The Theory of Industrial OrganizationMIT Press, 26/08/1988 - 496 من الصفحات The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In Part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In Part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Important Notice: The digital edition of this book is missing some of the images found in the physical edition. |
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... yields market performance (efficiency, ratio of price to marginal cost, product variety, innovation rate, profits, and distribution). This paradigm, although plausible, often rested on loose theories, and it emphasized empirical studies ...
... yields a clearer separation of those aspects that are specific to strategic behavior. I have included a “user's manual” on noncooperative game theory (chapter 11) to help the reader prepare for part II. It is not meant to be a ...
... yields p>c instead. The reason for this inefficiency is as follows: Charging a price equal to cost yields no profit to the supplier; raising the price above cost yields a profit with some probability; the forgone volume of trade ...
... yields only 50 cents to the supplier. The other 50 cents are held up by the buyer. The privately optimal investment is −c(I) = 2. In contrast, the socially optimal investment solves maxI[v − c(I) − I], so −c (I) = 1. Because c is ...
... yields xBC = v − c/2 > x∗ and WBC = 12(v − c/2)(v − 3c/2). The striking result here is that the buyer now overinvests. This is due to the fact that his authority will allow him not to pay the production c if his value is v. Because ...