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defence of his opinion will gain him, with all reasonable people, a pardon for his mistake. There are so many sides, on which most subjects may be viewed, and so many considerations to be taken in, that a wise man will always express himself modestly even on those subjects which he has thoroughly studied. Nor can there be any danger, but contrariwise great advantage, in hearing the opinion of others, if one converses with men of judgment and probity; and those of contrary characters are not fit for conversation.

It is remarkable, and quite contrary to what one would expect, that young people are more positive in affirming, and more given to dispute, than the aged and experienced. One would think it should be natural for youth to be diffident of itself, and inclinable to submit to the judgment of those who have had unquestionably superior advantages for information. But we find on the contrary, that a young person viewing a subject only from one side, and seeing it in a very strong and lively manner, is, from the sanguine temper natural to that time of life, led to dispute, affirm, and deny, with great obstinacy and arrogance. This is one of the most disagreeable and troublesome qualities of youth, otherwise so amiable and engaging. It is the business and effect of prudence to correct it.

The abilities of men, taken upon an average, are so very narrow, that it is in vain to expect that the bulk of a people should be very knowing. Most men are endowed with parts sufficient for enabling them to provide for themselves and their families, and secure their future happiness. But as to any thing greatly beyond the common arts of life, there are few that have either capacity or opportunity of reaching it. Human knowledge itself very probably has its limits, which it never will exceed, while the present state lasts. The system of the world, for example, was originally produced, and has been since conducted, by a wisdom too profound for human capacity to trace through all his steps. History, at least profane, beyond the two thousand years last past, is come down to us so defective, and so mixed with fable, that little satisfaction is to be had from it. And the history of succeeding ages is far enough from being unexceptionably authenticated; though this is not denying, that physiology and history are

still highly worthy our attention and inquiry. What I have said of these two considerable heads of study may be af firmed in some degree of most branches of human knowledge, mathematics and mathematical science excepted. It is the goodness of the Author of our being, as well as the excellence of our nature, and the comfort of our present state, that the knowledge of our duty, and means of happiness, stands clear and unquestionable to every sound and unprejudiced mind; that the difference between right and wrong is too obvious, and too striking, to escape observation, or to produce difficulty or doubt; unless where difficulties are laboriously sought after, and doubts industriously raised; that where we most need clearness and certainty, there we have the most of them; that where doubts would be most distracting, there we must raise them before we can be troubled with them, and that where we most need full proof to determine us, there we have superabundant. For with respect to our duty and future expectations, our own hearts are made to teach us them: and, as if the internal monitor, Conscience, was not sufficient, Heaven itself descends to illuminate our minds, and all Nature exerts herself to inculcate this grand and important lesson, That Virtue leads to happiness, and Vice to destruction. Of which subject more fully in the following book.

THE

DIGNITY

OF

HUMAN NATURE.

BOOK III.

OF VIRTUE.

INTRODUCTION.

As the human species are to exist in two different states,

S

an embodied, and a spiritual; a mortal life on earth, and an immortal hereafter; it was to be expected, that there should be certain peculiar requisites for the dignity of each of the two different states respectively; and that, at the same time, there should be such an analogy between that part of the human existence, which was to be before death, and that which was to be after it, as should be suitable to different parts of the same scheme; so that the latter should appear to be the sequel of the former, making in the whole the complete existence of the creature, beginning with the entrance into this mortal life, but knowing no end.

In the two parts of the Dignity of Human Nature, which we have already considered, to wit, Prudence, and Knowledge, it is evident, that the immediate view is to the improvement and embellishment of life, and for diffusing happiness through society; at the same time that many, if not the greatest part, of the directions given for the conduct of life, and of the understanding, are likewise useful with a view to the future and immortal state. And

indeed there is nothing truly worthy of our attention, which does not some way stand connected with futurity.

The two parts of the subject which still remain, I mean, of Morals, and Revealed Religion, do most immediately and directly tend to prepare us for a future state; but, at the same time, are highly necessary to be studied and attended to, if we mean to establish the happiness even of this present mortal life upon a sure and solid foundation. But every one of the four, and every considerable particular in each of them, is absolutely necessary for raising our nature to that perfection and happiness, for which it is intended.

The Dignity of Human Nature will, in the following books, appear more illustrious than the preceding part of this work represents it. So that the subject rises in its importance, and demands a higher regard. Might the abilities of the writer improve accordingly. Might the infinite Author of the universal œconomy illuminate his mind, and second his weak attempt to exhibit in one view the whole of what mankind have to do, in order to their answering the ends which the Divine Wisdom and Goodness had in view, in placing them in a state of discipline and improvement for endless perfection and happiness.

To proceed upon a solid and ample foundation in the following deduction of morals, it seems proper to take an extensive prospect of things, and begin as high as possible.

First, it may be worth while briefly, and in a way as little abstract or logical as possible, to obviate a few artificial difficulties that have been started by some of those deep and subtle men, who have a better talent at puzzling than enlightening mankind. One of those imaginary difficulties is, The possibility of our reason's deceiving us. "Our reason," say those profound gentlemen, "tells us, that twice two are four. But what if our reason imposes upon us in this matter? How, if in the world of the moon, two multiplied by two should be found to make five? Who can affirm that this is not the case? Nothing indeed seems to us more unquestionable than the proportions among numbers, and geometrical figures. So that we cannot (such is the make of our minds) so

much as conceive the possibility that twice two should, in any other world, or state of things, make more or less than four, or that all the angles of a plain triangle should be either more or less than exactly equal to two right ones. But it does not follow, that other beings may not understand things in a quite different manner from what we do."

It is wonderful how any man should have hit upon such an unnatural thought as this; since the very difficulty is founded upon a flat contradiction and impossibility. To say, I am convinced that twice two are four, and at the same time to talk of doubting whether my faculties do not deceive me, is saying, that I believe twice two to be four, and at the same time I doubt it; or rather, that I see it to be so, and yet I do not see it to be so. A self-evident truth is not collected, or deducted, but intuitively perceived, or seen by the mind. And other worlds, and other states of things, are wholly out of the question. The ideas in my mind are the objects of the perception of my mind, as much as outward objects of my eyes. The idea of two of the lunar inhabitants is as distinct an object in my mind, so far as concerns the number, as that of two shillings in my hand. And I see as clearly, that twice two lunar inhabitants will make four lunarians, as that twice two shillings will make four shillings. And while I see this to be so, I see it to be so, and cannot suspect it possible to be otherwise. I may doubt the perceptions of another person, if I cannot myself perceive the same object: But I cannot doubt what I myself perceive, or believe that to be possible, which I see to be impossible.

It is therefore evident, that to question the information of our faculties, or the conclusions of our reason, without some ground from our faculties themselves, is a direct impossibility. So that those very philosophers, who pretend to question the informations of their faculties, neither do, nor can really question them, so long as they appear unquestionable.

To be suspicious of one's own judgment in all cases where it is possible to err, and to be cautious of proceeding to too rash conclusions, is the very character of wisdom. But to doubt, or rather pretend to doubt, where reason

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