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and the whole universe were to be annihilated the next mo. ment, so that it would be impossible that any degree of happiness should be the consequence?

There is plainly an independent rectitude, or goodness, in the conduct of moral agents, separate from the connexion between virtue and happiness. And this is the foundation of the necessity of their acting according to.a certain fixed course; and consequently of their having laws and rules promulgated to them by the Universal Governor. Nor does this at all invalidate the connexion between virtue and happiness; but on the contrary, shows that there is, and ought to be, such a connexion. And, generally speaking, there is no safer way to try the moral excellence or turpitude of actions, than by considering the natural consequences of their being universally practised. For example, let it be supposed a questionable point, Whether the murder of the innocent is in itself right, or otherwise. Try it by the consequences, which must follow the universal practice of destroying all the good and virtuous part of mankind; and it immediately appears to be so far from right, that nothing can be conceived more contrary to rectitude. On the other hand, let it be disputed, Whether the protection and preservation of the innocent be right. Let it be considered, what would be the consequences of innocence being universally preserved and protected; and it appears evident beyond all possibility of doubt, that nothing is more agreeable to rectitude. Rectitude, therefore, does not consist in the pursuit of happiness; nor does the happiness, consequent upon a certain course of conduct, constitute the rectitude of such conduct. The true state of the case is, Certain actions are first in themselves right, and then happiness is the natural and judicial consequence of them.

In order to bring mankind to a complete and perfect concurrence with the Universal Scheme, it was plainly necessary, that other means should be used than force or instinct; the first of which was sufficient for working dead matter, and the second, the animal creation, to the Divine purpose. Had man been only inanimate matter, nothing more would have been necessary, than that he should be acted upon. Had he been a machine; a weight, or a spring, would have been sufficient to make him perform

his motions. Were there nothing in man but the mere animal powers; were he capable of being wrought to nothing higher than the animal functions; were his nature fit for no higher happiness, than those of eating and drinking, and, after living a few years, and leaving behind him a successor to fill his place, and continue the species, to pass out of existence; were this the case, there would have needed no very grand apparatus to make him fill his inconsiderable place, so as to contribute his small share to the happiness of the whole, and to secure his own mean portion. But it is very much otherwise, as will immediately appear. I believe hardly any one will deny, that man (or however most of the species) are endowed with the faculty of understanding; by which, though weak indeed and narrow at present, our species are yet capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, in all points of importance, and with sufficient certainty, as shown above. Now, in order to a creature's acting properly its part, and concurring with the whole, it is evidently necessary, that it make a proper use and application of every one of its faculties. No one will pretend, I think, that the perfection and happiness of the universe would be as universally promoted by every individual's making a wrong use of his faculties, as a right one; but on the contrary, that every individual's making an improper use of his faculties would produce the most consummate disorder and imperfection in the system, and would be the most opposite to the Divine Scheme, that could be imagined. It follows, that, if man is endowed with understanding, he is to be brought to cultivate and inform it, not to stifle and blind it; to endeavour to enlarge, not to narrow it; to apply it to the searching out of useful and important truth, not to mislead it into the belief of falsehoods, nor to employ it upon objects unworthy of it,

Another leading faculty in the human mind is will. That there is in man a faculty of will, or a power of choosing and refusing, we shall see established immediately. What I have to say at present is, That in order to man's concurrence with the Universal Scheme, it is necessary, that he regulates his will properly, or in such a manner that he may will or desire whatever is for the general good, and will or desire nothing that may be generally preju dicial. No man, I think, will pretend, that it would be

better if the wills of all created beings were set to thwart the general scheme, than that they were formed to concur with it; but, on the contrary, it is evident, that a general opposition of all beings to what is the nature of things, and the right upon the whole, must produce universal confusion; and that if there was no way to bring about this general concurrence, it were reasonable to expect, from the absolutely perfect rectitude of the Supreme Governor of the World, that an universe of such perverse and unruly beings should be utterly destroyed, or rather never have been produced. It is plain, then, that, in order to man's acting his part, and concurring with the general scheme, he must be brought to use all the faculties of his mind properly.

I promised above to bring some proofs for the fact of man's being a creature endowed with will, or freedom to desire, and power to determine himself in favour of, or against any particular object. The certainty of this fact is founded in sensation, and confirmed by reasoning. Let any man observe what passes in his own mind, and he will be obliged to own, that he feels he has it in his power to will, or desire, and determine himself in favour of, or against any particular object. We have no other proof for our existence, nor is it in its nature capable of any other, than that we feel we exist.

