The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... contract with a new supplier on time. This absence of ex post competition raises the possibility of “hold-up” or “opportunism” (the confiscation of the gains associated with one party's investment by the other party). A long-term contract ...
... contracts are rather different “governance modes.” It looks at the firm as a particular way of specifying what is to be done in the event of contingencies not foreseen in a contract. It starts from the idea that contracts are ...
... contract in which they agree to share the services of repairmen, or an independent repair firm could be established that would supply the services to the units. Second, we should not take it for granted that average-cost curves rise at ...
Jean Tirole. contract. We now study the new problems associated with long-run relationships—in particular, why the rules that govern trade tomorrow ought to be determined today whenever this is feasible.19 For simplicity, this discussion ...
... contract now know that later on there will be gains from trade between them to be exploited. It is important that these gains from trade be exploited correctly (i.e., that there be an efficient amount of trade ex post) and that they be ...