The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
من داخل الكتاب
النتائج 1-5 من 77
... choices of price and quality, the spectrum of goods, advertising, and the distribution structure. Most of the conclusions obtained there carry over to oligopolies. Part II analyzes the choice of price, capacity, product positioning ...
... better bargaining position. The supplier's intertemporal payoff is now v − 1 2[c(I) +c(λI)] − I. The ex ante choice of investment yields −[c (I) + λc(λI)] = 2. When λ = 1 (no asset specificity), p = v 1. WHAT IS A FIRM? 65.
... choice of investment for the buyer is given by max x ( xv +(1−x) ) , 2c−x22 which yields xBC = v − c/2 > x∗ and WBC = 12(v − c/2)(v − 3c/2). The striking result here is that the buyer now overinvests. This is due to the fact that ...
... choice of effort, although in the current model it could occur and be observed by the agent between the signature of the contract and the choice of effort without any change in the argument.) If the shareholders can observe effort, the ...
... choice of q does not change the managerial-control problem (recall that ̃c is a sufficient statistic), the shareholders (or the manager) might as well pick q so as to maximize P(q)q − (E ̃c)q. Hence, for an outside observer, the firm's ...