circumscribed in its extent. It has two limits a limit of place, and a limit of time. No individual can have any experience whatever, excepting where he is, and while he is. His experience, as to place, can reach no further than to the extent of his own personal presence, and the range of his bodily senses; he can have no experience beyond these:-and his experience as to time is necessarily limited to the very brief period during which he himself lives,-or rather during which he not merely lives, but is capable of intelligent observation. All else whatever that he believes-whether of existences, of facts, or of events, he believes, not on the ground of experience, but on that of testimony. He could have no experience of what was before his time; he can have none of what is beyond his observation. Whatever may be, or may have been, the experience of others,-to him it is not experience, but testimony; and cannot by possibility be anything else. Observe, then, further. From this it inevitably follows, that the experience of the present generation, or of any individual in it, can never go to disprove (directly I mean) what is alleged to have taken place, not during the present generation, or during the life-time of any individual belonging to it, but eighteen hundred years ago. It cannot even be said to be against it. It has not, in truth, and cannot have, anything whatever to do with it. That anything is not according to my experience now, can never be a proof of its not having been according to the experience of those who lived then. In this sense, then, the sense of each man's personal or individual experience, -the word is nothing to his purpose. What we learn of the past, we do not, and cannot, learn by experience; it comes to us entirely by testimony. Individual experience, then, being nothing to the purpose of his argument,-observe

2. If again by experience he means(and this he must mean, if he means anything worth meaning at all)—the universal experience of mankind, in all ages and in all nations; who is so blind as not to see, that to affirm anything to be contrary to experience in this sense is most palpably

to beg the question? It is impossible to imagine a petitio principii more direct and flagrant. For when divested of its philosophical garb of words, to what does this amount? Is it anything else whatever than a simple assertion, clothed in peculiar phraseology, that the things alleged did not take place? Analyze the expression, that a thing is contrary to the experience of all ages and of all nations;' and you will be satisfied, that it is no more-no more whatever-than a peculiar mode of saying that it never happened. It is a miracle,' says Mr. Hume, that a dead man should rise to life;-because that has never been observed in any age or country.' What is this, but simply denying the fact that a dead man ever was raised to life from the grave? The whole argument, therefore, so far as this assertion about universal experience is concerned, resolves itself, it appears, into nothing more than the philosopher's ipse dixit— his own affirmation-that no such thing as a miracle ever took place! But what experience had Mr. Hume of what had taken place in all ages and in all nations?

"3. We have seen how it is that we come to be acquainted with the experience of those who lived eighteen centuries ago, and in a distant part of the world. It is by testimony. It can be by nothing else. All the experience of others, whensoever or wheresoever they have lived and acted, is not experience to us:-it all resolves itself into testimony. What, then, follows? A very important sequence in this argument:—that to affirm all experience to be in contradiction of any particular class of facts, is the same thing as to affirm all TESTIMONY to be against those facts.

Now, in the present instance this is false;-and so thoroughly and notorioulsy false,—that we have testimony for them,- the recorded testimony of the only competent witnesses,-those who lived at the time when, and in the place where, the alleged facts are dated:-and we have no testimony against them. That is, we have experience, in the only form in which, from the nature of the thing, we possibly could have it,-in favour of the facts; and we have no recorded counter-experience in opposition to them.-Again

"4. How is it that the uniformity of the laws of nature and of the order of the material universe, is ascertained? How, but by testimony? There is no other way of ascertaining it possible: the testimony of men in different and distant nations, and in successive ages of the world. Mr. Hume, of course, ascribes it to experience

it is experience only which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature;'-but, then, how is this latter experience, in the needed extent, obtained, but by testimony?-To what, then, are we thus brought? Why, to these two conclusions:-In the first place,- -as indeed we have already seen,that Mr. Hume's uniform experience resolves itself into uniform testimony; and that when so taken, his assertion of uniformity is contrary to fact; inasmuch as the testimony, or, in other words, the recorded experience, is not uniform,there being testimony or recorded experience for the deviations from the laws of nature, as well as for the uniformity of those laws:-and what is more-secondly, that Mr. Hume's own belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature rests after all, on the very same description of evidence with that which he rejects when it comes to be in support of the deviations from that uniformity. He disowns everything miraculous, on the ground that nature is uniform, and human testimony uncertain and fallacious:-and yet, it is only by this same uncertain and fallacious testimony that his faith in the uniformity of nature is determined. The evidence of the ground on which he rejects miracles, it thus turns out, is the very same in kind with that on which others believe in them. He laughs at such believers for attaching credit to miracles on the ground of human testimony in opposition to the uniformity of the laws of nature; and yet it is on human testimony, necessarily and solely, that his own faith in this very uniformity of the laws of nature is founded."-pp. 111-117.

