people on what is in the interest of the people in your district and in the national interest. Any Congressman is concerned about popular opinion, as we always are, but you have to take a time when an issue becomes so important, and that the level of that public diplomacy has not been sufficient, that you are just going to do what is in your interest. And I am sure you would agree with me, Congressman Bonker, that what Edmund Burke said about this is absolutely right and absolutely true. When you have to live ultimately with yourself, and ultimately that you are proud to stand up, even though the Gallup poll may show that most people do not support you on this, even though that you know that, that by God, you are going to stand up and be a statesman. Chairman FASCELL. Well, Mr. Adelman, I can tell you are not running. Mr. Solomon. SOVIETS DIFFICULT TO NEGOTATE WITH Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Ambassador Adelman, let me just personally congratulate you; you certainly have justified all of the expectations that many of us had when you came into your position. You are doing a tremendous job. We and the American people appreciate it. It is difficult at best to deal with and to negotiate with what Chairman Fascell, I think, characterized earlier, as scorpions. I wrote to the President, along with many other Members of Congress, back on March 11, 1983, asking for a report to the Congress on Soviet violations of nuclear treaties. Forthcoming from that, from the President, is a list of seven of the most serious violations which I would like to submit for the record. When I say it is difficult to deal at best with the Soviets, here is a Congressional Record piece on February 1, 1984, which was submitted by Senator McClure and which shows literally hundreds and hundreds of violations of Soviet political treaties. This is the kind of people that we are dealing with. UNITED STATES MUST MODERNIZE WEAPONS SYSTEMS BEFORE SOVIET WILL NEGOTIATE But I would like just briefly to touch on what Congressman Bonker brought up before when he talked about the Soviets walking out of the intermediate INF talks. I have a picture in my office, Mr. Chairman, of the late Chairman Clem Zablocki and myself. And I think you were there in Geneva last year when Clem Zablocki and I were engaged in a conversation, after our head-on meeting with our counterparts from the Soviet Union. Afterward there was a reception and I was talking with a Soviet general. He was smoking Marlboro cigarettes and drinking scotch, American scotch. But we got into this conversation, and what I am driving home is an answer to Congressman Bonker's question. This general said; "Look, Jerry," or however he pronounced it, "We can never The letter of Mar. 11, 1983, as well as the President's response (included in Senator McClure's Congressional Record insert of Feb. 1, 1984) appear in app. 9. agree to let you deploy one missile. One intermediate range missile. One. We would have our heads cut off." He continued: "The only way that we can ever negotiate is for you to go ahead and deploy, as you have said that you would." Now, he would never say this officially and across the conference table. But at this reception, he told Clem Zablocki and myself; "Once you have deployed, then we can negotiate." Congressmen Studds and Levine have talked about having no bipartisanship, but it is clear to me that we have a great deal of bipartisanship. It just does not include the far leftwing of the Democratic Party. The moderate Democrats, the moderate Republicans, the rightwing Republicans have all been participating in a bipartisan matter. But when you get people who vote against the MX missile, the B-1 bomber, the ASAT and every other defense modernization program, we would have no new modernized weapons if that kind of view carried the day. And therefore my question to you is: If we do not have the MX, and the B-1, and the ASAT, and all these others, is there anything to negotiate? Is there any reason for the Russians to come back to the table? We would have no way of defending ourselves; they would have no reason to ever come back to the table. What is your comment on that? Mr. ADELMAN. It certainly decreases the leverage that you are going to have in any negotiation. It certainly makes our job, my job, Ed Rowny's job, Paul Nitze's job, so much harder. And in this respect, the Soviets are not different from anybody else in the world. When they are given something on a silver platter by our actions, unilaterally, they do not need to bargain over that; they can just take that, pocket it, thank you very much, and bargain over what is left. Mr. SOLOMON. It seems a poor way to do business and get results, I think. Thank you. Mr. ADELMAN. Thank you. Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Levine, there is some time left; go ahead. DEMOCRATIC POSITION ON MX REFLECTS OPPOSITION TO DESTABILIZING FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS Mr. LEVINE. Thank you. Just for the record, in light of the fact that my name was mentioned, and I think a position at least of mine was mischaracterized, and I believe- Mr. SOLOMON. Respectfully, though, it was mentioned. Mr. LEVINE. Well, thank you, Mr. Solomon, I appreciate the respect from the gentleman from New York. But I would like to set the record straight, at least to the extent of emphasizing that a number of us happen to support the B-1 bomber. As you will see if you take a look at my consistent voting record, that has been a position that I have had since being a Member of this Congress. I believe that, while we may need to modernize our bomber force, we still need to resist destabilizing first strike weapon systems, such as the MX. And when I was talking about a lack of a bipartisan consensus, I was referring to the MX in particular. On vote after vote after vote, while there have been a small number of Democrats who have worked and agreed with the administration on this issue, you will find an overwhelming majority of the Democratic Party in this House and in the other body reflecting most segments of that party, not just what you would characterize as the far left, has taken the view, I think for reasons that have been well explained in the course of the debate that this first strike destabilizing weapons system is one that is not necessary. That does not necessarily go to other weapon systems or on an across the board review of other weapon systems. And, I think that if we are going to be debating these issues and reviewing the positions of different people on these issues, we should at least know what their positions are and have them accurately described in the record. Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Hyde. POLITICIZATION OF ARMS CONTROL Mr. HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One advantage of being at the very low end of the totem pole, below the salt, is that you do have to stick around and listen to everything, and sometimes you learn some things and sometimes you do not. However, I have an opportunity to expound a little bit, and I am sorry you have to be the whipping boy, but you are there. You know, arms control, I agree that it is one of the most important issues that we face. It is not fiscal policy or the environment or monetary policy or public works; we are talking about war and peace. We are talking about World War III. And it is tragic that it has been so politicized in the grasping and the casting about for issues with which to catapult one's party back into political office, everything seems to be fair game. And this sensitive issue that has to do with life and death has been horribly politicized. And, I think that is tragic. I do not mean the people who disagree with the administration, ought not to express their disagreements, both stridently and vigorously. But there comes a time when we ought to stop negotiating with ourselves and try to agree on some principles and keep our eye on what the ultimate goal is; our national security as we face a very hostile world. But the fear factor has been discovered as one of the most useful political levers in history. We use it on domestic issues such as: Social Security, terrorize old people by telling them that they are going to lose their Social Security if they do not vote for so and so or for such a party. But when you take that fear factor, and you move it into arms control, then it develops an element, a coloration of tragedy, in my judgment. Now, the other party, the regnant party, the majority party, puts its trust to a almost childlike degree in paper, in agreements. The underlying theme seems to be to rely on the Soviets, on what they say; not on what they do and not on our own resources. You know what this Congress-the House; do you know what the House's response was to the Soviets playing tough guy at INF and at Geneva on the SALT, on the START negotiations? They walk out-they walk out of the Olympic Games, they walk-they shoot an airliner down with 269 people on it; and what has our reaction been? We cancel the MX. We refuse to modernize chemical warfare. We cancel antisatellite testing systems. We cancel sea launch crews missiles system testing. Boy, that will bring them to their knees. There are some muskets in a warehouse at Williamsburg, which have been overlooked by the Democratic Party; if they could find them, they would abandon them too. CANCELLATION OF U.S. WEAPONS SYSTEMS WILL NOT BRING SOVIET CONCESSIONS Bipartisan? What is Congress' foreign policy? What is our arms control policy? Who can tell? How do you find out? Well, in casting about for something to get my teeth into, I found an article by the man who well might be President, Walter Mondale. In the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation. The winter of 1983- Mr. ADELMAN. The Notre Dame Journal of Legislation? Mr. HYDE. Yes; it is called the Journal of Legislation published under the auspices of the Thomas and Alberta White Center for Law and Public Policy, Notre Dame Law School, winter 1983. "Criteria for a Comprehensive Strategy for Nuclear Arms Control by Walter F. Mondale." Now, that is just last year. Last winter. And he says, and this is on page 8; "We could abandon the MX, if the Soviets agreed-if the Soviets agreed to major cuts in the missiles that threaten our Minute Man silos." Gee, that makes sense. But here is a letter signed by Walter F. Mondale that I received just before our last MX vote: "Dear Colleague: We are writing to urge you to vote against all funding for the production of the MX missile." So what did we get? Well, in 1983 Mr. Mondale says: "If the Soviets agree to major cuts in the missiles, that threaten our Minute Man silos, we could have given away the MX." But now that the election is underway, we did not even get a half a bottle of Vodka for canceling the MX. Now, that is really wise. SUMMIT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL Summetry, that is what we need, some will say. Sit down every year and talk. I watched films of the Holocaust last night on television, showing a film that was at the Kennedy Center. Millions of people in a common grave. And then I looked it up to see how many people were killed in World War II; 50 million people were killed in World War II. Then I thought to myself, why couldn't we have avoided that? We did not negotiate enough with Hitler? We should have sent our best diplomats. Someone like Chamberlain, maybe. And asked him to go to Munich and negotiate with Hitler? We did not have to resort to the arms race and the military industrial complex. We should have negotiated. Of course, we did negotiate, but to no avail. If only Chris Dodd had been around then. We could have solved Hitler's problem and saved 50 million lives. How silly, to think you can sit at a summit and stare at Chernenko without knowing what you are going to talk about; and what is it going to do to public opinion, if you walk away with nothing agreed, in disagreement. How does that solve the problems of war and peace? But they are so in love with paper, and with talking without any idea of goals and the relationship of power to the negotiations and the success of the negotiations. Reagan is criticized for no progress, but he has had three leaders of the Soviet Union: Breshnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. I suppose he should have been a psychologically attuned to all three of them, I suppose. Summetry, negotiation, Congress. The Soviet Union is now carpet bombing in Afghanistan. They forbid family reunification. They had a one-party election in Poland. And do you know what we did yesterday on the floor, we passed a resolution condemning the Soviet's misconduct in providing postal service. Do you know what they do? You write a letter to your mother in the Soviet Union and it stays over there 2 months and they send it back with the word "deceased" on it. They make you think your mother is dead or your brother is dead or your family is dead. UNITED STATES MUST MEET SOVIET WEAPONS BUILDUP And President Reagan is disturbing the peace when he calls them an evil empire. Of course, the New York Times used the same phrase, only they were referring to Hitler as an evil empire. Whatever you do, do not tell the truth about the Soviet Union. The language of diplomacy has its uses, I suppose, but comity requires us to ignore what they call us in Tass and Pravda. But Reagan is disturbing the peace. Well, arms control is important. We ought to keep talking. We ought to try to talk. But if our response to their intransigence; to their rearming; to their militancy is to keep canceling weapons systems; I really tremble for the Republic. I am ready to go to the American people on this issue, this election. And I know the gentleman's is for the B-1. But if they were made in New Mexico, I wonder if he would be. But they are made in California. So, the gentleman like Alan Cranston is for the B-1. And that is terrific. Something is better then nothing. Thank you. ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTS ACDA Chairman FASCELL. Well, let us see, Mr. Adelman, where we are. Chairman FASCELL. Do you think Mr. ADELMAN. Have you ever met anybody who has? Chairman FASCELL. No; but you are pretty definite about your opinions and I assume you are statesman enough to say yes if you really meant yes. |