The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... Suppose that the cost c is known to both parties, that the value v is known to the buyer only, and that the supplier's beliefs about v are represented by a cumulative probability distribution F(v) with density f(v) > 0 on an interval [v ...
... Suppose that ex post the parties' bargaining leads to the Nash solution31: They split evenly any gain from trade. Thus, if c = 0, the gains from trade are 3 and the price at which they trade is 1.5 (so that each party's surplus is 1.5) ...
... suppose that specific investments are observable by the two parties, but not verifiable. By this is usually meant that, although each party can observe the other party's amount of specific investment before trading, this investment is ...
... suppose that v and c are random from a first-period viewpoint (with the possibility that v<c) but become common knowledge between the two parties at the beginning of the second period. Suppose further that only one party—the supplier ...
... Suppose that there is no contract and the two parties bargain ex post according to the Nash bargaining solution. Is the investment optimal? Point out the externality. (iii) Suppose that the parties sign a contract specifying that the ...