tle knowledge of nature shows, that, whatever moral instructions those phenomena are in general fitted to communicate at all times to mankind, the cause of them is part of the mere constitution of nature. And who can say, that superior beings may not have such extensive views of the august plan of the Divine government, as to see the whole scheme of revealed religion in the same light?

Nor are there wanting various particulars, in the Divine government of the moral world, analogous, in a lower sphere, to the grand scheme of revelation. How much are we in the present state dependant on others for various advantages spiritual and temporal? What gift of God do we receive without the interposition of some agent? How are parents, teachers, spiritual pastors, and guardian angels, made the channels of the Divine goodness to us? Is there not in this something similar to our receiving the inestimable advantages of the perfect knowledge of our duty, the pardon of our sins, and all the blessings which religion bestows, through the channel of a Mediator between God and us? Our Saviour's taking upon himself certain sufferings, by which we are to gain great advantages, is by no means foreign to the common course of the world, in which we see very great hazards run, and actual inconve niences suffered by friends and relations for one another. He and his apostles allow of this analogy.

In the common course of things, thoughtlessness and folly, which though not innocent, are yet pitiable, are the causes of very terrible misfortunes; and are therefore in many cases provided for by the goodness of the wise Governor of the world, so that they do not always prove irretrievable. A thoughtless person by intemperance, runs himself into a quarrel, in which he is wounded. Without help, he must perish. And it is not to be expected that he should be miraculously recovered. Is it not the Divine goodness, which has furnished the materials necessary for his cure, made provision in the formation of the human body for the accidents it might be liable to, so that every hurt should not prove fatal to it; and engaged us to be kind and helpful to one another; so that we should be sure of comfort from one or other in our distress? In the same manner, and by the same goodness, exerted in a higher degree, revelation teaches us, a remedy is pro

vided for the recovery to the Divine mercy (in a consist› ency with the wisdom and rectitude of his moral govern ment) of a fallen, offending order of beings. In the case of the unfortunate person here exemplified, his being convinced of his folly; his being heartily concerned for it; and his resolving never more to be guilty of the like, is not sufficient for his recovery; any more than repentance and reformation alone could be supposed sufficient to put offenders on a footing with innocent beings.

Natural ends are produced by natural means: so are moral. Natural means are many of them slow, and seemingly unpromising, if experience did not show their fitness. It may therefore be concluded, and hoped, that the design of giving a revelation to mankind, however unpromising of extensive success, will eventually, and upon the whole, be gained, in such a measure as it may not be wholly defeated. Natural means come short, in some particular instances, of their direct and apparent ends; as in abor. tions of all kinds in the animal and vegetable worid. In the same manner it is to be feared, that all the moral means used by Divine goodness, for the reformation of mankind, and revelation among the rest, will, through their per. verseness, come greatly short of the direct end, the hap piness of the species; though it shall not be in the power of all created beings to prevent the secondary and more indirect intention of the Divine moral institutions.

Some opposers of revelation have run themselves into a great many difficulties, by forming to themselves a set of groundless and arbitrary notions of what a revelation from God ought absolutely to be, which not taking place according to their theory, they have concluded against the credibility of revelation; than which nothing can be im. agined more rash and unreasonable, to say the least. They have for example, laid it down for an infallible position, that a truly Divine revelation must contain all possible kinds and degrees of knowledge. But finding that the modern astronomy, and other sciences, have no place in scripture, or that the expressions in those ancient books do not always suit the true philosophy, they conclude that scripture is not given by inspiration. But when it is considered, that the design of revelation was not to make men philosophers, it may very well be supposed, that the spirit which con

ducted it did not see it necessary to inspire the sacred penmen with any knowledge not directly necessary for improv, ing men's hearts and lives. Finding some inconsiderable variations in the historical accounts, as of our Saviour's resurrection and other particulars, they conclude, that the narration is not authentic: for that inspiration must have prevented any such variation in the accounts of the differ ent writers. But it is to be remembered, that the mea sure of inspiration must be supposed to have been limited; that every single article and syllable was not necessary to be expressly inspired; that where the human faculties of the writers were in the main sufficient, it was not to be supposed inspiration should interpose; and that revelation was designed to be perfect (as all things which we have to do at present) only to a certain degree.

