

Another arms control priority should be the achievement of a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing. Although we have come close on several occasions to achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty, it has eluded us. Advances in our technical ability to monitor Soviet tests have eliminated the main obstacle to a treaty. Arms limitation requires initiatives that are equitable, negotiable, verifiable, durable and stabilizing. If we fail to offer such proposals, the likelihood for both the superpowers is that economic considerations will produce uneven, unilateral arms restraint in the years ahead. Where there might have been mutually negotiated security, there will be greater peril, doubt and insecurity for both sides.

The president and his arms control staff have had ample opportunity to prove their mettle. Three years of work have produced zero progress. All previous prosidents since Eisenhower had some arms control agreement to their credit. While Soviet obduracy must be considered in judging the Reagan record, history will not be easily satisfied with the superficial excuse that "it takes two to tango.'

The president's bipartisan commission on strategic forces, the Scowcroft commission, concluded that "arms control is an indispensible element" of national security policy to reduce the risk of nuclear war. No amount of new weaponry can make up for our lack of success in this essential area.

APPENDIX 6

THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE, A PASTORAL LETTER ON WAR AND PEACE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, MAY 13, 1983

Summary

The Second Vatican Council opened its evaluation of modern warfare with the statement: "The whole human race faces a moment of supreme crisis in its advance toward maturity." We agree with the council's assessment; the crisis of the moment is embodied in the threat which nuclear weapons pose for the world and much that we hold dear in the world. We have seen and felt the effects of the crisis of the nuclear age in the lives of people we serve. Nuclear weaponry has drastically changed the nature of warfare, and the arms race poses a threat to human life and human civilization which is without precedent.

We write this letter from the perspective of Catholic faith. Faith does not insulate us from the daily challenges of life but intensifies our desire to address them precisely in light of the gospel which has come to us in the person of the risen Christ. Through the resources of faith and reason we desire in this letter to provide hope for people in our day and direction toward a world freed of the nuclear threat.

As Catholic bishops we write this letter as an exercise of our teaching ministry. The Catholic tradition on war and peace is a long and complex one; it stretches from the Sermon on the Mount to the statements of Pope John Paul II. We wish to explore and explain the resources of the moral-religious teaching and to apply it to specific questions of our day. In doing this we realize, and we want readers of this letter to recognize, that not all statements in this letter have the same moral authority. At times we state universally binding moral principles found in the teaching of the Church; at other times the pastoral letter makes specific applications, observations and recommendations which allow for diversity of opinion on the part of those who assess the factual data of a situations differently. However,

we expect Catholics to give our moral judgments serious consideration when they are forming their own views on specific problems.

The experience of preparing this letter has manifested to us the range of strongly held opinion in the Catholic community on questions of fact and judgment concerning issues of war and peace. We urge mutual respect among individuals and groups in the Church as this letter is analyzed and discussed. Obviously, as bishops, we believe that such differences should be expressed within the frame work of Catholic moral teaching. We need in the Church not only conviction and commitment but also civility and charity.

While this letter is addressed principally to the Catholic community, we want it to make a contribution to the wider public debate in our country on the dangers and dilemmas of the nuclear age. Our contribution will not be primarily technical or political, but we are convinced that there is no satisfactory answer to the human problems of the nuclear age which fails to consider the moral and religious dimensions of the questions we face.

Although we speak in our own name, as Catholic bishops of the Church in the United States, we have been conscious in the preparation of this letter of the consequences our teaching will have not only for the United States but for other nations as well. One important expression of this awareness has been the consultation we have had, by correspondence and in an important meeting held at the Vatican (January 18-19, 1983), with representatives of European bishops' conferences. This consultation with bishops of other countries, and, of course, with the Holy See, has been very helpful to us. Catholic teaching has always understood peace in positive terms. In the words of Pope John Paul II: "Peace is not just the absence of war. . . . Like a cathedral, peace must be constructed patiently and with unshakable faith." (Coventry, England, 1982) Peace is the fruit of order. Order in human society must be shaped on the basis of respect for the transcendence of God and the unique dignity of each person, understood in terms of freedom, justice, truth and love. To avoid war in our day we must be intent on building peace in an increasingly interdependent world. In Part III of this letter we set forth a positive vision of peace and the demands such a vision makes on diplomacy, national policy, and personal choices.

While pursuing peace incessantly, it is also necessary to limit the use of force in a world comprised of nation states, faced with common problems but devoid of an adequate international political authority. Keeping the peace in the nuclear age is a moral and political imperative. In Parts I and II of this letter we set forth both the principles

of Catholic teaching on war and a series of judgments, based on these principles, about concrete policies. In making these judgments we speak as moral teachers, not as technical experts.

I. Some Principles, Norms and Premises of
Catholic Teaching

A. On War

1. Catholic teaching begins in every case with a presumption against war and for peaceful settlement of disputes. In exceptional cases, determined by the moral principles of the just-war tradition, some uses of force are permitted.

2. Every nation has a right and duty to defend itself against unjust aggression.

3. Offensive war of any kind is not morally justifiable.

4. It is never permitted to direct nuclear or conventional weapons to "the indiscriminate destruction of whole cities or vast areas with their populations. . . ." (Pastoral Constitution, #80.) The intentional killing of innocent civilians or non-combatants is always wrong.

5. Even defensive response to unjust attack can cause destruction which violates the principle of proportionality, going far beyond the limits of legitimate defense. This judgment is particularly important when assessing planned use of nuclear weapons. No defensive strategy, nuclear or conventional, which exceeds the limits of proportionality is morally permissible.

B. On Deterrence

1. "In current conditions 'deterrence' based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. Nonetheless, in order to ensure peace, it is indispensable not to be satisfied with this minimum which is always susceptible to the real danger of explosion." (Pope John Paul II, “Message to U.N. Special Session on Disarmament," #8, June 1982.)

2. No use of nuclear weapons which would violate the principles of discrimination or proportionality may be intended in a strategy of deterrence. The moral demands of Catholic teaching re