APPENDIX 9

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM C. CARNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to have this opportunity to present my views to the Foreign Affairs Committee on the role of arms control in U.S. defense policy. only regret that I am unable to discuss this issue in person. However, I have a prior commitment to a hearing by another committee of the House

Mr. Chairman, everyone involved with this issue would agree that arms control must play a vital role in U.S. defense policy and must continue to play a central role in our efforts to maintain world peace and protect our national security. I know that all of my colleagues, both on the Committee and those providing testimony, will continue to work to promote the control and reduction of nuclear weapons. We will vigorously debate, and perhaps even argue over how best to achieve it, but these discussions are part of our great democratic process.

I want to reaffirm my support for a serious, realistic, and patient effort to achieve effective, equitable, substantial, and verifiable reductions in the world's arsenal of nuclear weapons as a balanced part of our commitment to protect our nation and to preserve world peace.

I also want to offer some words of caution in an effort to keep this important issue in its proper perspective with the hope of increasing our ability to contribute to the shared goal of nuclear arms reduction. Because of the current Soviet suspension of the START and INF negotiations, there is an increased urgency to our discussion of the arms control issue. Unfortunately, because this is an election year, there is often an increased stridency to these discussions. There are those that say we must de everything possible to negotiate an immediate arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Indeed, they seem to think that any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union will be the solution to all international tensions. This atmosphere distorts the issue and obscures our goal, which is to reduce nuclear weapons in a manner which will enhance the security of all nations and contribute to international security. It is not merely to negotiate a treaty that cannot do what it is intended to do.

Arms control by itself cannot eliminate the treat of nuclear war, or of any war. Arms control must be coordinated with a comprehensive national security policy and supported by a credible military deterrent. We must face the reality that weapons themselves do not start wars, nor can treaties alone prevent wars. Diplomacy and deterrence must be balanced.

It is instructive to remember the unrealistic hopes which were placed on the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. Also, recall Neville Chamberlain's misguided efforts to appease Hitler in Munich in 1938. Chamberlain obviously did not secure "peace for our time" as he had hoped. The Kellogg-Briand Pact failed because it was too broad and lacked the necessary ability to enforce its provisions. Chamberlain failed at Munich because Hitler doubted the European's will to defend their interests.

Our desire to achieve arms control agreements with the Soviet Union holds similar dangers. We must achieve an agreement that equally reduces the weapons of both sides, and one that insures that both sides can verify the other's compliance with that agreement.

The current impasse in START and INF is unfortunate and unsettling. However, we must not lose sight of why the negotiations were suspended. The Soviet Union walked out of both sets of talks simply because the U.S. and NATO would not accept the overwhelming Soviet advantage in intermediaterange ballistic missiles. The Soviets refused to agree to reductions in their 1,000-plus SS-20 warheads. In fact, they continued to increase the deployment of these missiles in Eastern Europe and other areas of the Soviet Union. In response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s, the U.S. and NATO began to address the defensive needs of the alliance through the gradual deployment of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs),

beginning in December, 1983. This was part of the 1979 "Dual Track" approach of diplomacy and deterrence, agreed to with our allies by the Carter Administration. The Soviets used this planned and moderate measure, of which they had been informed and provided with alternatives to, to walk out of both the INF and START negotiations. The Soviet precondition for returning to either negotiation is the unilateral removal of the Pershings and GLCM's deployed thus far. In other words, we must give them what they want simply to get them to sit down at the table. They would thus achieve their negotiating objective without having to negotiate any equal concession.

The Soviet Union is entitled to fair negotiations and equal trade-offs. It is certainly not entitled to diplomatic extortion.

Mr. Chairman, the suspension of the INF and START negotiations is frustrating to all of us who care about arms control. Yet, we must maintain a clear-eyed, levelheaded approach to this difficult situation. Have we been unfair in our negotiations with the Soviet Union? The Administration has been accused of making unrealistic demands of the Soviets to reduce their land-based ICBM force. ICBM's are the most destructive and destabilizing weapons in the nuclear arsenal. We should make every effort to reduce the number of MIRVed ICBM's of both nations. The MX is often attacked as a first-strike, destabilizing weapon that should not be deployed. However, the 608 SS-18s and SS-19s are the most destructive missiles in the world. The MX should be on the negotiating table, but we must also hold the Soviets to the same standard.