The want of universality is an objection of the same kind. But if the consideration of the true religion's not being communicated alike to all mankind, proves any thing against it, the same objection lies against reason. For it is given to men in such different measures, as almost to render it doubtful whether they ought not to be pronounced of different species. Nor is there any injustice in the different distribution of gifts and advantages; if we take in the due allowance made for those differences in the final judgment. If a Hottentot, be hereafter judged as a Hottentot, he ought as much to own the justice of his sentence, as a Newton, when judged as a philosopher.

Could we have formed any just notion what the measure of human reason, what the reach of human sagacity ought to have been? Whether it ought to shine forth in its great. est brightness at first, or to come to its maturity by slow degrees; whether it ought in its exertion to be wholly inde. pendent on the body, or if it should be liable to be disordered with the disorder of the corporeal frame; whether it ought to be always equal, or weak in youth and in extreme old age. Who would have thought the seemingly precarious faculty of invention, a proper method for improving arts and sciences! Who would have thought that writing and printing could ever have been made the means of carrying human knowledge to the height we know they have done? If we find that Divine wisdom can, by the most unpromising causes, produce the greatest effects,

and that hardly any thing is constituted in such a manner as human wisdom would beforehand have judged proper, why should we wonder if we cannot reconcile the scheme of Divine revelation to our arbitrary and fantastical views; which for any thing we know, may be immensely different from those of the Author of revelation?

With all our incapacity of judging beforehand what revelation ought to have been, it does not follow, that we may not be sufficiently qualified to judge of its evidence and excellence now it is delivered. And that is enough to determine us to what is right and safe for us, I mean, to pay it all due regard. For, in all cases, it is our wisdom to act upon the best probability we can obtain.

A supernatural scheme contrived by Divine wisdom, an express revelation from God, may well be expected to contain difficulties too great for human reason to investigate. The ordinary economy of nature and providence, is founded in, and conducted by a sagacity too deep for our penetration, much more the extraordinary parts, if such there are, of the Divine government. In the works of nature, it is easy for men to puzzle themselves and others with difficulties unsurmountable, as well as to find objections innumerable; to say, Why was such a crea ture or thing made so? Why was such another not made in such a particular manner? The ways of Providence are also too intricate and complex for our shallow understandings to trace out. The wisdom, which guides the moral, as well as that which framed the natural system, is Divine; and therefore too exquisite for our gross appre hensions. Even in human government, it is not to be expected, that every particular law or regulation should give satisfaction to every subject, or should be perfectly seen through by individuals at a distance from the seat of government which is often the cause, especially in free countries, of most unreasonable and ridiculous complaints against what is highly wise and conducive to the general advantage. But in inquiring into nature, providence, and revelation, one rule will effectually lead us to a proper determination, to wit, to judge by what we know, not by what we are ignorant of. If in the works and ways of God, in nature, providence, and revelation, where, comprehended by us, we find a profusion of wisdom and goodness exhibit

ed in the most perspicuous and striking manner; is any thing more reasonable than to conclude, that if we saw through the whole, we should perceive the same proprie ty in those parts which are intricate, as we now do in the clearest? And it has been the peculiar fate of revelation, much more than either of the other two, to be opposed on account of such difficulties in it, as arise from our weakness. Especially, it has very rarely happened, that the existence of God, and the doctrine of his being the Creator of the world, has been questioned merely on account of any difficulties in tracing out the wisdom of any part of the constitution of nature. And yet it would be as rational to argue, that there is no God, because the brutes have in some inferior respects the advantage of the lord of this lower world, as to question the truth of revealed religion, after examining its innumerable evidences, presumptive and positive, merely because we may think it strange, that the Saviour of the world shoud die the death of a criminal.

Here it is proper to enter an express caveat against whatever may pretend to the sacred character of a point of faith or religion, and on that pretence elude or baffle reason. There can nothing be imagined to be intended for the use and improvement of reasonable minds, which directly and explicitly contradicts reason. If reason and revelation be both the gifts of God, it is not to be expected that they should oppose one another; but that they should tally, as both coming from the same wise and good Author. . Whatever therefore is an express absurdity, or contradiction, we may be well assured can be no genuine doctrine of revealed religion, but a blundering invention of weak or designing men. It is one thing for a point of revealed religion to be, as to its modus, above our reach, and quite another matter, for a doctrine to be clearly contradictory to human understanding. That the direct connexion in the nature of things betwixt the death of Christ and the salvation of mankind, should be utterly inexplicable by human reason, is no more than what might have been expected, and, if unquestionably a doctrine of revealed religion, is to be received without hesitation upon the credit of the other parts which we understand more perfect. ly. But, that on a priest's muttering a few words over a wafer, it should immediately become a whole Christ, while