is the very opposite of will, or willingness. Let it be considered then, what the consequence must be of affirming that there is no will, but the Supreme. We find in history, that a monster of an Emperor wished that the whole Roman people had but one neck, that he might cut them all off at once. The same temper, which led him to desire the destruction of his people, of whom he ought to have been the father and protector, would have inclined him to wish the destruction of whatever opposed him, that is of all good beings in heaven and earth. Will any one pretend, that this temper of mind is agreeable to the Supreme will? Is it not blasphemy to imagine the Divine will to be against goodness? But if liberty or will in a created being is impossible, then what we call Caligula's will was really the Divine will; the destruction of all goodness was agreeable to the Divine mind! It is too horrible to think of.

I know, it has been said, that the perpetration of the most wicked action, that ever was committed, must have been in one sense suitable to the Divine mind, and scheme, else it would have been prevented by his over-ruling power. In a state of discipline, it was necessary, that both the good and the wicked should have liberty, within a certain sphere, to exert themselves according to their respective characters, and the Divine Wisdom has taken mea. sures for preventing such a prevalence of wickedness as should defeat his gracious ends; so that it shall still be worth while to have created an universe; though every thing would have gone incomparably better, had no moral agent ever made a wrong use of his liberty. Nor is there the least difficulty in conceiving of the Supreme Being, as proposing the greatest possible happiness of his creatures, and of a wicked being, as Satan, as studying how to produce the greatest misery. Which two inclinations, if they be not direct opposites, there is no such thing as opposition conceivable. And if there is a will opposite to the Divine, there is freedom; for freedom is necessary to the idea of will.

It being then evident, beyond contradiction, that man is endowed with liberty, or a power of choosing to act in such or such a manner within the sphere appointed him by his Maker, it follows, that to bring him to act his part properly, or in such a manner as may the most conduce to the order, per-

fection and happiness of the whole, such means must be used as are fit to work upon an intelligent free agent. Neither force, nor mere instinct, being suited to a creature of superior rank, fit to be acted upon by reasonable motives, it is plain, that nothing is so proper to lead mankind to a steady and habitual attachment to rectitude of conduct, as placing them in a state of discipline.

We find by experience, that we ourselves (and perhaps åt may be the case of all orders of rational created beings in the universe) are not of ourselves at first strongly attached to any object, but what we are led to by instinct or constitution, in which there is nothing either praise-worthy or blameable. Some minds are indeed observed to be very well or ill-disposed, so to speak, in early youth. But the goodness of very young persons is generally rather negative, consisting in a temper fit for virtue, a soil proper to sow the good seed in, and free from any unhappy cast of disposition. As on the contrary, those we call unpromising children, are unfortunate through some deficiency or redundancy, most probably in the material frame, which proves unfriendly to the cultivation of virtue in the mind, which would otherwise spring up, and thrive in it, almost of itself. For virtue wants only to be seen by an unprejudiced mind, to be loved. But the proper notion of goodness in a moral agent, is a strong and habitual inclination in the mind, to concur with the Divine scheme, or to act on all occasions according to rectitude, arising not from irrisistible, mechanical instinct, nor from mere negative happiness of constitution, but from clear and comprehensive views of the nature of things, and of moral obligations. In this there is a real and intrinsic excellence. And were this attachment to rectitude, on rational considerations, universally prevalent in all moral agents; moral evil there could be none. How the most effectually to produce and fix in the minds of free agents this inviolable attachment to virtue, is therefore the point to be gained.

The Supreme Mind perceiving all things as they really are, and having all things absolutely in his power, can in no respect be biassed against perfect rectitude; but must be more inviolably attached to it, so to speak, than any finite being, whose views must be comparatively narrow. And to speak properly, he is himself the basis and stand

ard of rectitude. The mind of an angel, or archangel, must, in proportion to the extent of his views of things, be more strongly attached to rectitude, than that of any mortal in the present state. Yet we have no reason to imagine that such his attachment was congenial to him ; but may rather conclude it to be the effect of examination, habit, and gradual improvement. We cannot conceive of a mind just produced into existence, as furnished with inclinations, attachments, or even ideas of any kind. We have no conception of these as other than the effects of improvement. And we consider a mind at its first enterance into being, as endowed only with the capacity of taking in ideas, as the eye is of viewing objects, when presented to it. So that we can form no other notion of the elevated degree of goodness, which those glorious be ings have attained, than as the effect of their having passed a very long course of improvement. Nor do the accounts we have in revelation, of the fall of some of them, seem so well to suit any other scheme, as that of their having been at that time in a state of discipline analogous to ours. Be that as it will, it is evident, that to such creatures as we are, with capacities and all other circumstances such as ours (and had they been different, we should not have been what we are, nor where we are) nothing but a state of discipline could have answered the end of producing in us the necessary attachment to rectitude or virtue. For this attachment or inclination could not have arisen in us of itself, and without adequate means.

