The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... Fixed Costs: Natural Monopoly and Contestability . . . . . . . . 771 8.1.1 Fixed Costs versus Sunk Costs . . . . CONTENTS xiii.
... fixed costs associated with these services, or at least it reduces these costs on the average. Demand complementarities may also be a motive for coordinating activities.11 The late nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of large ...
... fixed cost F, and then has a constant marginal cost. Average costs are everywhere declining (except at zero production), although at a vanishing rate. Figure 2b shows a U-shaped average-cost curve. The average cost declines until it ...
... fix the price is efficient. Such rights are somewhat similar to a sequential authority relationship (see subsection ... fixed-price contract. For instance, if c is common knowledge at the contracting date, the contract can be written in ...
... fixed, and the principal does not have an incentive to misrepresent the individual performances.69 Conversely, if the agents all exert effort, they know that x percent of them will yield profit Π2 (by the law of large numbers) and will ...