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sees no ground for doubt, even where the mind distinctly perceives truth, is endeavouring at a pitch of folly, of which Human Nature is not capable.

If the mind is any thing, if there are any reasoning faculties, what is the object of those reasoning faculties? Not falsehood; For falsehood is a negative, a mere nothing, and is not capable of being perceived, or of being an object of the mind. If therefore there is a rational mind in the universe, the object of that mind is truth. If there is no truth, there is no perception. Whatever the mind perceives, so far as the perception is real, is truth. When the reasoning faculty is deceived, it is not by distinctly seeing something that is not, for that is impossible; but either by not perceiving something, which if perceived, would alter the state of the case upon the whole, or by seeing an object of the understanding through a false medium. But these, or any other causes of error, do by no means affect the perception of a simple idea; nor the perception of a simple relation between two simple ideas; nor a simple inference from such simple relation. No mind whatever can distinctly and intuitively perceive, or see twice two to be five: Because that twice two should be five, is an impossibility and self-contradiction in terms, as much as saying that four is five, or that a thing is what it is not. Nor can any mind distinctly perceive, that if two be to four as four is to eight, therefore thrice two is four, for that would be distinctly perceiving an impossibility. Now an impossibility is what has no existence, nor can exist. And can any mind perceive, clearly perceive, what does not exist?

To perceive nothing, or not to perceive, is the same. So that it is evident, so much of any thing as can really be perceived, must be real and true. There is therefore either no object of mind, no rational faculties in the universe; or there is a real truth in things which the mind perceives, and which is the only object it can perceive, in the same manner as it is impossible for the eye to see absolute nothing, or to see, and not see, at the same time.

The only point therefore to be attended to, is to endeavour at clear perceptions of things, with all their circumstances, connexions, and dependencies; which requires more and more accuracy and attention, according as the

conclusion to be drawn arises out of more or less complex premises; and it is easy to imagine a mind capable of taking in a much greater number and variety of particulars, than can be comprehended by any human being, and of seeing clearly through all their mutual relations, however minute, extensive, or complicated. To such a mind all kinds of diffi culties in all parts of knowledge, might be as easy to investigate, as to us a common question in arithmetic, and with equal certainty. For truths of all kinds are alike certain and alike clear to minds, whose capacities and states qualify them for investigating them. And what is before said with regard to our safety in trusting our faculties in mathematical or arithmetical points, is equally just with respect to moral and all other subjects. Whatever is a real, clear and distinct object of perception, must be some real existence. For an absolute nothing can never be an object of distinct perception. Now the differences, agreements, contrasts, analogies, and all other relations obtaining among moral ideas, are as essentially real, and as proper subjects of reasoning, as those in numbers and mathematics. I can no more be deceived, nor bring myself to doubt a clear moral proposition, or axiom, than a mathematical one. I can no more doubt, whether happiness is not preferable to misery, than whether the whole is not greater than any of its parts. I can no more doubt, whether a being who enjoys six degrees of happiness, and at the same time labours under one degree of misery, is not in a better situation than another, who enjoys but three degrees of happiness, and is exposed to one of misery, supposing those degrees equal in both, than I can doubt whether a man, who is possessed of six thousand pounds and owes one, or another, who is worth only three thousand pounds and owes one, is the richer. And so of all other cases, where our views and perceptions are clear and distinct. For a truth of one sort is as much a truth, as of another; and when fully perceived, is as incapable of being doubted of or mistaken.

Yet some have argued, that though, as to numbers and mathematics, there is a real independent truth in the nature of things, which could not possibly have been otherwise, it is quite different in morals. Though it was impossible in the nature of things, that twice two should be five,

it might have been so contrived, that, universally, what is now virtue should have been vice, and what is now vice should have been virtue. That all our natural notions of right and wrong are wholly arbitrary and factitious; a mere instinct or taste, very suitable indeed to the present state of things: but by no means founded in rerum naturâ, and only the pure effect of a positive ordination of Divine Wisdom, to answer certain ends.

It does not suit the design of this work to enter into any long discussion of knotty points. But I would ask those gentlemen, who maintain the above doctrine, whether the Divine scheme in creating an universe, and communicating happiness to innumerable beings, which before had no existence, was not good, or preferable to the contrary? If they say, there was no good in creating and communicating happiness, they must show the wisdom of the infinitely-wise Creator in choosing rather to create than not. They must show how (to speak with reverence) he came to choose to create a world. For since all things appear to him exactly as they are, if it was not in itself wiser and better to create than not, it must have appeared so to him, and if it had appeared so to him, it is certain he never had produced a world.