SECTION V.

The present very proper for a State of Discipline. Objections answered.

WERE we to imagine a plan of a state of discipline, for improving a species of beings such as ours for high stations, and extensive usefulness in future states; how could we suppose it contrived in any manner, that should be materially different from the state we find ourselves in?

The Author would not, if it were to do again, draw up the following Section, altogether as it stands here, seeing, as he thinks, reason to change his opinion, in some points (none of them indeed of any material consequence) from what it was, when this book was written.

What scheme could be imagined, likely to answer the purposes of planting in the mind of the creature the neces sary habit of obedience to the Supreme Being; of giving it an inviolable attachment to virtue, and horror at irregularity; and of teaching it to study a rational and voluntary concurrence with the general scheme of the Governor of the universe; what method, I say, can we conceive of for these noble purposes, that should not take in, among others, the following particulars, viz. That the species should be furnished with sufficient capacity, and advan tages of all kinds, for distinguishing between right and wrong: That the ingenuity of their dispositions, and the strength of their virtue, should have full exercise, in order both to its trial, and its improvement: That they should have rewards and punishments set before them, as the most powerful motives to obedience: And that, upon the whole, they should have it fairly in their power to attain the end of their being put in a state of discipline?

If we consider the present as a state of discipline, all is ordered as should be. We enter into life with minds wholly unfurnished with ideas, attachments, or biasses of any kind. After a little time, we find certain instincts begin to act pretty strongly within us, which are necessary to move us to avoid what might be hurtful, and pursue what is useful to the support of the animal frame, and these instincts are appointed to anticipate reason, which does not at first exert itself; and bring us to that by mechanical means, which we are not capable of being worked to by rational considerations. Nature has ordered, that our parents shall be so engaged to us by irresistible affection, as to be willing to undertake the office of caring for us in our helpless years; of opening, and cultivating our reason, as soon as it begins to appear; and of forming us by habit, by precept, and example, to virtue and regularity. As we advance in life, our faculties, by habitually exerting them upon various objects, come to enlarge themselves so as to take in a wider compass. We become then capable of reasoning upon actions, and their consequences, and accordingly, do, in general, reason justly enough about matters of right and wrong, where passion does not blind and mislead us. When we come into the vigorous and flourishing time of life, excited by our pas

sions and appetites, without which, with the low degree of reason we then enjoy, we should be but half animated, we proceed to enter into various scenes of action. It is true, that innumerable irregularities and follies are the consequence. But without passions and appetites, we could not be the compounded creatures we are, nor consequently fill our proper station between the angelic and animal ranks. Here then is the proper opportunity for exercising our virtue; for habituating us to keep continually on our guard against innumerable assaults; for watching over ourselves, that we may not be surprized, and fall before temptation; or if we fall, that by suffering from our errors, we may be moved to greater diligence and attention to our duty, to a stronger attachment to virtue, and a more fixed hatred to the crimes, which have brought such sufferings upon us. And though the necessary propensions of our nature do indeed eventually lead us, through our own folly, into irregularity and vice, it must yet be owned at the same time, that by the wise and kind constitution of nature, we have innumerable natural directions, and advantages, towards restraining and bringing them under subjection, and innumerable ill consequences are made to follow naturally upon our giving a loose to them. Which ought in all reason to lead us to reflect, that the government of our passions and appetites is a part of our wisdom and our duty.

Pleasure and pain, health and disease, success, and misfortune, reward and punishment, often at a very great distance of time after the action, are made the natural, or at least frequent consequences of our general behaviour here; to suggest to us the reasonableness of concluding that an extensive uniformity prevails through the whole of the Divine moral government, and that what we see here in shadow, will in the future state appear in substance and perfection, and that it not only will, but ought, to be so, and cannot be otherwise.

If we consider the opposite natural tendences and effects of virtue and vice, in the present state, we shall from thence see reason to conclude, that the former is pleasing to the Governor of the world, and the latter the contrary. The natural effects of temperance are health, length of days, and a more delicate enjoyment of the in