The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... allows the student to become familiar with some key topics in IO without getting swamped by the simultaneous introduction of game theory. It also yields a clearer separation of those aspects that are specific to strategic behavior. I ...
... allow partial-equilibrium analysis. It should also allow a single description of the main interactions among firms. It is also important to realize that the “right” definition of a market depends on the use to which it will be put. For ...
... allows suppliers to circumvent the law by generating internal—and consequently unobservable—transactions. There are other legal reasons that may lead vertically related firms to integrate. One is the existence of a sales tax. The ...
... allows the production of q units of output. For simplicity, assume that the cost function is twice differentiable, except possibly at zero output: C(q) = ⎛ ⎨ F+ ∫ q C(x)dx for q > 0 ⎝ 0 0 otherwise where F ⩾ 0 denotes a fixed ...
... will not invest in learning firm-specific skills if he has no guarantee that the firm will not exploit his captive position later on, and so forth. This simple model also allows us to see the effect 64 THE THEORY OF THE FIRM.