We regret exceedingly that we cannot make room for the whole of the author's reply to Hume, which extends over twelve pages more; and which is one of

the acutest pieces of reasoning we ever met with, not excepting the best portions of Butler's Analogy. We shall, in our Essay department, furnish extracts to show how successfully Dr. Wardlaw has dealt with the views of miracles entertained by German Rationalists, Mythists, and Spiritualists; and how powerfully he has drawn the line of demarcation between the real miracles of the Bible, and "the lying wonders" of Rome.

We have always been of opinion that one sterling work, on a given subject, is worth a dozen of second or third rate quality. On this principle, we strenuously recommend our readers to lay hold, as soon as possible, of this treatise on miracles, and to read it with care; and we promise them an acquaintance with the errors of the day, and a means of combating them, such as they will find it difficult to command in the wide range of our theological literature.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN EXHIBITED. By DR. JULIUS MÜLLER, Ordinary Professor of Theology in the University of Halle, Wittenberg. Translated from the Original German of the Third improved and enlarged Edition by WILLIAM PULSFORD. Vol. I.

Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1851. OUR philosophical and theological importations from Germany have, within the last few years, been very numerous. Some have been of the worst possible description, distinguished indeed by talent and erudition, but imbued with the most malignant spirit of irreligion and impiety; others have been indifferent, as they were rendered innocuous by their cloudiness and total want of adaptation to the English mind; and a few have been valuable accessions, inasmuch as they have thrown light on some of the "deep things" of philosophy and religion, and have materially aided in developing and applying the principles of Hermeneutics and Biblical Criticism. To the last small but important class of works, must be added that of Dr. Müller now before us. Judging, indeed, from the part of this work already presented to English readersfor we have had no opportunity of seeing

the original-we cannot but regard it as one of the most learned, profound, and luminous treatises ever produced on "the origin of evil”—that dark problem which has perplexed all earnest minds, and still continues to throw a mysterious shadow around "the ways of God to men." The book, it is true, is thoroughly German in its style, its reasonings, and modes of investigation, and therefore, to readers not familiarized with the questions at issue, among the various schools of philosophy in Germany, during the last twenty or thirty years, and having but little acquaintance with the nomenclature employed in philosophical discussion, it may appear occasionally misty or obscure, and possibly may repel them. But to those who will give themselves heartily to the perusal of the work, and will seek the qualifications necessary to do it with intelligence, it cannot fail to prove a mine of purest gold, a fountain of living waters.

Dr. Müller, although but little known in this country, occupies one of the highest places in Germany as a scholar, a theologian, and a profound thinker. He studied at Berlin, where his mind was imbued with the purest and loftiest principles by the pious and accomplished Neander, whilst it was stimulated and thrown back on the verities of inspiration by the doubtful theology of Schleiermacher and the pantheistic philosophy of Hegel. He has occupied various positions both as preacher and professor, and is now associated with Tholuck in the University of Halle, which he adorns with his character as a Christian, and his ability as an intrepid and original thinker. Considering then the earnestness, the piety, the scholarship, and the high intellect by which Dr. Müller is distinguished, we are thankful that he has directed his attention to the profoundly interesting subject discussed in this treatise; and we cannot but feel that Mr. Pulsford has rendered important service to English readers by putting this great work within their reach. A few more such works imported from Germany will serve to redeem it, in the estimation of all sound English thinkers, from the

shame and dishonour cast upon it by the impious speculations of many of its divines and philosophers, and to restore it to that high place in evangelical Christendom which belongs to it as the birthplace of the Reformation, and the home of Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin.