To this some answer, that his creating a world was not the consequence of his seeing it to be in itself better to create than not; but he was moved to it by the benevolence of his own nature, which attribute of goodness or benevolence is, as well as benevolence in a good man, according to their notion of it, no more than a taste or inclination, which happens, they know not how, to be in the Divine Nature; but is in itself indifferent, and abstracting from its consequences, neither amiable nor odious, good nor bad. To this the reply is easy, to wit, That there is not, nor can be, any attribute in the Divine Nature, that could possibly have been wanting; or the want of which would not have been an imperfection: for whatever is in his nature, is necessary, else it could not be in his nature; necessity being the only account to be given for his existence and attributes. Now what is in its own nature indifferent, cannot be said to exist necessarily ; therefore could not exist in God. To question whether goodness or benevolence in the Divine Nature is neces

sary or accidental, is the same, as questioning whether the very existence of the Deity is necessary or accidental. For whatever is in God, is God. And to question whether the Divine attribute of goodness is a real perfection, or a thing indifferent, that is, to doubt, whether the Divine Nature might not have been as perfect without, as with it, comes to the same as questioning, whether existence is a thing indifferent to the Deity, or not. His whole nature is excellent; is the abstract of excellence; and nothing belonging to him is indifferent. Of which more

hereafter.

It is therefore evident, that the benevolence of the Divine Nature is in itself a real excellence or perfection, independent of our ideas of it, and cannot, without the highest absurdity, not to say impiety, be conceived of, as in. different. It is also evident, that it must have been upon the whole better that the universe should be created, and a number of creatures produced (in order to be partakers of various degrees and kinds of happiness) than not; else God, who sees all things as they are, could not have seen any reason for creating, and therefore would not have created them.

Let it then be supposed, that some being should, through thoughtlessness and voluntary blindness at first, and afterwards through pride and rebellion, at length work up his malice to that degree, as to wish to destroy the whole creation, or to subject millions of innocent beings to unspeakable misery; would this likewise be good? Was it better to create than not? and is it likewise better to destroy than preserve? Was it good to give being and happiness to innumerable creatures? and would it likewise be good to plunge innumerable innocent creatures into irrecoverable ruin and misery? If these seeming opposites be not entirely the same, then there is in morals a real difference, an eternal and unchangeable truth, proportion, agreement, and disagreement, in the nature of things (of which the Divine Nature is the basis) independent on positive will, and which could not have been otherwise; being no more arbitrary or factitious, than what is found in numbers or mathematics. So that a wickedly disposed being would, so long as he continued unreformed, have been as really so in any other state of things, and in any other world, as in this in

which we live; and a good being would have been equally amiable and valuable ten thousand years ago, and in the planet Jupiter, as upon earth, and in our times; and the difference between the degrees of goodness and malignity are as determinate, and as distinctly perceived by supe rior beings, as between a hundred, a thousand, and a mil lion; or between a line, a surface, and a cube.

Nothing is more evident, than that we can enter a very great way into the Divine scheme in the natural world, and see very clearly the wisdom and contrivance, which shine conspicuous in every part of it. I believe nobody ever took it into his head to doubt, whether the inhabitants of any other world would not judge the sun to be proper for giving light, the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing, and so forth. No one ever doubted whether the angel Gabriel conceived of the wisdom of God in the natural world, in any manner contrary to what we do. Why then should people fill their heads with fancies, about our perceptions of moral truth, any more than of natural ? There is no doubt, but we have all our clear and immediate ideas, by our being capable of seeing, or apprehending (within a certain limited sphere) things as they are really and essentially in themselves. And we may be assured, that simple truths do by no means appear to our minds in any state essentially different from or contrary to that in which they appear to the mind of the angel Gabriel.

That there is a possibility of attaining certainty, by sensation, intuition, deduction, testimony, and inspiration, seems easy enough to prove. For, first, where sensation is, all other arguments or proofs are superfluous. What I feel I cannot bring myself to doubt, if I would. I must either really exist or not.. But I cannot even be mistaken in imagining I feel my own existence; for that necessarily supposes my existing. I feel my mind easy and calm. I cannot, if I would, bring myself to doubt, whether my mind is easy and calm. Because I feel a perfect internal tranquility; and there is nothing within or without me to persuade me to doubt the reality of what I feel; and what I really feel, so far as I really feel it, must be real; it being absurd to talk of feeling or perceiving what has no real existence.

Again, there is no natural absurdity in supposing it pos

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