But because the reality of human liberty has been cavilled at by some men of metaphysical heads, who have run into greater difficulties to avoid less, it may be worth while to consider this matter a little. I know not whether I am made like the rest of mankind. But I can feel every thing pass in my mind, that I can conceive I should feel, if I was really a free agent. For example, in an indifferent case: When I look on my watch, to know whether it is time for me to give over writing, and I find the hour come, when I usually give over, I do not find that I am impelled to lay down my pen, in the same manner as the index of my watch is moyed to point at the hour; but that I give over, because I think, upon the whole, it is more proper I should give over, than go on. Does my watch point to the hour, because it thinks upon the whole it is more proper that it should point to that hour, than any other? If so, then the watch and I are beings of the same sort,

endowed with much the same powers and faculties. Do I not lay aside my pen, because I choose to lay it aside, that is, because I am willing to lay it aside? Should I give over, if I was unwilling to give over? If I find my usual time past, and yet should be glad to finish the head I am upon, before I lay aside my pen, does that motive act upon me, and force me to go on, as a spring acts upon a watch, or does it act as a consideration upon a rational creature?

Again, suppose I am tempted to do a bad action, do the motives laid in my way force my compliance? Do I not, on the contrary, feel that I yield to them, because I choose to seize a present object, which I expect to yield me some fancied advantage? Do I not feel in my own mind a violent struggle between the considerations of present profit or pleasure, and those of wisdom and virtue? Is it possible I should feel any such struggle if I was not free? Does any such thing pass in a machine? Do I not find, that I sometimes yield to temptations, which at other times I get the better of? Have not others resisted temptations which have proved too hard for me? Could these differences happen, if they and I were machines? Do not these instances of temptations conquered, fix both liberty and guilt upon me, in having yielded to what it was plain I might have resisted at one time, if I did at another? If it is extremely difficult, or what may be called next to impossible, to resist all sorts of temptations at all times, does this prove any thing else, than that human nature is weak? Were man a machine, he must act as a machine, uniformly and invariably.

What I have here remarked upon the case of being tempted to a bad action, is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to that of an opportunity of doing a good one. Motives, according as they appear, will influence a rational mind. But the appearance of motives to our minds, as well as their influence over us, depends very much upon ourselves. If I am prevailed on by motives, do motives force me? Do I not yield to them, because I choose to yield to them? If this is not being free, what is freedom? What should I feel pass in my mind, if I was really free? What may we suppose superior beings, what may we suppose the Supreme himself to feel in his infinite mind? Does he,

(with profound reverence be it spoken) does he act without regard to motives? Does he act contrary to reasonable motives? Can we suppose him uninfluenced by proper motives? Can we suppose he feels himself to be wholly uninfluenced by reasonable and important considerations? Would we be more free than the most perfect of all beings? If he gives us liberty and power to a proper extent, what would we have more? If we feel that we have such liberty, why should we, contrary to possibility, endeav our to bring ourselves to doubt of our having it? If we cannot doubt of our being free creatures, what have we more to think of, than how to make a proper use of our liberty, how to get our wills formed to a perfect concur rence with the grand scheme of the Governor of the Universe, so that we may behave properly within our sphere? which if we and all other moral agents did, every part must be properly acted, every sphere properly filled, and universal regularity, perfection, and happiness be the result.

Some have imagined that allowing liberty or will to created beings was a derogation from the Supreme, to whom alone the privilege of freedom ought to be ascribed. It is certain that this is strictly true of absolute, independent, original freedom. As it is undoubted that independent, necessary, or natural existence is the incommunicable privilege of the First Cause. But, as we find a limited, dependent existence may be, and actually is communicated to created beings, where is the difficulty or impropriety of supposing a limited, independent freedom, or power of choosing or refusing, communicated to created beings? As created beings depend on the Supreme for their exist. ence; and yet the existence they enjoy is a real and proper existence; so may the liberty they enjoy, of choosing or refusing, be a real and proper liberty, and yet derived from, and dependent on the infinite Giver of every gift.

If there is no such thing as liberty, in any created being, as some have imagined, then it is evident, there can be no will but that of the Supreme Being: for liberty, or a power of choosing or refusing, is only another term for will. Will, or willingness, implies freedom in the very term. Therefore, the common term free-will is a tautology, as much as if one should say voluntary will. There neither is, nor can be, any will but free-will. Constraint, or force,

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