The volume now before us is but a part of the work, and therefore we are incompetent to pronounce upon it as a whole; we cannot doubt, however, that the profound and solemn questions which must have engaged the attention and taxed the deepest thoughts of Dr. Müller in the concluding portion of his treatise, have been treated in a manner worthy of himself, and with a power equal to that distinguishing this volume. Our readers who take an interest in the discussion of the dark and mysterious question of “sin,” either on theological or philosophical grounds, will undoubtedly await with anxiety the appearance of the second part of this work, after they have read the first. We are inclined to think, indeed, that Mr. Pulsford would have acted with greater wisdom, both in reference to the subject of the treatise, the reputation of the author, and the benefit of readers, had he published the whole at once. We trust, then, that the second part will be presented to English readers with as little delay as possible.

This volume, which we imagine is just one-half of the work, consists of an Introduction, and Two Books. The Introduction, which is perhaps as clear as the nature of the subject would admit, sets forth the method of investigation pursued, defines speculation as distinct from reflection, and controverts certain opinions propounded by Rothe in an ethical work recently published by him. The First Book, entitled "The Reality of Sin," is a comprehensive and masterly investigation of the Nature and Guilt of Sin. Under the first of these two heads, Dr. Müller, with a force of reasoning and a ripeness of scholarship which we have rarely seen matched, exhibits sin as Transgression of the Law, as Disobedience against God, and as Selfishness; and under the second, whilst he protests against the philosophy that would resolve good and

excite the scorn of all candid and earnest minds. This theory, then, must be re

This theory, it will be obvious, by what ever great names it may have been advocated, and with whatever doctrines it may be associated, involves a denial of responsibility, and forbids the infliction of punishment; and, moreover, not only charges God as the author of sin, but gives to moral evil an extent and perpetuity commensurate with the existence of the universe. And hence, as it draws after it such consequences, and thus involves the moral government of God in deeper mysteriousness or positive dishonour, it cannot be accepted as a solution of the dark problem of evil.

The next theory which Dr. Müller brings under review is, that of sensationalism, which seeks for an explanation of the existence of evil in the impulses, or insubordination of the animal nature. This theory, although it sometimes attempts to fortify itself by a reference to the language of Scripture, and especially to St. Paul's employment of the term σàpέ, flesh, is that which is commonly adopted by irreligious men, and is especially patronized and lauded by those who seek to extenuate the evil of sin, and silence the remonstrances of conscience by pleading the weakness and infirmity of our nature. The parties, indeed, by whom this theory has been adopted, and its practical results in all ages, have been sufficient to expose it, not only to suspicion, but to positive condemnation. For, whilst deists and rationalists have been its zealous defenders, it has been found in all ages fostering, on the one hand, the spirit of Pharisaism, and on the other, that of Asceticism. But had we no practical reasons for rejecting this theory as a solution of the great mystery of evil, it is found, as Dr. Müller admirably shows, to be altogether inadequate as an explanation of the existence and varied developments of sin. It furnishes no satisfactory elucidation of the origin of those sins which are immediately connected with sense, and of those peculiarly and especially belonging to the spirit it attempts none, or attempts it in a way that must

tion of the problem of evil by an assumption which involves an impeachment of the wisdom and rectitude of God. It has all the viciousness of reasoning in a circle, and leaving the mystery just where it found it.

ness.

In an appendix to his chapter on Sensationalism, and in the succeeding chapter, Dr. Müller examines the opinions of Kant and Schleiermacher in reference to the origin and existence of evil. He shows that the views of Kant have an apparent identity with the sensuous theory, that they are contradictory, and highly mystical; but that, in reality, his doctrine of the freedom of the will forbids his being classed with Sensationalists. Still, whatever may have been the views of Kant, and by whatever amount of thought and earnestness they are characterized, he evidently left the great question of the origin of evil where he found it, or, perhaps, involved it in additional mysteriousSchleiermacher's views are shown to be little better than another form of Sensationalism running out into privation or imperfection. According to his theory, indeed, sin is nothing but a subjective illusion-guilt is an airy nothing which vanishes before the light of knowledgeconscience is a phantom of the night which melts away beneath the influence of speculation-universal restoration becomes necessary, in order to vindicate the Divine government from the most monstrous form of injustice-and the very idea of redemption is but an impertinence, or a dream. Happily the system of Schleiermacher, which furnishes no explanation of the origin of evil, and is so utterly subversive of the fundamental verities of Christianity, has, in a great measure, lost its hold on the German mind, although not a few in this country, who seem ambitious of gathering up the fragments of what has fallen to pieces among our Teutonic neighbours, and presenting it to Englishmen as something singularly original and felicitous, are still labouring to introduce among us the mischievous doctrines of this philo