In both Rounds IV and V of the START talks, the U.S. modified its initial proposals to address Soviet concerns over U.S. bombers and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs). In addition, we incorporated the build-down concept which was developed in close cooperation with many of the Members participating in today's hearing. The Soviets have resisted these progressive, forward thinking proposals. Instead, they prefer slight reductions and general limits on nuclear weapons which do not improve on the SALT agreements. Their proposals would not significantly reduce existing weapons, nor halt the arms race.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviets are tough and shrewd negotiators. They are also slow to accept new proposals. These negotiating hurdles are made more difficult by the recent forced changes in their leadership, as well as their current, often conflicting, style of joint decision-making in the Politburo. In our efforts to overcome the impasse in the arms control talks we must not lose sight of the basic fact that the United States and Soviet Union are vastly different nations with conflicting goals and values. A simple reading of Soviet history will remind us that confrontation with the West is unequivocally dictated by the ideology upon which the Soviet government is founded.

We must continue to seek negotiations with this adversary, but we must have no illusions about how agreements can be reached. The Soviets are not swayed by good intentions and peaceful rhetoric. They will only accept agreements which they believe are advantageous to them. They will not seek to achieve by negotiation what they believe they can achieve by other methods, intimidation and coercion not least among these methods.

The United States must make equitable arms reduction proposals in good faith, but we must also make these proposals credible by demonstrating the commitment to maintain a force modernization program. The Soviets will not agree to reduce their advantages in critical nuclear systems unless they believe the U.S. is prepared to match these systems. Such are the realities of international relations with the Soviet Union.

We must not panic nor despair over any setback in our efforts to preserve peace and freedom. We must maintain a patient and responsible approach to arms control. The Soviet tactics are intended to use the pressure of American election-year politics, as well as our innate and laudable American desire to get things done in a hurry, to obtain concessions from the U.S. to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are constantly seeking an advantage they can use. I am not referring to a military advantage to provoke a war, I believe the Soviets realize the mutual disaster any war between the superpowers would mean. Rather, they seek an advantage they can use to further their political aims; for example, use of intermediaterange nuclear weapons to intimidate Western Europe. These tactics do not mean we cannot peacefully deal with the Soviet Union, but we should be cautious and determined in our negotiations with them.

Mr. Chairman, we must vigorously pursue arms reductions with the Soviet Union. We must continue to seek to renew the START and INF talks. In addition, we must welcome all efforts to control anti-satellite weapons and all weapons in space. In addition, we should continue our efforts to ban chemical weapons and to limit conven

tional forces in Europe. I call on the Administration to continue its leadership, and challenge it to develop creative proposals and approaches to these arms control problems. We in the Congress must contribute to this effort; we demonstrated that we can by the build-down approach and the compromises on the MX programs.

We must also recognize that arms control is not a unilateral effort. The Soviets have been much less than forthcoming in attempts to negotiate substantial, equitable, and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons. They must respond and return to the nuclear arms control negotiations. They are our adversary, but we can, indeed we must, work with them to reduce the threat to our world that nuclear weapons present.

What I am asking today is that we demand of the Soviet Union what we demand of our own nation. That is, a fair and honest attempt to reduce nuclear weapons. Thank you.

APPENDIX 10

STATEMENT OF EDWARD F. SNYDER, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL IN U.S. POLICY

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the subject of these hearings, “the role of arms control in U.S. policy." Given the current arms control impasse and the danger posed by nuclear weapons, it is hard to imagine a more timely topic.

Since I take a rather unorthodox view of arms control in the comments which follow, I would like to state for the record the longtime support of the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) for the concept of arms control and disarmament. Our Committee worked hard to help bring the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into being in 1961. And we have testified or given other support for the treaties concerning Antarctica (1960), Limited Test Ban (1963), peaceful uses of outer space (1967), Latin American nuclear-free zone (1967), Nonproliferation (1968), Anti-Ballistic Missiles (1972), and qualified support for the SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979) Treaties. We have also supported the nuclear freeze in its various manifestations as well as multilateral negotiations and U.S. initiatives to reduce both nuclear and conventional arms.

Now, in 1984, nearly 40 years into the nuclear age, a disinterested observer would have to conclude that the trends are in the wrong direction, and very dangerously so. Military budgets continue to rise, nuclear weapons are becoming even more numerous and provocative, serious arms control negotiations are virtually non-existent, and international problem-solving and conflict resolution mechanisms are withering for lack of use. All of this is happening despite the efforts made by people of talent and good will around the world acting under a sense of great urgency.

In this situation, it is time to take a hard look at some fundamental U.S. policy assumptions. In our view certain of these fundamental assumptions are undermining efforts for an effective arms control policy. And so long as these assumptions go essentially unchallenged, there is little likelihood the United States and the Soviet Union can achieve significant arms reductions.

I identify two current, fundamental U.S. policy assumptions which must be closely examined:

(1) U.S. national security can be built on a policy of nuclear deterrence which rests on the creation and maintenance of fear and mistrust, and

(2) The subject of arms control can be isolated from the broad context of U.S.Soviet relations.

