Mr. SOLARZ. So, in other words, a certain number of those Minuteman III's targeted at a land-based Soviet ICBM would have the capacity of destroying it? Leaving aside the exact number. Mr. PERLE. Well, that's a somewhat more complicated question to answer. It takes several warheads on Minuteman III's to give a statistical probability of destroying a Soviet ICBM silo. But there are a lot of problems involved in operating a force in that manner. It is not a reliable way to attack Soviet hardened targets. Mr. SOLARZ. I'm also told that the Trident II warhead has sufficient accuracy and yield so that it gives us the capacity, when deployed in sufficient numbers, to destroy Soviet land-based ICBM's. Is that correct? Mr. PERLE. I think it's too soon to say what the ultimate characteristics of the Trident II warhead will be against hardened Soviet targets. Mr. SOLARZ. Well, just one final question, Mr. Chairman. Is it our expectation or is it our intention to give the Trident II that capacity? Mr. PERLE. I think it will have some limited hard-target capability, yes. U.S. HARD-TARGET CAPABILITY UNDER ADMINISTRATION'S PLANNED BUILDUP Mr. SOLARZ. Well then, my last question would be, if you add up the hard-target capability of the 100 MX's the administration wants us to produce and deploy, plus the hard target capability, such as it is, of the Minuteman III, plus the hard target capability of the Trident II warheads which will shortly be deployed, won't that collective hard target capability give us an effective first strike against Soviet land-based ICBM's? Mr. PERLE. The situation you would have, as you describe it, is one in which—let's say for argument's sake, that collective capability would enable you to destroy the 1,398 Soviet ICBM's-virtually the whole of our strategic force would be devoted to attacking a very small part of the total Soviet force. And, that is not a sensible strategy to pursue. It is not our strategy. Chairman FASCELL. It might be moot anyway, if you have to assume that they will strike on warning, because you'll be hitting empty holes. Mr. Hyde? Admiral Howe. If I could add, Mr. Chairman, just for clarification. This business of hardship, I think, is a very important asymmetry between our two systems. The Soviets have made a lot of advances, which will be dynamic as the systems are developed. Of course, we won't expect to see the first D-5's before 1989. Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. SURVIVABILITY, DETERRENCE, AND STABILITY Mr. HYDE. And, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Either one of you, I'd like a comment on this statement. It is widely agreed that multiple warhead land-based missiles placed in fixed silos do not meet the criteria of survivability, deterrence, and stability. Our defense dollars should not be wasted on a weapons system which is not survivable, which is not a credible deterrent, and which will raise the risk of a preemptive Soviet attack in a time of crisis. Now, that statement was contained in a letter to each of us in the House, when we were going to vote on the MX. The lead sentence was, "We are writing to urge you to vote against all funding for the production of the MX." Now, that came from Mr. Mondale and Mr. Hart. Lieutenant (jg) Hart, I might hasten to add. Would either of you comment on that statement? Admiral HowE. I think I have to take on lieutenant (jg) for starters. Then, I'd like to turn it over to Richard. I think you've identified three important criteria clearly. No system necessarily meets all three. In the case of MX, I think we have to agree that survivability, if it is deployed in a fixed silo and unless we have continuing improvements in hardness, is one of the weak points. But right now, it helps correct a large gap in deterrent capabilities. And in so doing, it contributes to stability. Ultimately, I think that the Midgetman system which will come along in the next decade is going to have all three of those elements, and in particular, survivability, which is a very important characteristic, as we have discussed here. HARDENING OF SILOS WILL ENHANCE SURVIVABILITY OF MX Mr. HYDE. What rate of survivability? I've been told that the MX put in the Minuteman silos would be 30- to 40-percent survivable, which is enough survivability to help the deterrence. Is that a valid statement? Mr. PERLE. We are optimistic that we will be able to achieve a degree of hardening with those reworked silos that will give significantly greater survivability than was anticipated, possibly, even when that letter was written. But, I can't resist commenting on the irony of the point of view that lies behind that letter. I'm sure that view is subscribed to by large numbers of Members who, at the same time, have for years, right up until the present, accused successive administrations of exaggerating when we described the window of vulnerability, that is, the vulnerability of Minuteman missiles to attack. It strikes me as inconsistent to suggest that there is no significant problem of survivability in our existing deterrent forces. That the Soviets, contrary to what has been testified to by recent administrations, not just this one Mr. HYDE. What you're saying is, MX or not, not even implied, the assertion in this letter is that the silos we now have, the fixed silos, are not survivable? Mr. PERLE. They seem to be saying the fixed silos are not survivable. But, when you talk about dealing with a problem of that vulnerability, they seldom acknowledge that there's a problem with that vulnerability. Mr. HYDE. In other words, if they're not survivable for the MX, which we don't have, they're sure not survivable for the Minuteman missiles that are in there now? Mr. PERLE. That's right. The MX would be more survivable, silo for silo, than the missiles that are there now. Mr. HYDE. But, of course, a freeze would prevent us from moving ahead to make them more survivable. Mr. PERLE. Well, a