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1984 h

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DAN MICA, Florida

MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan

GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California

PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

HARRY M. REID, Nevada

MEL LEVINE, California

EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ROBERT GARCIA, New York

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington
JIM LEACH, Iowa

TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

GERALD B. H. SOLOMON, New York
DOUGLAS K. BEREUTER, Nebraska
MARK D. SILJANDER, Michigan
ED ZSCHAU, California

JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff GEORGE R. BERDES, Staff Consultant ROBERT T. HUBER, Staff Consultant CAROL GLASSMAN, Senior Staff Assistant

(II)

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CONTENTS

WITNESSES

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL IN U.S. DEFENSE

POLICY

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 20, 1984

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:35 a.m., Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman) presiding.

Chairman FASCELL. The committee will please come to order. The committee meets to begin a series of hearings on the question of the role of arms control in U.S. defense policy.

The nuclear arms buildup between the two superpowers is proceeding at a brisk, dangerous, and costly rate. We need to review what appears to be an unrelenting massive, mutual nuclear buildup. The efforts, which are admittedly extremely difficult, to reduce tensions between the superpowers, and the use of arms control as an instrumentality to help reduce those tensions, is under serious question.

It appears that the two superpowers use arms control and disarmament as a convenient crutch to pacify the people of the world while they unrelentingly continue what they consider to be absolutely essential in the construction of new nuclear weapons.

The question that plagues people is, how long can this go on before the sword of Damocles cuts off everybody's head.

We have related questions here it seems to me in the Congress. And those related questions are how do we make those difficult tradeoffs when one considers the huge Federal deficits that are in place and projected for the future. The tradeoffs that have to be made between the kind of society that we want to survive, for which we are paying the price through the military establishment that we have, and the utility of arms control in reducing that price and enhancing U.S. security are difficult tradeoffs.

We think that they can be made. We are called upon to make those difficult choices in the Congress every day.

Finally, it seems that our major witness, who is Mr. Kenneth L. Adelman, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a gentleman whom I have known and have a high respect for, has an almost impossible task.

His Agency is not that big in terms of power, or money, or support. Whatever he does has to be coordinated. And it should be, of course, with many other agencies. I think that it is fair to say that the Agency's voice is not the predominant voice in the making of arms control policy. It just has input.

Therefore, we have called on Mr. Adelman to help us answer some of these questions. But primarily, to explain to us and the American people what is the role of arms control in U.S. defense policy, how is it played, where do we think we are going, what are we trying to do, and can we sensibly answer the concerns of not only the American people, but other people around the world.

Now having said that, I would like to yield to my ranking minority member, Mr. Broomfield of Michigan.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our friend, Ken Adelman, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, on the critical subject of nuclear arms con

trol.

Helping to maintain our national security through strategic arms control is an important objective of our foreign policy and our strategy for peace. Fully realizing the Soviet Union's military capabilities, we should not cease in our search for a possible agreement in the arms control arena.

At the same time, however, I believe that arms control is simply not an end in itself. That it is a means to an end, a tool of an American foreign policy which should be used effectively and realistically in order to provide the United States and its free world. friends with a stronger sense of security.

Most importantly, I believe that President Reagan has proposed an arms control plan which goes beyond any concept of nuclear freeze at current levels. That plan involves the achievement of reductions in the levels of nuclear weapons first and foremost. By achieving such reduction, we can best provide for a more peaceful and stable environment.

Now on May 25, I received a personal letter from General Rowny, our chief negotiator at the START talks, at which he expressed his confidence in our arms control proposal. I would like to read just a few lines of what he said to me.

And I quote, he says,

We do have a good flexible position on the table. It will lead to real trade-offs of United States and Soviet advantages. Thus, there is a good deal in our proposals for both sides. And we all win if we reduce the role of nuclear war."

In conclusion, the administration in its strategy for peace has demonstrated a willingness to modify its original negotiating positions while the Kremlin which has not been forthcoming has now refused to further negotiate any force reductions in the INF and START arenas.

I believe that a review of the President's record provides ample evidence that he is making a good faith effort to obtain an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement which will reduce the risk of war while securing the security of the American people.

I believe that these are complex negotiations. Like any arms control talks, they require time and careful consideration. We should remain at the negotiating table patiently awaiting any Soviet interest in reducing arms and the risk of war.

Now before Mr. Adelman speaks, Mr. Chairman, I understand that other witnesses will be appearing before our committee on this important matter.

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