The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... reduces these costs on the average. Demand complementarities may also be a motive for coordinating activities.11 The late nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of large, multifunctional firms, which were organized in a unitary (U) ...
... reduces c) and a buyer invests in value enhancement (his investment increases v). These investments are specific in that they would not reduce cost or increase value if the parties were to trade with other parties. Bargaining Let us, as ...
... reduces his production cost. Assume instead that the ex ante investment affects the quality of the product and thus the value to the buyer. The buyer's ex post value is v(I)=3I − 12 I2. Hence, the buyer's surplus in case of trade is v ...
... reduce w1, say, and keep this constraint satisfied; if the decrease in w1 is not too large, the participation constraint is still satisfied.) Thus, in this simple case, the optimal wage structure, given that the high effort is to be ...
... reduce the wage w1 a bit; this would not impair incentives and would still induce the manager to participate. In some circumstances, however, reducing the wage may not be possible. Suppose that, because of limited liability and laws ...