The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... positive (explanatory) analysis, to the detriment of normative (welfare) analysis, and it has done too little to help practitioners distinguish between competing theories. But it definitely has practical content. Furthermore, the ...
... positive for an inferior good (and is equal to zero in the case of quasi-linear utility functions). It stems from the fact that a unit increase in ph costs the consumer Dh units of income, which affects the demand for good h by ∂Dh/∂I ...
... positive; on the other hand, our conclusions would be even stronger if he did not impose the improvement.) If the value is v, the status quo is efficient and no bargaining occurs. The buyer gets v by imposing the improvement. If the ...
... positive. The second term, which is equal to the covariance of u and ε (recall that Eε = 0), is non-negative, so equation 7 cannot hold. The reason the covariance is non-negative is that for b ⩽ 0 the manager's income is nonincreasing ...
... positive parameter; mathematically, λ⩽ Φ(e) for all e. The manager is infinitely risk-averse over the states of nature β, so he is only interested in his utility in the worst state of nature: minβ U(w, e). The manager learns β after ...