The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... possibility sets. A paradigm of market organization is then added. All agents are price takers. The consumers ... possibilities, giving rise to supply functions (or correspondences). A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices, with ...
... possibility of “hold-up” or “opportunism” (the confiscation of the gains associated with one party's investment by the other party). A long-term contract must ex post guarantee the parties a fair return in order to ex ante THE THEORY OF ...
... possibility of arbitrage among the retailers serving these markets. To avoid arbitrage, the manufacturer may integrate into distribution and serve the low-price market himself. A similar phenomenon, but one induced by the law rather ...
... possibilities. The first is that the two concerned parties resort to a third party. This third party is supposed to ... possibility gives one of the two concerned parties, rather than a third party, the right to determine what happens ...
... possibility that the principal can observe the agent's performance but cannot verify his observations (i.e., cannot supply sufficient evidence) to a court. Because performance cannot be verified by a court, contracts that are contingent ...