freeze would leave us with, if they are right, nonsurvivable silos. And, no opportunity to remedy that situation. RESTRICTIONS IN DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BILL REMOVE SOVIET INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE Mr. HYDE. That's terrific. Now, the House, in the Defense authorization bill, responded to the Soviets walking out of our arms control discussions by putting off any MX's till next year some time, halting any modernization of our chemical warfare, halting effectively our sea launched nuclear tipped cruise missile program. And also, forbidding any testing in an object in the air of our antisatellite systems. Now, those four retreats-retrenchments, hobbling of elements of our defense, how useful are those? And, by the way, these were our response to them walking out. We got nothing for them at all. How helpful were those actions in achieving meaningful arms control agreements with the Soviets? Mr. PERLE. Exceedingly unhelpful. Obviously, the Soviets are not going to make concessions, if they can sit back and watch the legislature unilaterally impose limitations on U.S. strategic forces. Mr. HYDE. They're on a roll by not showing up. Is that correct? Mr. PERLE. They're doing rather better absent from Geneva than they did when they were there. Admiral HowE. I think it's clear that if we reward it, as the Soviets see it, we are rewarding intransigence. There are many reasons for them not coming to the table, but clearly, this takes away one of the major incentives they have. I think that they do have interest in arms control where we have solid systems and modernization. I sincerely believe that they are interested in START and they're interested in making some reductions in that area. At least by next vear, we will be into serious considerations, if we maintain our modernization programs, which are central. Mr. HYDE. What cards have we left to deal with at the table? They're on a winning streak now by us canceling system after system in response to them not showing up. We're providing them with incentives to keep playing tough guy, aren't we? Is that sensible arms control? Mr. PERLE. A few more bills like this, and we'll have no cards left at all. But, we're not through the process yet. And, I hope that, in conference, we will cover some of these things. Mr. HYDE. You know, in thinking about this, I've decided that there is an agenda that is behind our canceling of systems in response to their nonnegotiation. I think our real plan is to get them laughing so much that they'll be incapable of working the electronic gear that is necessary for their modern weapons system. We'll get them falling down laughing, and then we pounce. But, I thank you for your patience in staying and listening to those of us who are more amateur than we ought to be on this very crucial subject. And, I appreciate your instruction. It's been most helpful. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You, too, deserve a medal. Chairman FASCELL. Thank vou, Mr. Hyde. I'm forced to the logical conclusion that what we should do is proceed as rapidly as pos sible to the ultimate weapon, which is the use of a universal high energy magnetic field that surrounds the Earth, and deploy the ultimate Air Force system, which I'm sorry to say, Admiral, the Navy has not been working on. And, that is the exponential distention of outer space so that when our opponent launches all of his missiles, they will disappear and we'll have no problem. But, thank you very much for being with us today to give us your views, and for being so candid and forthright. Admiral HowE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. PERLE. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1984 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, DC. The committee met at 1:40 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman) presiding. Chairman FASCELL. Today the committee meets to resume our series of hearings on the role of arms control in U.S. defense policy. Yesterday we heard from administration witnesses. We are pleased today to have testifying a variety of private defense and arms control experts who will present their views on the contributions that arms control can and should make to our country's defense and our national security interests. Our witnesses today include Hon. R. James Woolsey, Delegate-atLarge, the U.S. Delegate, START; Admiral Noel Gayler, U.S. Navy, retired, former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in the Pacific and former director of the National Security Agency; Ms. Randall Forsberg, director, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies; and Hon. Gerard C. Smith, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The latter two witnesses have been delayed because of airplane trouble and other scheduling problems and will join us as soon as they can, hopefully within the hour. In the meantime, we are delighted to welcome Mr. Woolsey and Admiral Gayler to discuss with us this ever important subject, at least in my judgment, and to hear your views on this matter. Mr. Woolsey, do you have a prepared statement or do you just desire to speak extemporaneously? STATEMENT OF R. JAMES WOOLSEY, DELEGATE-AT-LARGE, U.S. DELEGATION, STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS Mr. WOOLSEY. I do not have a formal written statement. I would like to speak for a few moments. I have a short article that appeared a month or so ago in Foreign Affairs Quarterly covering this issue and I don't know whether the committee wants it for the record or perhaps just for its files, but I could submit it. I am going to talk, in part, based on that article. Chairman FASCELL. Why don't we put it in the record and then we will have the benefit of the entire article and you may summarize as you see fit.1 1 The article referred to, "The Politics of Vulnerability: 1980-83," appears in app. 1. 37-561 0-84-6 |