The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... show that, in particular, the specificity variable is a significant determinant of the integration decision. Masten (1984) finds analogous results for aerospace manufacturers. In a similar spirit, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) study ...
... Show that if β and/or e were observable by the principal, the optimal contract would yield w = ̄w and e = e∗ for all β, and that the expected cost of the project is ̄w + Eβ − e∗. (ii) Under asymmetric information, show that the ...
... Show that a social planner (or a competitive industry) would yield a total welfare of Wc = c1−ε/(ε− 1). (ii) Compute the welfare loss, WL, under monopoly. (iii) Show that the ratio WL/Wc (relative dead-weight loss) increases with ε ...
... Show that at each instant the monopolist sets marginal revenue equal to the average (discounted) unit cost in the future: A(t) = ∫ ∞t c(ω(s))re−r(s−t)ds. Hint: Consider the current cost and the future savings from changing q(t) ...
... show that nonconcavities or discontinuities in the profit function may prevent the monopolist from learning his true ... shows that the monopolist will eventually reach a local maximum of the profit function. To reach a global maximum ...