While giving lip service to alternatives, all U.S. nuclear age presidents have grounded their policies on the first assumption. The Reagan administration seems to be alone in holding to the second.

1. DETERRENCE BY FEAR

The nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of U.S. policy and is widely supported by presidents, members of Congress and the general public. But it seems clear that this support is not due to hard realism or proven success, but rather to wishful thinking and the inability to develop alternatives.

It is often said that "deterrence works" because we have not had a nuclear war since 1945. But 39 years is a relatively short time in human history to settle on a policy when just one failure would have such catastrophic consequences for humanity. Indeed the deterrence doctrine has a built-in assumption that it may fail; if that possibility were not present, the other party would cease to be deterred. Moreover, the mere passage of time does not in itself lend credibility to a thesis. It would have been unwise in 1830, for example, to conclude there would be no civil war in the United States because one had not yet taken place. One must look also at trends (426)

and directions and these are most disconcerting. This unexamined optimism about the success of the nuclear deterrent is sometimes countered with a humorous analogy: Remember the story of the man who fell from the skyscraper. As he passed the 35th floor, he shouted, "I'm doing all right so far."

The deterrence policy was adopted quite logically when the Soviet Union developed hydrogen bombs deliverable by intercontinental_bombers, and then missiles. Since it was no longer possible for the Department of Defense physically to prevent all Soviet bombs from being delivered on U.S. targets, it became necessary to devise a policy to prevent (deter) them from being launched in the first place. The focus of U.S. defense policy shifted to the minds and the perceptions of Soviet decisionmakers who had to be persuaded that the United States had both the capacity and the will to inflict terrible retribution if a Soviet attack were launched. That capacity became available in the late 1950's. Demonstrating a continued will or readiness to use these terrible weapons has been more difficult. A hostile and bellicose public attitude must be created and maintained. The inexplicably huge numbers of powerful weapons added to the U.S. arsenal since then are more readily comprehensible when seen as a part of this continuing demonstration of national will.

Ironically, short-run success of the nuclear deterrent breeds long-term problems. The fear that is created in the minds of the leaders of the adversary also breeds mistrust and suspicion. The weapons which the builder knows are only for its defensive purposes, appear to the other to be part of an aggressive policy against them. Not surprisingly counter build-ups and a spiralling arms race result.

Perhaps more importantly, deterrence requires that a high level of fear and mistrust be maintained among the citizens in the United States so they will pay taxes to buy ever more destructive weapons and support belligerent actions and policies like "war-fighting" or "limited" nuclear war which help to demonstrate a continuing will to use these weapons of mass destruction. For citizens to accept responsibility for the enormity of the use of nuclear weapons which would result in casualties in the millions, it is necessary to dehumanize the "enemy." Hence reports of transgressions tend almost inevitably to be magnified while reports of cooperative efforts are minimized.

This climate makes it extremely difficult to negotiate arms reductions. Even the modest SALT II Treaty agreed to by generals and admirals in Washington and Moscow was never taken up by a Senate which was hearing especially from that part of the public which had been conditioned by two decades of fear and suspicion generated by the deterrence doctrine.

Thus a deterrence policy builds a climate of mistrust which inhibits efforts to reduce arms, and spawns new and more dangerous weapons and doctrines.

2. ARMS CONTROL IN ISOLATION

Prodded by hundreds of thousands of people marching in the streets of Western Europe and the United States, the Reagan Administration entered the INF and START talks. The positions which it proposed and still holds were very favorable to the United States and very disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. This indicated (1) an inability to perceive Soviet security interests from the Soviet viewpoint, or (2) an intention to talk but not to agree, of (3) an unrealistic expectation that the Soviet Union would sign a treaty favoring the United States.

But even more detrimental than the unrealistic positions reluctantly put forward at Geneva has been the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union which created a climate in which fruitful negotiations were impossible. The President himself termed the Soviet Union alternatively an "evil empire" and a "Mickey Mouse" system. It is difficult to imagine which term is more provocative or demeaning or detrimental to an arms control negotiating atmosphere which requires a modicum of respect, good will and cooperation to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. During this same period the administration has also reduced educational, scientific and technical exchanges, attempted to interfere with the agreement between the Soviet Union and Western European countries on the gas pipeline, greatly increased military expenditures, launched an arms race in space and continued to initiate a series of weapons systems which can be perceived by a suspicious adversary as preparation for a U.S. first strike.

This is not the policy one pursues if one is serious about achieving agreement on the most sensitive and dangerous of all national security issues-nuclear weapons. Now, with U.S. elections approaching, the administration is suggesting the possibility of a summit meeting. That proposition should have been made two years ago after the Senate voted 92 to 6 on May 12, 1982 and again overwhelmingly on July 12, 1983 to support a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting.